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ABSTRACT
The tradition of liberalism in South Africa has played a significant role in shaping
the country's multi-party democracy. Yet, there are several gaps within the
tradition of liberalism which can be associated with an aversion towards majority
rule, equalising opportunities through affirmative action measures, and a focus
on securing political rights as opposed to substantive rights for all citizens. It is
my contention that weaknesses within the liberal tradition could be minimised if a
more credible conception of liberalism is constructed within the parameters of a
deliberative framework of democracy.
In this dissertation I make an argument for a defensible form of liberalism which
can be achieved through a rational, reflexive discourse-oriented procedure of
deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy in turn can engender a form of
citizenship which recognises the need for citizens to care, reason and engage
justly in political conversation with others.
KEYWORDS: Liberalism, communitarianism, deliberative democracy and South
Africa.
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ABSTRAK
Die tradisie van liberalisme in Suid-Afrika het 'n noemenswaardige bydrae
gelewer tot die totstandkoming van die land se veelparty demokratiese bestel.
Afgesien hiervan, verskyn daar vele gapings binne die liberale tradisie wat
hoogstens vereenselwig kan word met 'n teenkanting teen
meerderheidsregering, skepping van gelyke geleenthede deur regstellende
aksies en 'n fokus eerder om politieke regte liewer as ook substantiewe regte vir
alle burgers te bekom. Ek redeneer dat tekortkominge binne die liberale tradisie
geminimaliseer kan word indien 'n meer vededigbare begrip van liberalisme
gekonstrueer word binne die perke van 'n beredeneerde demokratiese
raamwerk.
Ek voer aan dat 'n verdedigbare vorm van liberalisme bewerkstellig kan word
deur 'n rasionele, refleksiewe diskoersgeoriënteerde prosedure van
beredeneerde demokrasie. Op die beurt kan beredeneerde demokrasie 'n vorm
van burgerskap teweegbring wat die belangrikheid van omgee en redenering
erken, en ook terselfdertyd burgers betrek op 'n geregverdige wyse in
gesprekvoeing met ander persone.
SLEUTELWOORDE: Liberalisme, gemeenskapsgerigte liberalisme,
beredeneerde demokrasie en Suid-Afrika.
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·.. For philosophy reflects and articulates the political culture of its time,
and politics represents and enacts the arguments of philosophy
(Walzer, 1986: 136).
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND DESIGN
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FOCUS
The South African political scene has certainly undergone major conceptual
and structural changes ever since the demise of apartheid politics. Since April
1994 political transformation in South Africa from apartheid rule to a liberal
democracy witnessed a complete overhaul of the past racially based political
order. A remarkable series of events followed the establishment of the
country's liberal democratic system, none so compelling as the proceedings of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).1 South Africa, since the
findings of the TRC, is a country desperately in need of nation building and
reconciliation after decades of racism, discrimination against the majority of its
citizens, and at times, inhumanity towards the disenfranchised majority.
As could be expected, the political road towards freedom and the
establishment of a sense of community in South Africa after decades of
apartheid, would not be plain sailing and without any serious political
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2impediments. The state, in particular, faces serious challenges in its quest to
consolidate South Africa's newly found democracy. Many liberals who believe
in the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement
of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism, non-sexism, supremacy of the
rule of law, universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government with the aim to
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness, would certainly
consider the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 as an "ironic
victory" (Welsh, 1998). This is so for the reason that liberalism has never been
a major political power in the history of the country, in the sense of having
been the dominant political voice of the ruling party. Yet, the legacy of the
liberal tradition throughout South Africa's turbulent political history has in
many ways influenced the politics of oppositional groups such as the Liberal
Party in the 1950s, which later became the Progressive Federal Party, and is
today allegedly represented by the Democratic Party (currently part of the
Democratic Alliance). Liberalism has for quite long been associated with
opposition to apartheid politics, in particular racial discrimination, unjust laws
and abusive administration within and beyond the parliamentary structures of
the South African political sphere. Undoubtedly liberalism has been a
vanguard for many of the oppressed groups among the majority Blacks,
Coloureds and Indians in South Africa for many decades (Butler, Elphick &
Welsh, 1987).
1 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is an independent commission initiated by
government to conduct an investigation into the crimes of the apartheid years without
interference from political organisations and parties.
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3Yet, the liberal tradition in South Africa has not been without contradictions
and anomalies, in particular where it concerns the freedom, equality and rights
of the majority politically and socio-economically disadvantaged groups. In
other words, liberalism as it played itself out on the South African political
scene also had its shortcomings and ambiguities, despite having been a
champion against the politics of racial discrimination and socio-economic
injustice. For instance, for most liberals the Constitution guarantees the rights
of all South Africans to housing, health care, education, and so on. Yet, not all
South African citizens are in a fact in a position to exercise such rights due to
perhaps poverty and other constraining conditions such as not being able to
travel or afford to pay for public transport to the nearest clinic or school. In
other words, being afforded rights is not the same as being able to exercise
such rights. In this way, the liberal argument for the procurement of rights
without also taking into account conditions which have to prevail in order to
exercise such rights, seems inadequate." In short, there are several gaps or
inadequacies (weaknesses) within the liberal tradition in South Africa.
Therefore, with reference to South Africa's liberal thinkers' views on
community and democracy, I shall attempt to identify some of the gaps within
the liberal tradition and then try to construct a more credible notion of the
concept which can hopefully lead to more freedom, rights and better equality
for all South Africans.
2 Of course my potential critic might claim that the gaps I have identified in the South African
liberal tradition can be attributed to an insufficient realisation of the requirements of liberal
theory in political discourse. But then, such a claim is grounded in an understanding that a
particular theory has some universal grounding unrelated to the context in which it becomes
manifest. Instead, my contention is that theories are inextricably linked to the practices in
which they are realised. Theories are not unsituated. Moreover, if the argument were to hold
that South African liberalism failed to realise some of the major tenets of liberal theory in
political discourse, then the presence of gaps seems to be more justified in the sense that
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4The question arises: What are some of the gaps which can be associated with
the liberal tradition in South Africa? In my reading of the liberal tradition in
South Africa I have identified three distinct weaknesses: the curbing of
majoritarianism in order to procure minority freedoms; equalising opportunities
through affirmative action and providing procedural rights without also
substantive rights to the disadvantaged (Butler, Elphick & Welsh, 1987).
Before I briefly expound on these gaps, I first need to frame my identification
of these gaps in relation to the assumption of South African liberalism that
politics should be treated independently from the economy. The ideology of
the free market which emerged as a response to the apartheid ideology in the
early 1980s, called for the progressive removal of the state's role in the
economy and replacing it with the sovereignty of the neo-liberal free-market
ideology. This idea of separating politics from the economy was based on the
liberal view that Blacks would shortly with their then growing politicization
demand massive state intervention such as that perpetrated by Afrikaner
Whites (Yudelman, 1987: 255). Consequently, this liberal influence in South
African politics resulted in entrenching the exclusion of the majority of the
disadvantaged masses and socio-economic inequality. To my mind the
aversion many liberals have for straightforward majoritarianism, the favouring
of affirmative action as an equalisation mechanism, and the presumed trade-
off between procedural and substantive rights are inextricably related to the
separation liberals make between politics (state) and economics (capital) - an
understanding which aims to preserve White privilege and thus entrenching
liberalism in South Africa departs from accepted norms of liberal theory, hence, the presence
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5socio-economic inequality. My contention is that if these gaps can be
overcome, the possibility exists for deliberative democracy to reduce the
divide liberals make between state and capital.
Firstly, as I shall show in chapter 3, liberalism in its South African guise seems
to view political decision making by majority rule as a threat to minority
freedoms, in the sense that the tyranny of the majority might undermine and
exclude the political voices of minority groups from among Whites, Coloureds
and Indians. In my view, majority rule does not have to be considered as
threatening to minority freedoms if it is used only as a temporary (last-ditch)
procedure to avoid any kind of political deadlock among contending political
groups whether minorities or majorities which might occur. I would certainly
question any form of unbridled majority rule which sets limits on what the
minority might do which seems to be the case with South African liberal
thought as I shall show in chapter 3. Consequently, it seems that liberalism
has a justifiable case to be concerned about majority rule. But then, majority
rule does not have to be seen strictly in terms of absolute or strict
majoritarianism whereby decisions of political groups with a superior
numerical advantage also seem to gain preference over potential
marginalised minorities. It is this position of absolute majoritarianism that I
wish to explore and challenge in this dissertation, particularly addressing the
liberal concern that majority rule could undermine minority freedoms.
of gaps.
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6Secondly, as I shall show in chapter 3, liberalism seems to relate equality of
opportunity to affirmative action measures for the disadvantaged majority. In
the first place, equalising opportunities are necessary to ensure that all
citizens, particularly the previously disadvantaged majority have a right to
basic civil liberties such as health care, education, housing and employment.
But then, using only racially based affirmative action efforts to redress the
political and socio-economic disadvantages of the majority of South Africa's
population could reinforce negative stereotypes, racial tension, and a
stigmatisation which thwarts the efforts of members of the preferred groups to
pursue their goals on merit and hard work rather than preferential treatment
(Japhta, 1998). My contention is that affirmative action (as liberals argue) is
necessary but should not be considered as the most important measure to
redress socio-economic imbalances created by the apartheid past. It is this
weakness within the South African liberal tradition I wish to analyse and
explore in this dissertation.
Thirdly, as I shall show in chapter 3, liberals were intent to secure procedural
rights for all South Africans, particularly the disenfranchised masses during
the height of apartheid rule. Thus, it was a major concern for liberals that all
Blacks, for instance, had to have a right to education. However, securing a
procedural right for Blacks not to be denied formal access to education did not
mean that such a right was in fact substantive. Although Blacks had a political
right to education which could be defended legally in a court of law, such a
right was not substantive enough since education for different race groups
was in fact unequal. In this way, the liberal position does seem impoverished,
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7that is, having secured procedural rights for people did not mean that they
actually enjoyed or exercised substantive rights. It is this gap between
procedural rights and substantive rights within the South African liberal
tradition I wish to explore in this dissertation.
In essence, the main argument of this dissertation is threefold: (1) majority
rule does not have to be viewed as threatening as liberals suggest; (2)
equality of opportunity should not just be confined to affirmative action
measures but needs to be extended to the notion of "allowable differences";
and (3) procedural rights should not be pursued independent from substantive
rights in order to secure political freedom and socio-economic justice for all
South African citizens, particularly the least advantaged.
These arguments are also located within the following understandings related
to the unfolding of the liberal tradition in South Africa: (1) the dominant political
party is often accused of using neo-liberal principles in effecting political
discourse; (2) the Constitution and Bill of Rights are dominated by liberal
values; (3) the political views of the current oppositional party are highly
liberal; and (4) the emphasis the ruling African National Party places on
procuring individual and socio-economic rights for the majority of the
disadvantaged people.
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1.2 SCOPE OF STUDY
The final Constitution of 1996 and its Bill of Rights provides a political
framework for securing the rights of individuals in relation to the rule of law,
electoral participation, freedom of expression and association, proportional
representation, self-determination and citizenship - all those characteristics
associated with the intellectual roots of liberalism. Coupled with such
characteristic features of liberalism, the Constitution also advocates socio-
economic justice, political emancipation, nation building, participation, thus
invoking a sense of community (Sections 3, 7 & 31). It is certainly beyond the
scope of this dissertation to interpret the Constitution as well as providing a
political analysis and synthesis of constitutional matters, for the reason that
such analyses require rigorous interpretations of legal, technical and political
judgments of those involved with constitutional discourse. My concern is to
analyse and explore the self-understandings of South African philosophical
liberalism, in particular how it frames notions of community and democracy
vis-a-vis South African political discourse.
As I mentioned before, this dissertation aims to investigate (analytically I might
add) some of the weaknesses within South African liberalism by focusing on
essential moments within the history of the tradition. However, any analytical
exploration of our liberal tradition cannot ignore the intellectual roots of
philosophical liberalism. My own reading of the intellectual heritage of
liberalism with reference to the works of J. S. Mill (1968,1982), Rawls (1971,
1993) Sandel (1982, 1998), Raz (1986, 1989), Walzer (1983, 1986, 1990),
8
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9Taylor (1985, 1989, 1991) and Kymlicka (2002) is that liberals seemed to
have reconciled notions of individuality with that of community. On the one
hand, it seems as if liberal thinkers rejected the atomistic picture of
individuals, that is, individuals as self-absorbed persons only concerned about
their own self-interests and preferences. On the other hand, liberal thinkers
seem to support the view that social life is a co-operative and mutually
enriching venture. Mill (1968) certainly initiated the first move by
reconstructing the liberal individual beyond the being concerned with self-
interest to one that is potentially self-transforming. But whether he fully located
the individual within the realm of social relations is an issue worth exploring.
Rawls (1993) never held the view that individuals are "socially unsituated". He
values community especially where it serves as "a fair scheme of mutual
cooperation between free and equal (individual) citizens" (Rawls, 1993). The
point I am making, is that it does seem from my tentative gleanings of the
literature that philosophical liberalism reconciled individuality with a sense of
community, that is, the interdependence of individuals and society. In this
way, the liberal-communitarian debate seems to be misconceived. Why is this
so? In the first place, an explanation of liberalism cannot be restricted to a
simple, universal definition. Liberalism, like any other concept has been
shaped by the political, social and historical context of its time. Thus to
assume that liberalism can have a single definitive meaning would be to
ignore the varying contexts which have given rise to the formation of the
concept. Consequently, in this dissertation I explore trends of liberalism which
would give the concept distinct meanings as opposed to one absolutely
defined meaning. It is my contention that utilitarianism, political equality and
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communitarianism are three trends of liberalism which guide meanings of the
concept. This implies that utilitarianism, political equality and
communitarianism offer distinct ways of understanding the roles of the
individual and community in particular socio-political contexts. Therefore, to
consider liberalism as the antithesis of communitarianism does seem to be a
gross oversimplification.
Moreover, this dissertation also challenges the classical understanding of
liberalism being associated exclusively with the procurement of individual
freedom or rights as against the rights and freedoms of a community. I agree
with Sandel (1982) that classical liberalism misconstrues the relationship
between the self and its social roles and relationships, that is, classical liberals
exaggerate individuals' capacity to distance themselves from social
relationships, and hence exaggerate their capacity for individual choice. If this
were to be the case as many classical explanations (definitions) of liberalism
suggest, then it means that liberalism does not accentuate the rights of
community. However, whether an individual can in fact function atomistically
without relating to other individuals is an understanding which I find difficult to
accept. Surely the decision of an individual voter who might think that she
atomistically makes up her own mind to vote for a political party in some way
effects the outcome of voting and hence, the political decisions which are
going to be binding on other individuals. In this way, an individual does not
really function in isolation from others. A parent does influence her child.
Likewise, a teacher does make an impression or not on her student. The point
is that individuals do not simply function in an "unsituated" or unrelated way.
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They are socially connected in some way or the other. Here I agree with
Taylor (1985) when he claims that classical liberals ignore the fact that
individuals' capacity can only be developed and exercised in a certain kind of
social, political and cultural context. Consequently, I disagree with
explanations of liberalism, as I shall show in chapter 2 with reference to the
ideas of liberal thinkers, which accentuate the role of the individual as
separate from that of a form of community. Kymlicka (1989: 2) cogently posits:
(Many) liberals, in a misguided attempt to promote the dignity and
autonomy of the individual, have undermined the very communities and
associations which alone can nurture human flourishing and freedom.
Any theory which hopes to respect these facts about the way in which
we are socially constructed and culturally situated will have to abandon
'atomistic' and 'individualistic' premises and principles of liberal
theories of justice.
To my mind, the ongoing debates concerning liberalism's focus on
individuality and a sense of community should also have impacted on the
liberal tradition as it unfolded in South Africa's political history. Any history that
involves struggles for political freedom, human rights, equality and socio-
economic justice (such as that associated with our country) has to be viewed
consistently with the debates of philosophical liberalism. The emphasis of the
Constitution on securing rights for persons and communities and socio-
economic justice, shows how much South African political legislators locate
liberal thought within the conceptual parameters of concepts associated with
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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the intellectual heritage of liberalism itself. It is my contention that South
Africa's liberal tradition endorsed and reconstructed many of the concepts
associated with past and contemporary philosophical liberalism. The extent to
which our liberal tradition has adopted, adapted and reconstructed notions of
individuality and community vis-a-vis the South African political set up is a
task worthwhile exploring. Thus, with reference to two significant works, Ironic
Victory: Liberalism in Post-liberation South Africa and Democratic Liberalism
in South Africa: Its History and Prospect and other South African liberal views,
I shall explore some of the gaps within the liberalism tradition with the aim to
construct a credible notion of liberalism - one attuned to the notion of
deliberative democracy.
1.3 GOALS AND THEORETICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE
The primary goal of this dissertation is to construct a defensible form of South
African liberalism commensurate with the idea of a deliberative democracy. In
this way, I hope to minimise some of the conceptual inadequacies (gaps)
associated with the South African liberal tradition. In order to achieve this
goal, my procedure is four-fold: Firstly, I shall discuss and evaluate at a
philosophical-conceptual level two opposing philosophical conceptions of
community and democracy in South Africa: a liberal versus a communitarian
one. Why? My contention is that specific variants of community and
democracy unfold in essential moments of the liberal tradition which impact on
the way South African liberal thinkers frame their understandings of the kind of
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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political road the country needs to chart out in its quest to consolidate its multi-
party democratic system of government.
Secondly, I shall specifically focus on an exposition of liberalism as a
philosophical tradition in South Africa with the aim to find out how liberal
thinkers deal with issues of community and democracy. My main contention,
as I shall show, is that there are distinct gaps in South African literature on
liberalism which could be bridged by reconstructing a defensible liberal
conception of community and democracy.
Thirdly, I shall subject a reconstructed and defensible liberal conception of
community and democracy to a deliberative democratic critique in order to
show how conceptual weaknesses in the liberal understanding of community
and democracy could be overcome. A deliberative democratic discourse, as I
shall argue for, encourages "the mutual openness and accountability of
different groups to each other's perspectives, each of which is committed to
thinking from the standpoint of everyone else" (Bohman & Rehg, 1997: xxv).
Put simply, a deliberative democratic discourse recognises that the flourishing
of each citizen is dependent upon the flourishing of other citizens, whether
politically and socio-economically disadvantaged or not, and which is fully
compatible with the views of influential theorists such as Habermas (1996a),
Benhabib (1996), Bohman (1996), Rawls (1997), Bohman and Rehg (1997)
and Elster (1998). It is my contention that aspects of community and
democracy within the conceptual parameters of the liberal tradition in South
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14
Africa, at times, are incongruent with a deliberative account of community and
democracy as espoused by Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib.
Fourthly, I shall attend to the notion that liberalism as a political good not only
teaches individual citizens to know themselves as social beings, but also
serves as the embodiment of liberal values aimed at unifying people
according to "patterns of relationship, networks of power, and communities of
meaning" (Walzer, 1990: 10). In other words, a constituent good of liberalism
is to inculcate in people a sense of moral virtue or "public spiritedness" to
respect the rule of law, to cultivate socio-economic justice and to promote
commonality amongst themselves, that is to say, to foster a sense of
citizenship (Miller, 2000: 83). Such a view of "public spiritedness" or
citizenship seems to be in line with Lotter's (2001: 91) argument that citizens
need to develop by themselves a sense of "internal control" which can help
them to contribute towards "establishing and maintaining the public
conception of justice by being role models, engaging in dialogue with fellow
citizens, or by simply doing their part in maintaining just institutions". My
argument is that a notion of citizenship can best be achieved through
nurturing a deliberative democratic discourse.
In so far as my own theoretical orientation is concerned, I am attracted to
Habermasian critical theory which is aimed at exploring and developing
discourse specific to the particular historical situations with which it is
concerned - discourse that have a practical purpose: to help people to
change an unsatisfactory situation (Habermas, 1972: 308). Critical theory is
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driven by the emancipatory interest; that is, its purpose is to contribute to
change in people's understanding of themselves and their practices. Critical
theory strives to engender self-reflective activity amongst individuals to bring
about a clear articulation of arguments in an atmosphere of openness to
overcome ideological distortions generated within social relations and
institutions (Carr & Kemmis, 1986: 162). A critical approach to philosophical
inquiry aims to generate critical action in others and gives rise to conditions to
replace one distorted set of practices with another, hopefully less distorted,
set of practices (Carr & Kemmis, 1986: 197). My contention is that if some of
the inadequacies (gaps) within the South African liberal tradition are
reconstructed, it has a better chance of contributing towards consolidating our
fledgling liberal democracy. Critical theory not only positions one favourably to
reconceptualise inadequate understandings of South African liberal thought,
but also demands that one's own misunderstandings and misrepresentations
be changes akin to a more defensible understanding of liberalism. It is here
that the potential contribution of this dissertation lies. Since, critical theory
constitutes the theoretical framework of thinking which embeds this
dissertation, I shall examine in further detail what it entails.
Like Habermas, proponents of critical theory contend that positivist and
interpretive inquiries, at best, only describe or explain the social world - such
as describing or explaining what liberalism means. On the one hand,
positivism claims that all events we want to explain are "facts in the world",
that is, of the same logical type. For positivist theory there can be no rational
argument about values - values are subjective like feelings or attitudes.
15
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Positivist theory insists that there is only one proper form of explanation, that
is, the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation: whenever (1) C
happens then E occurs, (2) C happened, (3) therefore E occurred. The
nomological statement indicated by (1), that is, C happens then E occurs,
specifies a logically necessary relationship between variables. C is called the
"independent" variable because in the context of this explanation the
occurrence of C is independent of the occurrence of E, and E the "dependent"
variable because its occurrence depends on the occurrence of C. For
example, "Whenever a teacher gives information to a child, the child learns" is
a nomological statement (it specifies a relationship between two facts - a
teacher giving information to a child and the child learning). Moreover, for
positivist theory the object of philosophical inquiry is to try to find nomological
or "scientific" statements, that are hypotheses, and then to set out to try to
"falsify" them (philosophical inquiry proceeds by formulating an hypothesis
("conjecture"), and then setting out to "test" it to try to refute it). Positivist
theory claims that philosophical inquiry should enable one to gain better
control over political processes with the link between explanation and
prediction, and thus explanation and control, providing a haunting and
powerful motive for philosophical inquiry.
On the other hand, interpretive theory insists on two central issues: the self-
understanding of the individual forms the basis of all social interpretation
(phenomenological or hermeneutical) and generally human consciousness is
transparent (or that human explanations and interpretations, as they appear,
do not conceal any deeper understanding of events). Vandenberg (1995: 188-
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189) explains social interpretation on a phenomenological level according to
three phases: (1) understanding or gaining insight into the phenomenon; (2)
describing phenomena "by imagining a conversation with others to give one's
findings an inter-subjective testing"; and (3) recontextualising the well-defined
phenomenon by locating it "within the whole educational domain and
evaluating its significance for the development of an integral human life".
Danner (1995: 223) explains social interpretation as "hermeneutic
understanding" which aims to make meaning explicit, to explain, to
understand "sense" and to interpret meaning.
Both the above explanations of social interpretation accord with interpretive
theory. Interpretive theory believes that analysis involves more than
observation (as some positivists believe). The crucial point of analysis is to
reach the self-understanding of the person acting in the situation, analysing
and understanding his or her reasons for their actions (Fay, 1975: 74). For
example, one person at a distance from another person waves her hand. How
does one interpret her action? Perhaps she is calling the other person; or
even making a gesture with her hand to show her anger; maybe she is just
stretching her arm. In other words, her actions cannot just be observed and /
or taken for granted that she is waving at the other person. Her actions have
to be interpreted. We need to know her reasons for performing such an action;
we need to know her self-understanding.
Interpretive theory rejects the claim that all events we want to explain are of
the same logical type in terms of the view that human actions belong to a
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different logical category from all other events in the world. For interpretive
theory an understanding of human beings and society is logically different
from an understanding of the natural world. For this reason, according to
interpretive theory we cannot give a D-N explanation (causal explanation) of
human action since the dependent variables (what is trying to be explained)
cannot be identified (Fay, 1975: 74). Interpretive theory differs distinctly from
positivist theory. A human action such as "acquiring knowledge" cannot simply
be identified by mere observation or discovery. For instance, you open a text
with some information about alligators. What are you doing? Perhaps you are
reading the text to explain how alligators are similar to or different from
crocodiles, or consulting the text in order to write an essay, or moving your
eyes over the page without reading it. To know which of these actions is
actually taking place I might need to know something about your purposes, or
the context in which the action takes place. If I determined that what you are
doing is "looking at the pages of the text", I have interpreted the action by
describing it - a view positivist theory rejects. I have explained your action in
terms of your reason for doing it. In this way, different types of explanations
exist for different actions theorists want to interpret or explain. On the one
hand, positivist theory, in contrast, insists that there is one absolute or
objective form of explanation. For interpretive theory on the other hand, to
know the meaning of a word is to know how the word is used, and not just to
get the "correct image" or "true picture". In other words, meaning grows out
of human experiences. For instance, for philosophers of education to get to
know the meaning of education is to know how the concept is used and not
just what they think it is or what they think it ought to be. I contend that
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interpretive theory's concern with explanation, interpretation and analysis
provides philosophical inquiry with some tools that break with inquiry as a
positivist "science". These tools of analysis and interpretation are necessary
but not sufficient for philosophical inquiry to change or transform the self-
understandings of people.
Different from positivist and interpretive theories, critical theory provides
resources and strategies both to criticize and change the social world. For
critical theory" ... the truth or falsity of (its) theories will be partially determined
by whether they are in fact translated into action" (Fay, 1975: 95). In this
regard, it is worth referring to Taylor (1985: 108) who convincingly argues
against theories which merely explain events in the world. In his words, "... it
is clear that theories do much more than explain social life; they also define
the understandings that underpin different forms of social practice, and they
help to orient us in the social world". In other words, theories (including critical
theory) cannot just be seen as "reflections of interest" but they shape (sustain
or reform) political practices to enable people to cope more effectively with the
world (Taylor, 1985: 107).
Of relevance to my philosophical inquiry in this dissertation is the link Taylor
establishes between theories that can shape effective practices and his notion
of "shared goods" as distinct from "convergent goods":
By 'shared good', I mean something different and stronger than mere
convergent good, where people may have a common interest in
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something. A good is shared when part of what makes it a good is
precisely that it is shared, that is, sought after and cherished in
common. Thus the inhabitants of a river valley have a common interest
in preventing floods. This is to say that each one has an interest in the
same flood prevention, and this is so irrespective of whether they have
some common understanding of it, or indeed, whether they form a
community at all. By contrast, shared goods are essentially of a
community; their common appreciation is constitutive of them (Taylor,
1985: 96).
Thus, for people to have shared practices does not mean that they merely
have to reach agreement among themselves. That would be a convergent
practice. To have shared practices, implies that people have to nurture and
develop those common understandings which are constituted in the social
practices of a community; understandings which were not conjured up on the
basis of what was arbitrarily decided, but understanding which developed out
of the practices of a community, that is, understandings which are constituted
in a community's social practices, and which, in turn strengthen that
community.
In essence, critical theory as "shared goods" develops understandings specific
to the particular historical situations with which it is concerned -
understandings and explanations that have a practical purpose: to help people
to change an unsatisfactory or indefensible situation. My contention is that
gaps within the South African liberal tradition represent such an unsatisfactory
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1.4 RESEARCH METHODS
situation which needs to be remedied. This dissertation is a modest attempt to
reconstruct a credible notion of liberalism commensurate with the idea of
deliberative democracy.
Much contemporary philosophical liberalism has been largely analytical. It has
mainly been concerned with conceptual clarification in building and defending
systemic political theories. Conceptual clarification within analytical philosophy
mainly involves exploring meanings of concepts and their concomitant
histories. In a different way, contemporary philosophical liberalism
domesticates its richly textured past (history) in the image of analytic self-
understanding (Simhony & Weinstein, 2001: 4). In relation to the analytic
nature of philosophical liberalism, my research methods involve the following
categories: discussions with my promoter and other informants, a review of
relevant literature and independent reflection related to analysing and
exploring concepts and questions of meaning.
Moreover, my analysis of the tradition of South African liberalism is at the level
of the nation-state for the reason that any understanding of the thoughts and
practices which informed such liberalism can reasonably be achieved by
analysing the socio-historical context in which the tradition unfolded. It would
be inconceivable to assume that the tradition of liberalism could be
understood in an informed manner without analysing the thoughts and
practices of people who influenced South Africa's liberal path. For instance,
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analysing the liberal concepts which make up South Africa's constitutional
democracy requires that one explores the ways in which liberal ideas and
practices manifested within the boundaries of the nation-state.
Of course, my potential critic might legitimately argue that liberalism in South
Africa cannot be analysed in isolation from global neo-liberal influences which
currently impact on the country's constitutional multi-party democratic system.
I agree for the reason that South Africa's quest to consolidate its newly found
democracy is continuously affected by economic, political and cultural
determinants of globalisation which makes an analysis of liberalism within the
boundaries of the nation-state somewhat anomalous. However, before one
can understand how global determinants influence South Africa's
consolidation of its multi-party democracy, one first needs to know what
constitutes the thoughts and practices of such a system of government.
Similarly, an analysis of the tradition of liberalism in South Africa presupposes
an analysis of global determinants which impact on the unfolding of such a
tradition. I am not suggesting that a global analysis of liberal thought and
practice is not important, but before one can actually do so, one first requires
some understanding and analysis of the way in which the liberal tradition
manifested in South African political discourse. In this way one would be
favourably positioned to explore how global determinants shaped the tradition
of liberalism in South Africa.Kymlicka (2002: x) makes the point that political
philosophers must grapple with problems and realities which are common to
their situational contexts, before one can start forming judgments about
whether we are making progress towards achieving them in the context of
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global concerns. In other words, one first needs to understand the needs,
aspirations and complexities of the tradition of liberalism in South Africa,
before one can begin to make judgments about its success or not in a global
context. Consequently my level of analysis is at the level of the state without
being oblivious of the importance of global influences which impact on South
Africa's multi-party democratic system of government.
1.5 PROGRAMME OF STUDY
This dissertation aims to identify and narrow several gaps within the South
African liberal tradition vis-a-vis notions of community and democracy. In my
attempt to reconstruct a more credible notion of liberalism with reference to
ideas of community and democracy I have organised my research project as
follows:
In Chapter 2 I shall firstly analyse and explore various general strands of
liberalism in relation to notions of individualism and community with the aim of
serving as a general framework for an analysis of the liberal tradition in South
Africa, as will be occur in chapter 3 of this dissertation. I shall specifically
analyse the philosophical underpinnings of liberal strands such as
utilitarianism, liberal equality and communitarianism in order to gain more
clarity regarding to relations between individuals and communities.
In Chapter 3 I examine essential moments in the history and theory of the
liberal tradition in South Africa, in particular how liberal thinkers view liberty
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vis-a-vis community and democracy. I specifically analyse some of the gaps
within a snapshot of the liberal tradition with the view to construct a credible
notion of liberalism.
In Chapter 4, I shall explore a concept of deliberative democracy that can
help to bring to light (1) conditions that are favourable for the advancement of
"public deliberation" with reference to three major statements on the concept -
Habermas' rational, consensus-oriented discourse, Rawls' public reason and
Benhabib's discursive democracy. I then analyse the general principle of
rationality which constitutes deliberative democracy, before moving on to a
discussion as to how and why it can engender better political discourse in
SouthAfrica.
In Chapter 5, I subject weaknesses which I have identified in the liberal
tradition in South Africa, to deliberative democratic scrutiny in order to come
top a deepened and more justifiable understanding of democracy (including
the eradication of socio-economic injustice) in a diverse South African society.
In Chapter 6, I explore some of the weaknesses associated with deliberative
democracy before moving on to a discussion of how the discourse can
cultivate citizenship in South African society. My contention is that citizenship
is a unifying force which can hold a diverse South African society together
along the lines of communitarianism, that is, "reasoning together with others"
in order to secure the legitimate interests of most people in political decision-
making.
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1.6 SUMMARY
This introductory chapter is an attempt to map the conceptual and procedural
aspects related to this research dissertation. Conceptually, I am attracted to
aspects of political philosophy within the parameters of a critical theoretical
paradigm. Procedurally, I shall firstly explore and analyse the intellectual roots
of liberalism, before moving on to a discussion of deliberative democracy
which I consider as an antidote to close the gaps left by South Africa's liberal
heritage. My contention is that deliberative democracy provides an adequate
theoretical framework in terms of which notions of community and democracy
can be framed.
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CHAPTER2
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LIBERALISM AND
COMMUNITARIANISM
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Any analysis of essential moments in the liberal tradition in South Africa with
the aim to identify gaps and to construct a credible view of liberalism,
invariably taps into the richness of the liberal tradition as understood in liberal
political theory. Much of what can be associated with liberalism in South Africa
(as I shall point out in chapter 3) draws on the intellectual roots of liberalism or
what Simhony and Weinstein (2001: 1) refer to as "a family of liberalism", that
is, strands of liberalism. Since the 1970s, these strands of liberalism are
mostly associated with shifts in liberalism from utilitarianism to liberal equality
to communitarianism, effectively integrating many essential communitarian
concerns with traditional liberal commitments. For the reason that essential
moments in South African liberalism cannot be seen independently from these
shifts in liberal political theory, it seems feasible to examine the rich heritage
of liberalism, at least with reference to notions of individualism and
community. Why? These strands of liberalism also provide philosophical
spectacles through which notions of individualism and community are framed
which in turn, have important implications for liberal democracy in South
Africa. I shall now explore various strands of liberalism in relation to notions of
individualism and community with the aim to gain more clarity about the liberal
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tradition in South Africa as will be discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation.
These strands of liberalism include, utilitarianism, liberal equality and
communitarianism.
In the previous chapter, I have already enunciated the sort of liberalism I am
interested in defending. I am averse to views on liberalism which accentuate
excessive individualism or atomism, and which ignore manifest ways in which
individuals are embedded or situated in various social, political and cultural
relationships. The term "liberal" has been used in many different ways and
fields of study, and defining its central features can be as controversial as
evaluating them. My concern with liberalism in this dissertation firstly involves
the capacity of individuals to have resources and freedoms to live a good life
without being penalised by others for holding different views about the good
life, albeit in a political, religious or cultural sense. Hence, I am (liberally)
concerned with civil and personal freedoms. Secondly, I am also concerned
about individuals acquiring different views about the good life, as well as
intelligently examining and re-examining such views. Thus, I am (liberally)
concerned with freedom of articulation in a rational way. These concerns with
liberalism are not necessarily what classical or seventeenth century liberalism
is about. Usually, classical liberalism involves abstract individualism and
skepticism about the good life. Abstract individualism depicts individuals as
"given" with interests, wants, purposes and needs, that is, "given"
independently of a social context, while society and the sate are pictured as
sets of actual or possible arrangements which respond more or less
adequately to individuals' requirements (Lukes, 1973: 73). As I shall show,
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neither of the above mentioned assumptions about liberalism dominates the
theories of Mill and Rawls - two prominent liberals. Jaggar's (1983: 40)
discussion on liberalism illustrates the classical view of the concept I contest
in this dissertation:
The liberal assumption (is) that human individuals are essentially
solitary, with needs and interests that are separate from if not in
opposition to those of other individuals. This assumption is the starting
point of liberal theory. It generates what liberals take to be the
fundamental questions of political philosophy: what are the
circumstances in which essentially solitary individuals might agree to
come together in civil society, what would justify them in doing so and
how might conflict be preventedwhen they do?
Jaggar's view that individuals are "essentially solitary" and separate from
other individuals, confirms classical liberalism's concern with a kind of
"abstract individualism" which discards the social. If one accepts that
individuals' goals and interests are products of social interactions such as
political decision making, then the classical liberal view that individuals are
"pre-social" seems to be a misconceived. The fact that individuals can go
outside of society to revise and re-examine their political commitments without
the influence of other individuals does not seem to be a logical claim. When
political actors question and revise their allegiance to political parties, they do
not go outside society to do so, nor do they transcend any social conditioning
in achieving this. It seems absurd to think that political actors need to exist
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outside society to revise their choices. Thus, with reference to three significant
strands of liberalism, I shall show that the classical liberal idea of an abstract,
unsituated individual is misconceived.
2.2 UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism, as a self-conscious political and philosophical movement, arose
as a radical critique of English feudal society, a society whose practices
utilitarians believed were organised to benefit a small privileged elite at the
expense of the rural and working class majority (Kymlicka, 2002: 47). In its
simplest formulation, utilitarianism claims that the morally right act or policy is
that which produces the greatest happiness for the members of the society,
which means that the pursuit of humanwelfare or utility be done impartially for
everyone in society (Kymlicka, 2000:10-11). For JS Mill (1998: 142) who
devoted most of his intellectual life to the project of reconstructing in a more
satisfactory and more liberal form classical utilitarianism, utility or happiness is
not merely confined to "the agent's own great happiness, but the greatest
number of happiness altogether ... (which) makes other people happier".
Thus, utilitarianism not only calls for the achievement of the well being or
happiness of human beings but also to maximize or give equal weight to each
person's welfare or utility, what Mill (1998: 142) refers to as the cultivation of
"the nobleness of others". In other words, according to such an egalitarian
theory of utility, no individual stands in a privileged position or has a greater
claim to benefit than any other individual. This equal consideration of interest
argument is implicit in J.S. Mill's claim that utilitarian morality involves "To do
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as you would be done by, and to love you neighbour as yourself ..." (Mill,
1968: 16). The claim "To do as you would be done by" implies that each
individual's interest should be given equal weight, whereas "To love your
neighbour as yourself' denotes a morally right act which will maximise an
individual's utility. Hence, utilitarianism is in fact an egalitarian theory in the
sense of being premised upon moral equality. Mill (1998: 148) posits that this
notion of "utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of
sacrificing their greatest good for the good of others".
Liberty (freedom) is an value in utilitarianism since the protection of individual
liberty is of great importance to utilitarianism. This is obvious in the case of
utilitarians, like Mill, who felt that utility was maximised by according
individuals the freedom to choose their own form of life. Mill (1982: 122)
emphasised that individuals, in a self-determining way, must be able to
determine for themselves whether inherited social practices in all forms of life
(both social and political) are "properly applicable to his (her) own
circumstances and character". In other words, Mill's insistence that individuals
have the right to question whether social practices are worthy of allegiance
and to question such practices clearly provides individuals with a sphere of
self-determination to be respected by others. As Mill put it, it is the right and
prerogative of each mature individual to interpret for himself (herself) the
meaning and value of their experiences, that is, the right to be self-
determining in major decisions in life is inviolate (Mill, 1982: 123). Put
differently, each individual, if denied the liberty he (she) is entitled to, is being
denied his (her) equal standing as a human being whose utility is a matter of
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equal concern. Thus, Mill recognised the capacity of individuals for personal
growth in exercising and successfully developing their inner capacities,
deciding what to do with their lives. Several critics of Mill's conception of the
individual accuse him of failing to locate social relations (that is, a sense of
community) at the core of the inner capacities of the enclosed individual self.
Bosanquet (1910: 61) claims that Mill's understanding of individual liberty "lies
in a sort of inner self, to be cherished by enclosing it", whereas Norman (1983:
156) argues that Mill devalues a sense of community by accentuating the idea
of "the isolated individual". My own reading of Mill is that he does recognise
the importance of community. In Utilitarianism Mill insists that selfishness, that
is, "(individuals) caring for nobody, but themselves ..." is the main cause for
not maximising their utility, of enjoying meaningful lives (Mill, 1963: 25).
Likewise in On Liberty, Mill insists that his plea for individual liberty is not a
defence of selfishness but that there is an increasing need to promote a sense
of community: "It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine
(utilitarianism) to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends
that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that
they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one
another ... there is a need of great increase of disinterested exertion to
promote the good of others" (Mill, 1998: 84).
If Mill did have such an abstract view of the self, then he would not have
criticised Bentham's view of liberalism as "that of a collection of persons
pursuing each his (her) separate interest or pleasure ... the prevention of
whom from jostling one another more than is avoidable" (Mill, 1962: 70).
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Instead, Mill posits that such a view of the self is of little help for people in the
formation of their character, for the reason that it ignores the fact that social
interaction modifies our character in accordance with essential interests in
living a good life. Mill (1962: 71) claims that people's concern is not only with
promoting their worldly interests, but also with the manner in which their
affections and desires, that is, characters are formed through social
interactions. In this way, Mill states, one can defend the liberal concern for
civic freedoms, for a public sphere of expression, and for a liberal education.
In his words,
... (F)or how can we judge in what manner many an action will affect
even worldly interests of ourselves and others, unless we take in, as
part of the question, its influence on the regulation of our, or their,
affection and desires? A moralist on Bentham's principles may get us
as far as this, that he ought not to slay, burn or steal; but what will be of
his qualifications for regulating the nicer shades of human behaviour, or
of laying down even the greater moralities as to those facts in human
life which are any influence on worldly circumstances ... (Mill, 1962:
71).
Before moving onto a discussion of why utilitarianism's conception of equality
seems to be inadequate, it is worth exploring some of the problems critics of
utilitarianism have with its perceived emphasis on atomistic individualism.
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According to utilitarian critics atomistic tndivlduallsm'' affirms the self-sufficient,
self-attentive and personal freedom of individuals with limited external
constraints. An atomistic, self-attentive individual does not depend on her
relationships with others for the realisation of her ends and has ontological
priority over the community (Gyekye, 1997: 35). For Miller (in Simhony &
Weinstein, 2001: 2) atomistic individualism defends its political position by
"invoking an individualistic view of the self'. In others words, atomistic
individualism considers people as solitary and abstract who find fulfillment in
separation from each other (Simhony & Weinstein, 2001: 2). Kymlicka (2002:
212) posits that for many utilitarian critics "the problem with liberalism is not its
emphasis on justice, nor its universalism, but rather its 'individualism"'.
According to this criticism, he argues, atomistic individuals base their theories
on notions of individual rights and personal freedom, but neglect the extent to
which individual freedom and well-being are only possible in community.
Moreover, critics of atomistic individualism complain that the concept is
nothing but a political life of excessive individualism, self-discovery, self-
realisation and self-fulfillment without respect for the claims of others. Like the
critics of the 1960s, those of the 1980s and beyond fault atomistic
individualism for being "mistakenly and irreparably individualistic" (Gutman in
3 Fukuyama (1992: xiv-xxi, 159, 172) asserts that the primary motive for the rise of liberal
democracies, sparked by the French and American revolutions and galvanised by the natural
sciences and technology, is the individual's desire and struggle for recognition - understood
as ..... a form of self-assertion, a projection of one's own values on the outside world, and
gives rise to feelings of anger when those values (freedoms) are not recognised by other
people". Individuals exert themselves in pursuit of recognition which involves securing private
freedoms indifferent to the "things of this world" - beginning with private property and ending
with their own happiness - in the face of limited state intervention. For Fukuyama (1992: 160)
such a liberal view of human beings as advocated by Hobbes and Locke pejoratively
characterises the individual as "narrowly consumed with his (her) own immediate self-
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Gaus, 2001: 137). Simhony and Weinstein (2001: 15) purport that atomistic
individualism "conceives individuals as competitive, self-centred, and
independent, and social life simply as an arena for coordinating the
competitive pursuit of private (self-) interests". Galston (1991: 42) argues that
atomistic individualism is claimed "to undermine community, to restrict unduly
opportunities for democratic participation, to create inegalitarian hierarchy,
and to reinforce egoistic social conflict at the expense of the common good" -
the latter referring to "a good in which each man (woman) has a share and
that share, in turn, consists in realizing his (her) capacities of feeling ... of
mental and physical energy, and in realizing these he (she) plays his (her)
part in the social life ... the common good is simply the total of all lives that
are in mutual harmony" (Weinstein, 2001: 177).
If, as I have previously stated, Mill's utilitarianism does not ignore "the good of
others" in relation to his conception of the individual, it would be worth looking
at critiques of atomistic individualism which builds on other earlier forms of
liberalism. These include, the individualism of disengaged rationality
pioneered by Descartes whereby each person thinks self-responsibly for him-
or herself and the political individualism of Locke, which considers the will of
the person prior to social obligation. To put this point more broadly in
Taylorian terms: in a liberal democracy, atomistic (self-absorbed) individuals
"are 'enclosed' in their own hearts ... where few will want to participate
actively in self-government. They will prefer to stay at home and enjoy the
preservation and material well-being interested in the community around him (her) only to the
extent that it fosters a means of achieving his (her) private good (freedom)".
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satisfactions of private life, as long as the government of the day produces the
means to these satisfactions and distributes them widely" (Taylor, 1991: 9).
Atomistic individualism differs from possessive individualism in the sense that
the latter suggests that what people (individuals) want in life is to maximise
their share of social resources and material goods, rather than promote the
good of others or their own spiritual well-being (Kymlicka, 1989: 886). For
atomists, an individual's capacity for meaningful choice is "self-sufficient
outside of society and culture" (Kymlicka, 1989: 894). Likewise for Galston
(1998: 47-50) the atomistic individualism is sensitive to the claims of
"individual conscience", that is, a concern for individual rights and for what is
sometimes called the private sphere, which limits the legitimate power of
"political community". Taylor (1991) offers several reservations against
atomistic individualism, which I shall briefly discuss under the following
constitutive features of the concept: subjectivity, neutrality and narcissism.
First, atomistic individualism in a subjectivist sense is primarily concerned with
the right of individuals to develop "their own form of life, grounded on their
own sense of what is really important or of value ... for him- or herself'
(Taylor, 1991: 14). Kymlicka (2002: 245) posits that atomistic individuals claim
not to be "in need of any communal context in order to develop and exercise
their capacity for self-determination". Individuals being concerned with
developing "their own form of life" aim to achieve a kind of "self-fulfillment"
disengaged from matters of public importance, albeit religious, political or
historical. Such a subjectivist view of liberalism is one whereby individuals do
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as they choose and do not have to decide and act together. Each individual
has the right to pursue his or her own interest and to do what they individually
happen to desire. In other words, subjectivity sees the individual as
ontologically "prior" to the social, that is, maintaining that the individual's
thoughts and actions are free and independent of the society in which they are
embedded (Sandel, 1998: 19). In any case "self-fulfillment" cannot merely be
associated with atomistic individuals who consider themselves detached from
a sense of community. In this regard, Sullivan (1982: 158) posits the following:
Self-fulfillment and even the working out of personal identity and a
sense of orientation in the world depend upon a communal enterprise.
This shared process is the civic life, and its root is involvement with
others: other generations, other sorts of persons whose differences are
significant because they contribute to the whole on which our particular
self depends.
Certainly the South African democratic transformation process cannot
accommodate a non-communitarian subjectivist understanding of self-
fulfillment which is loath to acknowledge the claims of collective religious,
political and historical ldentlties" for the reason that democratic transformation
in the first place requires "collective intervention" (Hudson, 2000: 97).
4 The question of identity is often phrased by people in the form of "Who am I?". This "Who
am I?" does not merely refer to the genealogy or name of a person but rather, to "the
commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which we I can try
to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I
endorse or oppose ... the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand" (Taylor 1989:
27). The point is that in order to know who you are suggests that you be oriented towards
moral 'spaces' in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and
what not, and what has meaning and importance for you (Taylor 1989: 28). According to
Taylor (1989: 30, 34) our identity is what allows us to define what is important to us and what
is not whereby we orient ourselves in a moral space towards the good: " ... (W)e are only
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
37
Democratic transformation directly or indirectly affects all South Africans.
Each person's individual concern is a matter of common concern since
transformation has implications for all South Africa's citizens. Transformation
'depends on the conditions of society as a whole, a notion that stands in stark
contrast with subjectivist individualism, which reifies the individual over
society. In this regard I agree with Taylor (1991: 15) when he states that
subjectivity "widely espoused today is a profound mistake, even in some
respects self-stultifying. It seems true that the culture of self-fulfillment has led
many people to lose sight of concerns that transcend them". Such subjectivist
individualism, to use Sandel's expression (1998: 19), defines the self as "prior
to its ends" which accords supreme value to individual autonomy and agency
and stands opposed to collectivism. In his words, " ... a conception of the self-
given prior to its aims and attachments could not make sense of certain
important aspects of moral and political experience. Certain moral and political
obligations that we commonly recognize - obligations of solidarity, for
example, or religious duties - may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice.
Such obligations are difficult to dismiss as merely confused, and yet difficult to
account for if we understand ourselves as free and independent (atomistic)
selves, unbound by moral ties we have not chosen (Sandel, 1998: 188). The
above criticism of atomistic individualism is supported by Kymlicka (1989:
894) for whom an "atomist route ... is inadequate since our dependence on
the cultural structure for worthwhile ways of life is undeniable, and few if any
liberals have ever been 'concerned purely with individual choices ... to neglect
of the matrix in which such choices can be open or closed, rich or meagre"'.
selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation
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Second, atomistic individualism also accords importance to neutrality. In the
words of Taylor (1991: 17)
One of its (atomistic individualism's) basic tenets is that a liberal society
must be neutral on questions of what constitutes a good life. The good
life is what each individual seeks, in his or her own way, and
government would be lacking in partiality, and thus in equal respect for
citizens, if it took sides on this question.
If, according to neutrality, the good life should be what each individual strives
for, then it could mean that individuals can lay claim to unconstrained
demands such as for South African blacks to receive preferential treatment in
terms of posts, positions, capital and credit or for white citizens to oppose
transformation. In other words, transformation within a liberal framework of
neutrality is understood as an effort to realise specific and unrestricted
conceptions of the good life at the expense of the collective. Such a
conception of the good life whereby individuals could do what they want
without interference from the state would be difficult to defend for the reason
that human beings in the first place are not isolated from one another. It is in
this context that Taylor (1991: 47) claims:
My discovering my identity doesn't mean that I work it out in isolation
but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internalized,
with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly
to the good".
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generated identity gives a new and crucial importance to recognition.
My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relation with others.
Thus, for white citizens to oppose transformation depends in part on their
relations with and towards others. Similarly for black citizens to expect
preferential treatment depends on their relations with and towards others. If
people are allowed to do whatever pleases them it would lead to societal
chaos and an extreme disregard for the conditions of law and order. Here I
agree with the position of Raz (1986: 133) that the role of the state cannot be
neutral in terms of allowing individuals to make their choices without any form
of interference. He holds that individual (personal) well-being depends on
social and institutional forms, that is, the "provision of many collective goods is
constitutive of the very possibility of autonomy" (Raz, 1986: 207). In other
words, individuals are deeply social and dependent on their relations with one
another. In a Maclntyrean sense, it is the individual qua citizen who reasons
together with others. Liberal neutrality fails to encourage social practices in
which people are challenged to develop appropriate practices in association
with one another (Pettit, 1994: 180).
Third, atomistic individualism also involves what Taylor (1991: 54) refers to as
"the culture of narcissism", that is, "the spread of an outlook that makes self-
fulfillment the major value in life and that seems to recognize few external
moral demands or serious commitment to others". The idea of self-fulfillment
or "being true to oneself appears to challenge the notion of dependency
whereby individuals are concerned about their own interests and
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relationships. Individuals feel they are "called" riot to be concerned about
others and to avoid active engagement with any form of public discourse, that
is, "a joint, cooperative form of social action" (Bohman, 1996: 54). Taylor
(1991: 16) describes self-fulfillment as follows:
It's not just that people sacrifice their love relationships, and the care of
their children, to pursue their careers. Something like this has perhaps
always existed. The point is that today many people feel called to do
this, feel they ought to do this, feel their lives would be somehow
wasted or unfulfilled if they didn't do it.
Certainly for a newly found democracy like South Africa individuals cannot
only be true to themselves, that is, to their choices, careers and relationships.
The fact that the development of democracy involves the participation of
different individuals'' in critical engagement about the meaning of their past
and possibilities for the future provides a serious challenge to narcissist
individualism. Despite individuals' desire to be true to themselves, their private
concerns in relation to societal and political life will always affect others. An
individual's desire to vote for a political party does impact on the political
reconstruction of a particular society. The issue of how individuals become
individuated into the societal rules and norms is an issue ignored by narcissist
individualism due to its individualistic, non-social conception of the person.
Jonathan (1997: 147) claims that such a position on liberalism sees the
individual as a person who "contracts" his or her social connections but who is
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"existentially separate from their context ... acting upon society and acted
upon by it".
In summary, the major problems with atomistic individualism are its
individualist orientation based on subjectivist, neutral and narcissist
conceptions of the self. The priority of the individual over the social is linked to
an untenable understanding of freedom which disregards the fact that the
freedom people might have is conditional upon the social structures in which
they are embedded. Since Aristotle it has been articulated that human beings
ascribe to social practices (Pettit, 1994: 182). This means that an individual is
only so when she realises her unique individuality and the commonality
between her and other persons close to her and surrounding her. Kwant
(1973: 9) notes that the human self lives by herself and also exists in relation
to the group or other people." In other words, an individual in isolation, cannot
be bonded to others on the basis of language, culture, history and self-
understanding. Instead, an individual possesses some natural inclination to
co-exist with other people. He or she is not alone but has a relationship with
family, neighbours and other members of society.' By implication the
individual person is structured as a social being (Kwant, 1973: 19).8 In this
regard Dissen (2000: 503) posits:
5 In a democracy different individuals are obliged to share power with others who might be of
different mind (Pettit, 1994: 187).
6 In his words, "Het 'zelf neemt immers zowel een groepsgestalte aan alsook een individuele
vorm" (Kwant, 1973: 9).
7 Kwant (1973: 61) claims the following: " ... (H)et is ook waar dat de mens de fundamentele
mogelijkheid bezit zich in te leven in het denken, in het aanvoelen, in het belang van andere
mens. Wij existeren zo, dat wij tot coëxisteren in staat zijn".
8 Kwant (1973: 19) notes the following: "Dit impliceert dat de mens iemand is die op zeer vele
wijzen gestructureerd is ... Daarom is hij een behoeftig organisme".
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People's development, their· freedom, and their well-being are
dependent upon social forms, and this may give them a degree of
autonomy but it could not make them autonomous in anything but a
highly relative sense.
Now that I have explored some of the constraints atomistic individualism
encounters in order to sustain any form of democratic society (not surprisingly
since, as I show in chapter 3, South African liberalism has never been
associated with atomism), it would be fair to say that over-exaggerated
criticism of utilitarianism's perceived emphasis on atomistic individualism
seems unfounded. Mill does not seem to locate atomism at the core of his
conception of the individual. According to John Rawls' project, as I shall show
in turn, utilitarianism's conception of equality is inadequate and vulnerable to
critique, and not its conception of the role of a self-determining individual,
neither to unfairly equate Millian individuality with atomistic individualism.
Instead, in On Liberty Mill (1998: 148) insists that utility places the happiness
of every individual "as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the
whole ... (establishing) in the mind of every individual an indissoluble
association between his (her) own happiness and the good of the whole" - an
idea of utility which seems to encourage the concept of community. This
brings me to a discussion of what is wrong with the utilitarianism's conception
of equality according to Rawls' project.
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2.3 LIBERAL EQUALITY
The weakness in utilitarianism as a conception of equality is adequately
illustrated by comparing it with Rawls' "general conception" of justice as
enunciated in A Theory of Justice. When one compares these two
conceptions, utilitarianism seems implausible as an account of moral equality,
at odds about what it means to treat people with equal consideration. In
presenting Rawls' ideas, I shall first explicate his "'general conception" of
justice: "All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth,
and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
favored" (Rawls, 1971: 303). Rawls ties the idea of justice to an equal sharing
of social goods, but he adds that by treating people as equals does not mean
that one has to remove all inequalities, especially when the presence of such
inequalities favour the least advantaged. For instance, if giving poor citizens a
better pension allowance than wealthy citizens actually promotes the welfare
of the poor without disadvantaging the living conditions of the wealthy, then
inequality is allowed.
Rawls breaks down this "general conception" of justice into two principles:
First Principle - Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
44
Second Principle - Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged
so that they are both:
a. to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and
b. attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1971: 56).
According to these principles, equal liberties take precedence over equal
opportunities, which take precedence over equal resources. But central to
both principles is the idea that an inequality is allowed if it benefits "the least
advantaged". In order to show how Rawls differs from the utilitarian
conception of equality, I shall focus on his "difference principle" (second
principle) which governs the distribution of economic resources. The utilitarian
justification for economic distribution in society is based on the idea of giving
equal weight or consideration to each person's utility (welfare). No matter how
much the wealthy already have, their desire for more resources continues to
count equally, even when resources they want must come from the "least
advantaged". As a result, the utilitarian commitment to treat people as equals
allows others (in this instance, the "least advantaged") to be treated as less
equals, as means to other people's (the wealthy) ends. Utilitarians simply
assume that each person's preference should be given equal or the same
weight, if one wants to secure equal utility. This idea conflicts with Rawls'
theory, for while Rawls also requires equality of opportunity in distributing
resources, under the "difference principle", people only have a claim to a
greater share of economic resources if they can show that it benefits those
among the "least advantaged". By contrast, under the utilitarian idea of
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equality of opportunity, the "least advantaged" have no right to expect to
benefit from an unequal distribution of resources which favour those well off
citizens.
Certainly Rawls' liberalism in A Theory of Justice does seem to indicate some
sort of affinity with individualism and community being held in suspicion. The
subjects of his theory of justice are "persons" and "men":
Men are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims
against one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their
society. Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what
constitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for
him to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once and for all what
is to count among them as just and unjust. The choice which rational
men would make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty,
assuming for the present that this choice problem has a solution,
determines the principles of justice (Rawls, 1971:57-58).
Thus it seems as if Rawls' earlier liberalism relied on an individualist
understanding of the self as an "unsituated chooser" which held community
and common good in suspicion (Simhony & Weinstein, 2001: 11). In his more
recent work entitled, Political Liberalism, Rawls still endorses his two
principles of justice: the liberty principle which guarantees every citizen equal
basic liberties; and the difference principle which requires an equal distribution
of resources except where inequalities benefit the least advantaged people.
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Yet, it is his argument for the liberty principle which has changed. Rawls'
conception of liberty is no longer merely limited to providing equal basic
liberties to individuals, but that liberty (freedom) must be interpreted in terms
of an individual's capacity to form and revise his (her) conception of what it
means to do good. "As free persons, citizens claim the right to view their
persons as independent from and as not identified with any particular
conception of the good, or scheme of private ends" (Rawls, 1993: 30). For
instance, according to this Rawlsian idea of "political liberalism" every
individual affiliated to a particular religious group has the right to exercise his
(her) rights and in so doing attempts to restrict or eliminate group-imposed
hindrances that would nullify such private individual rights. In other words,
groups cannot limit the basic liberties of their individual members, including
their right to be non-religious or to question and revise inherited conceptions
of the good (Kymlicka, 2002: 238). What Rawls' "political liberalism" involves,
is not only giving to individuals certain formal legal rights to revise their
understandings of what it means to do good, but also knowledge of these
rights, as well as the educational and legal conditions required which would
enable individuals to exercise such rights in an autonomous way (Kymlicka,
2002: 239).
But Rawls also concedes that citizens' private ends may be situated or what
Miller (2000: 47) refers to as "encumbered ones": "They may regard it as
simply unthinkable to view themselves apart from certain religious,
philosophical, and moral convictions, or from certain enduring attachments
and loyalties" (Rawls, 1993: 31). In other words, Rawls does not seem to
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reject the notion of community, that is, to view individuals as "socially
unsituated" (Simhony & Weinstein, 2001: 12), "unencumbered" or not being
tied to a particular group (Miller, 2000: 45). To put this another way, as Miller
(2000: 45) argues, Rawls' "political liberalism" sees citizens of liberal
democracies as having a double identity: "In their personal or private capacity
they are seen as holding a conception of the good, a view about what a
valuable life consists in, which may include, for instance, their personal tastes
or religious beliefs. This conception is pursued in day-to-day life and forms the
basis of the many voluntary associations that flourish in a liberal society". In
essence, Rawls does value community especially where it serves as "a fair
scheme" where "people develop their different and complimentary talents and
skills, and engage in mutually advantageous co-operation" (Rawls, 1993:
206). In essence, Rawls' ideas accentuate a concern for individual choice and
civil liberties, as well as a defence of the social (communal) formation of
people's interests:
... (People should) regard themselves as having a highest-order
interest in how all their other interests, including even their fundamental
ones, are shaped and regulated by social institutions. They do not think
of themselves as inevitably bound to, or as identical with, the pursuit of
any particular complex of fundamental interests that they have at any
given time, although they want the right to advance such interests
(provided they are admissible). Rather, free persons conceive of
themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final ends and who
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give first priority to preserving their liberty in these matters ... under
condition that are free (and socially situated) (Rawls, 1974: 641).
The question arises: Can Rawls' "political liberalism" strategy succeed in
accommodating the interest of many communitarians? In order to address this
question, in the next section I shall expound on various strands of
communitarianism in particular showing that Rawls' liberal conception of the
individual self is at odds with the communitarian conception of the embedded
self.
2.4 COMMUNITARIANISM
Communitarianism is described as a thesis about the social construction of
the self, that is, the self cannot be understood apart from the social relations in
which it is embedded (Miller, 2000: 99). For communitarians, individuals make
up social practices and institutions in which they pursue their aims in
collaboration with one another. Miller identifies three variants of
communitarianism which emphasise the social constitution of the self and the
embeddedness of the individual in social relations: a liberal communitarianism
which seeks to create and support a pluralist society that provides conditions
for individual autonomy, for instance, to be free to reflect critically upon the
ethos of a particular group to which they belong by voluntary consent; a
conservative form of communitarianism which argues that preserving the
authority of a single inclusive community is the precondition for social
cohesion (unity) amongst individuals and groups; and a left communitarianism
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association must be as equal citizens engaged in collective self-determination
(Miller, 2000: 106).
Firstly, liberal communitarians among whom Will Kymlicka is a distinguished
representative in recent political philosophy, holds that that there are many
valuable ways of life which people may choose to pursue in an autonomous
way after reflecting on alternative ways of the good life. Although this sounds
very much Rawlsian, the communitarian twist occurs when Kymlicka argues
that both the availability of a plurality of ways of life and the capacity for
autonomous choice depend upon a communal background and by "restricting
certain individual rights" (Kymlicka, 2002: 240). In his words, "... if we truly
wish to accommodate communitarian conceptions of the self, then we must be
willing to provide some exemption for communitarian groups from the rigorous
enforcement of individual liberties" (Kymlicka, 2002: 240). The point is that
people cannot just engage in societal practices (family life, religious
observance and educational discourse) and political institutions (Parliament
and voting), unless there are groups of people in society who engage in such
practices and institutions. Moreover, as Miller (2000: 102) asserts, the
individual's capacity to exercise his (her) autonomous choice and to reflect
critically upon any particular way of life is not something that people are
natively endowed with, but a capacity that is nurtured by "autonomy-
supporting practices and institutions whose existence cannot be taken for
granted". This suggests that there is a deep tension between the
communitarian conception of the embedded self and the Rawlsian
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commitment to the priority of the individual's right of freedom to revise his
(her) conception of the good life. What liberal communitarians want is that the
individual's right of freedom be subordinated to the group's right to uphold a
conception of the good. For example, where a Rawlsian conception of the
person is one which recognises the individual's capacity to form and
autonomously revise his (her) religious beliefs, liberal communitarians would
want to limit the civil liberties of their members, including the right of
individuals to hold religious views different from those of the group. Thus
community becomes a condition of autonomous choice; that is, autonomy
cannot be fully achieved unless members are able to reflect critically upon
assumptions and ethos of any particular group to which they belong (Miller,
2000: 103). Rawls' strategy of "political liberalism" continues to enforce
individual civil rights, which makes it hostile to the liberal communitarian
conception of the constitutive or embedded self (Kymlicka, 2002: 244).
Secondly, a conservative form of communitarianism or "communitarianism of
the right" argues that we have to feel that we belong together in a common
society before we can consolidate the political institutions that will govern us
(Miller, 2000: 104). In other words, unlike liberal communitarianism's
emphasis on community as a voluntary association, communitarianism of the
right emphasises unity amongst people to occur within a community that
would be hard to leave, thus being a source of authority. Such an inclusive
community shares a language, history, common culture and identity (Miller,
2000: 104).
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Thirdly, "communitarianism of the left" seeks to preserve or establish a
community on the basis of equality, and that the community should be actively
and collectively self-determining rather than subjected to "authority of
tradition" (Miller, 2000: 105). On the one hand, each member of such a
community enjoys equality of status despite occupying and unequal standing.
For instance, an engineer is equal to a garbage collector in terms of being
persons, although one is regarded as more capable than the other at solving
engineering problems. On the other hand, members of a community
deliberate collectively about their aims and purposes in a self-determining
way. Walzer (1983), a champion of "communitarianism of the left", posits that
equal membership of a political community is the precondition for practices of
distributive justice citizens of such a community might engage in. My concern
with a political community which unites members as equal persons, is the
view that people need to engage in collective deliberation. In this regard, I find
the seminal ideas of Alasdair Macintyre apposite, in particular his efforts to
establish a kind of left communitarianism which advances the practice of
collective deliberation.
Before I introduce Macintyre's ideas on communltarlanlsrn", I shall briefly
trace his central arguments in moral and political philosophy, which began
with a pre-1967 paper entitled "Notes from the Moral Wilderness" (Knight,
9 Fuller (1998: 1) makes the point that in order to understand Macintyre's work, one has to
make sense of his "interminably long project" which involves his pioneering investigations in
key themes of moral philosophy, namely, virtues, rules, practices, traditions, good, reason,
truth, incommensurability, fact and value. My account of Macintyre's ideas which prefaced his
latest book Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues does not
involve a detailed exposition of how Macintyre champions the traditions of Aristotle and
Aquinas in relation to "human flourishing", as well how his ideas are congenial to Nietzsche's
criticism of morality. Rather, I shall confine my brief account of Macintyre's project to his
advocacy of the self attaining "the virtues" in relation to other human beings.
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1998: 2). What is striking about this paper is his critique of the Enlightenment
project, in particular his arguments against "the arbitrariness of individual
choice" in favour of a common moral image for society on the basis of Marx's
revision of Hegel's account of human nature (Knight, 1998: 2). Macintyre's
approach to modern moral philosophy and political theory, which seems to be
persistent throughout his recent work, actually began with the publication of
his book A Short History of Ethics in 1967. In this book Macintyre explicitly
"rejected the belief, common in philosophical circles at the time, that moral
concepts were a timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate species of
concepts [that] can be examined and understood apart from their history. On
the contrary, he maintained that moral concepts and beliefs have to be
studied historically and contextually because moral concepts are embodied in
and are partially constitutive of forms of social life" (Horton & Mendus, 1994:
2).
In his Against the Self-Images of the Age published in 1971 Macintyre planted
the seeds for a more radical critique of modernity. He passionately argues for
a need for an "ideology" for the reason that, according to him, despite the
positive contributions made by psychoanalysis, Marxism and Christianity to
peoples' self-understanding, these ideologies have contributed to the
perceived ills of modernity (Horton & Mendus, 1994: 2). Moreover, over twenty
years after writing "Notes from the Moral Wilderness" Macintyre again referred
to it in prefacing After Virtue where he revised his judgement on Christianity
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and criticised Marxist morality'? together with liberal individualism for
embodying "the ethos of the distinctively modern and modernizing world, and
that nothing less than a rejection of a large part of that ethos will provide us
with a rationally and morally defensible standpoint from which to judge and act
..." (Macintyre in Knight, 1998: 4). Macintyre regards as intractable a defence
of a liberal-individualist framework in which atomistic liberals aim to secure a
justification for inalienable individual rights independent of "an overall theory of
the human good" (Macintyre in Mason, 1994: 226). He criticizes Nozick for
advocating a framework of individual liberalism constituted by a set of rights
independent of "a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding
both of the good of man (woman) and of the good of that community and
where individuals identify their primary interests with reference to those
goods" (Macintyre in Mason, 1994: 237).
InAfter Virtue Macintyre, in the Aristotelian/Thomist tradition, not only extends
his critique of some facets of modernity, particularly individual liberalism, but
also champions the idea of the greatest good, understood as the attainment of
"happiness" which, in turn, refers to "human flourishing" (Fuller, 1998: 7).
"Human flourishing", in a Maclntyrean sense, is understood as "the capacity
for each particular individual to realize the full potential of their generic form ...
(and) that this greatest good is also the common good and can only be
achieved in the company of others" (Fuller, 1998: 8). For Macintyre to pursue
the common good "in the company of others", involves human beings
engaging in social practices, considered as the first principle of the argument
10 For Macintyre, morality involves "how people live together, about society and therefore
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of After Virtue (Knight, 1998: 10). Knight (1998: 10) cogently summarises
Macintyre's argument of linking the achievement of the common good to
social practices:
What defines each of the numerous examples of a practice cited by
Macintyre is a particular goal or good internal to it and common to its
practitioners. In pursuing this internal good, practitioners are able to
achieve excellence of character, or virtue ... Practices are the schools
of the virtues. Justice, courage and truthfulness are cultivated through
participation in practices, as practitioners come to find in a practice
something beyond themselves that may be valued for its own sake
rather than as a mere means to satisfy their more immediate or selfish
desires.
Certainly for Macintyre anything that does not promote justice, courage and
truthfulness in individuals (that is, goods or excellences internal to their
practices) cannot be considered as social practices (Knight, 1998: 10). In
elaborating upon this argument that internal goods (virtues) constitute social
practices, Macintyre in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? which was
published in 1988, refers to a practice not just as the schools or traditions of
the virtues, but also as socially embodied traditions of practical rationality, that
is, "to exercise sound judgment with regard to what is the best or most
perfected example of a good yet (to be) achieved" (Knight, 1998: 12). For
history, not about hypothetically presocial individuals" (Knight, 1998: 4). Already his stance in
favour of community is quite apparent.
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Macintyre to be a good human being 11 or to live the good life is to act
rationally in society with others, which involves a good to be pursued, whether
it be peace, freedom, respect, dignity, security or satisfaction. Macintyre's
term for such a form of practical rationality is "Encyclopedia" - "a belief in
shared rationality, capable of progressing towards truth, whether in science or
epistemology, ethics or politics" (Fuller, 1998: 15). It is precisely this
Maclntyrean project of practical rationality as a means for the individual to
attain the good life 12 in association with others that informs his most recent
argument in defence of communitarianism.
In essence, Macintyre (1999: 109) argues that individuals and others do not
have to be considered as mutually exclusive beings without any relation with
one another. Rather, as participants they engage in a set of social
relationships where "the good of the individual is not subordinated to the good
of the community nor vice versa". Before I assess the force of this
communitarian argument, I first need to expound on the concept of
"commu nity",
11 Like Aristotle, Macintyre regards human beings as essentially political in nature, where
politics is considered "a teleologically ordered practice ... concerned with the proper ordering
of practices within a community" (Knight, 1998: 20).
12 Taylor (1989: 44) explains "in quest of the good" as follows: "(Contact with the good) ... is
understood as a relation to God and may be understood in sacramental terms or in those of
prayer or devotion. For those who espouse the honour ethic, the issue concerns their place in
the space of fame and infamy. The aspiration is to glory, or at least to avoid shame and
dishonour, which would make life unbearable and non-existence seem preferable. For those
who define the good as self-mastery through reason, the aspiration is to be able to order their
lives, and the unbearable threat is of being engulfed and degraded by the irresistible craving
for lower things. For those moved by one of the modern forms of the affirmation of ordinary
life, it is above all important to see oneself as moved by and furthering this life, in one's work
for instance, and one's family. People for whom meaning is given to life by expression must
see themselves as bringing their potential to expression, if not in one of the recognised artistic
or intellectual media, then perhaps in the shape of their lives themselves".
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Communitarians accentuate that community does not merely imply an
aggregation of individuals. People constituting a community have common
public ends, and not merely congruent private ends. In other words, people
constitute a community with the intention of sharing goals and values with
others, with individuals conceiving of themselves as "members of the group,
and of their values as the values of the group" (Buchanan, 1989: 856). In
contrast, an aggregation13 comprises individuals who conceive of their
interests as private, independent and potentially opposed (Buchanan, 1989:
857). A brief reference to current theories of community within the mainstream
of contemporary philosophical liberalism reveals that the concept is the
consequence and not the cause of social arrangements (Freeden, 2001: 27).
Sandel and Walzer who respectively consider community as "as constitutive
of the shared self-understandings of the participants" and "the expression of
social networks" best explain community as the consequence of social
arrangements. For Sandel, membership in a community is a constituent of
individual identity: "(A) community must be constitutive of the shared
understandings of the participants" (Sandel, 1982: 173). He promotes the
case for a strong communal obligation, that is, "a sense of belonging, a
concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community" (Sandel, 1996: 4-5).
Walzer's (1990: 10) communitarianism is an attempt to move away from the
individual to "patterns of relationship, networks of power, and communities of
13 Francis Dunlop (1979: 47) also distinguishes between an "aggregation" of individuals
(Gesel/schaft) and a "community" (Gemeinschaft). In a Gesel/schaft people are put together
as one interest group on a voluntary basis. They are bounded by a contract which opens
space for equality amongst them. He further claims that the individuals in a Gesel/schaft are
"free and autonomous" and can easily withdraw from it. This notion of Gesel/schaft poses a
problem for community since it allows the individual to be "free and autonomous" which
means that his or her subjectivities can dominate the group. This view of "community" is
incongruent with that of Gemeinschaft which accentuates the need for people to belong
together.
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meaning". He sums up his understanding of communitarianism as follows: "It
would be a good thing ... if we could teach those (individual) selves to know
themselves as social beings, the historical products of, and in part the
embodiments of, liberal values" (Walzer, 1990: 15). It is this view of
community, which constitutes the communitarian argument against unsituated
individualism I shall now assess in more detail.
King (1974) cogently articulates a concept of community which does not
merely constitute an aggregation of individuals. For King (1974: 30) when an
individual joins a community, she does not simply assume the subjective
views of other individuals but rather adopts points of view, which transcend
both her and others' points of view. This makes sense for the reason that a
community "has its own distinct identity, a more inclusive identity" which
transcends individual subjectivities (King, 1974: 30). This view of community
accentuates a need for "a shared identity" which considers the ideas and
wants of the group as more important than those of the individual. In this
regard, King (1974: 31) who draws on an early zo" century American
philosopher Josiah Royce, posits that a community with "a shared identity" is
one that
... represents a distinctly different 'level' of human life from the
individual. It is not simply an aggregate of individuals. It includes
individuals but also transcends them by incorporating them into a more
inclusive whole. The individual who participates in a community finds
his identity enhanced; without ceasing to be an individual, he (she)
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becomes more than an individual; he (she) enters a life 'incomparably
vaster' than anything he (she) has previously known.
For the reason that a community is characterised by "a life 'incomparably
vaster' than anything" the individual has known, one can justifiably claim that
such a notion of community binds individuals together on the basis of some
shared, common good referred to by King (1974: 32) as "social
transcendence". In other words, the subjectivities of individuals are not
abandoned, but are only considered in relation to others' subjectivities,
establishing "their allegiance to a common cause ... and to work together for a
common good" (King, 1974: 31).
Moreover, Fielding's account of community also supports the idea of working
towards achieving "a common good" in relation with others. In his words, "for
community to become real the mode of relation characterized by freedom to
be and become ourselves in and through relations of personal equality must
take place within the context of certain dispositions and intentions towards
other persons (in search of 'a common good')" (Fielding, 2000: 400). Thus, it
emerges that community is not fundamentally about location, time, memory,
or even a sense of belonging together in a group. Rather, community is a
process in which people regard each other in a certain way (i.e. love, care and
concern for the other) and in which they relate to each other and act together
in mutuality as persons in search of "a common good". Fielding (2000: 401)
articulates such an understanding of community as "the shared, mutuality of
experience". It is this working towards "a common good" on the part of people
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in their relation with others that provides the premise on which a Maclntyrean
understanding of communitarianism is based. This brings me to a discussion
of Macintyre's project of communitarianism.
Macintyre, in Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the
Virtues, argues for a dependent relationship between the individual and the
community. His book is an attempt to reconstruct the Aristotelian account of
the relationship between the individual and the community. Positively,
Macintyre (1999: 107) sees the individual as embracing the pursuit of what he
calls "practical reasoning".
Practical reasoning is by nature, on the generally Aristotelian view that I
have been taking, reasoning together with others, generally within
some determinate set of social relationships. Those relationships are
initially formed and then developed as the relationships through which
each of us first achieves and is then supported in the status of an
independent practical reasoner. They are generally and
characteristically first of all relationships of the family and household,
then of schools and apprenticeships, and then of a range of practices in
which adults of that particular society and culture engage.
Communitarianism - what Macintyre refers to as practical reasoning -
therefore, constitutes practices such as "reasoning together with others"
achieved through people's deliberative engagement in social relationships. In
other words, Macintyre's view of practical reasoning does not consist solely in
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
60
engagement in social relationships or practices. One can engage with
parents, family elders and teachers, for instance, but this might not mean that
one's engagement with them takes the form of "reasoning together". For
Macintyre (1999: 105) to sustain one in this quest of "reasoning together", that
is, to give to others an intelligible account of one's reasoning, one needs to
show "the ability and the willingness to evaluate the reasons for action
advanced to one by others, so that one makes oneself accountable for one's
endorsements of the practical conclusions of others as well as for one's own
conclusions". Political party members may advance their electoral manifesto
based on promises of seclo-economic improvement to individual voters who in
turn evaluate it. Individuals can endorse the party's manifesto by recognising
the latter's commitment to socio-economic betterment for the majority of
citizens and may decide to vote for it. The point is that voting no longer
centers around the decisions individuals make, but also their evaluation of the
reasoned opinions of others, in this instance, the electoral appeal of a political
party grounded in reasons for socia-economic improvement of the majority of
citizens. Consequently, the action performed by an individual constitutes part
of "some whole, so that by their performance the whole is brought into being"
(Macintyre, 1999: 106).
There is much more to Macintyre's whole argument than this; but enough of it
has been presented for the nature of his challenge to unsituated individualism
in favour of communitarianism to be reasonably clear. On this view of
personal reasoning the pursuit of individual goals do not occur independently
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of the goals of others. For Macintyre (1999: 107-108) "reasoning together with
others" (collective deliberation) is at the core of practical reasoning:
So the good of each cannot be pursued without also pursuing the good
of all those who participate in those relationships. For we cannot have
a practically adequate understanding of our own good, of our own
flourishing, apart from and independently of the flourishing of that
whole set of social relationships in which we found our place."
Macintyre's account of practical reasoning introduces the notion of "the good
of each" for "the good of ali". In seeking the good an individual does not do so
as an isolated individual but within a set of social relationships with others.
The question arises: What constitutes the notion of "good" according to which
the individual and others within the community engage? In a different way,
what constitutes practical reasoning which shapes the practice of "reasoning
together with others"? Macintyre (1999: 108) posits that "reasoning together
with others", that is communitarianism, can best be achieved through the
acquisition and exercise of virtues. Following Macintyre (1999: 92) "those
qualities of mind and character that enable someone both to recognise the
relevant goods and to use the relevant skills in achieving them are the
14 Macintyre (1981: 178) in After Virtue distinguishes between external and internal goods.
External goods such as power, fame and money belong to the individual and the more
someone has of them the less there is for other people. Internal goods such as learning to
recognise what is due to others, to listen carefully when told of our inadequacies, or to
advance the art of batting which could enrich the whole cricket community, are goods for the
"whole community". For instance, cricketers do not just become excellent batsmen
independently without bowlers and fielders. A good internal to excellent batting is that a
batsman scores a century through brilliant stroke play in relation with fast or spin bowlers who
ply their sport.
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excellences, the virtues ...". In After Virtue Macintyre (1981: 178, 204) offers
two accounts of the virtues: Firstly, he links the achievement of the virtues to
the notion of internal goods or "standards of excellence", that is, acquired
human qualities (for example, justice, courage and honesty) the possession
and exercise of which tend to enable people "to achieve goods which are
internal to practices". Secondly, he links the virtues to that of "the good life",
that is, "the virtues ... which will enable us to understand what more and what
else the good life for man (woman) is". This brings me to a more detailed
discussion of Macintyre's notion of virtues as internal goods or "standards of
excellence".
Macintyre distinguishes internal (constitutive) and external goods. External
goods are essentially competitive and belong exclusively to particular
individuals, which may include, tenure, prestige, money and power. Internal
goods constitute the "excellences" or virtues necessary to sustain practices.
Macintyre (1981: 175) inAfter Virtue holds
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an
example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill;
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but the game of football is, and so is chess. Brick-laying is not a
practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is.
So are the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the
work of the historian, and so are painting and music. In the ancient and
medieval worlds the creation and sustaining of human communities -
of households, cities, nations - is generally taken to be a practice in the
sense in which I have defined it.
According to Macintyre (1981: 175) practices contain internal, shared goods
which make people produce "excellence" appropriate to their "socially
established" cooperative activities such as building cities, nations,
communities, civilisations, and so on. For practices to sustain the excellence
of what is produced they need goods internal to their practices, that is, virtues.
Macintyre uses the example of chess-playing to illustrate his distinction
between external and internal goods. For Macintyre, on the one hand, a child
could be motivated at first to play chess by giving him or her incentives such
as candy. On the other hand, there are goods internal to chess which would
not have been there if the child did not participate or experience the game of
chess. When the child starts enjoying the game, plays fairly and intelligently
(such as having the courage to make good chess moves), in a Maclntyrean
sense, she has acquired the standards of excellence of chess-playing, that is,
the virtues of the game which could be shared with the wider chess
community. Drawing on Macintyre's explanation of internal and external
goods, I shall later on argue that the virtues or internal goods can also include
the care, conversational justice and political reasoning to sustain the
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excellence and "cooperativeness necessary for working (and deliberating) on
a common task".
Before I shall attempt to give a comprehensive account of virtues or internal
goods which constitute practical reasoning or communitarianism along
Maclntyrean lines, I first need to say something about virtues and achieving
"the good life". Macintyre's good life does not solely imply that human beings
engage in practices. What is required in one practice may be at odds with the
requirements of another: the demands on one as a poet, for instance, may get
in the way of one's obligations to the church. Somehow, the different practices
in which one engages must integrate with one's life as a whole. In other
words, the good life is to be understood as the goodness of a life seen as a
whole. For Macintyre, the good life for a human being has the form of a
narrative, that is, one's life is always embedded in the story of those
communities from which one derives one's identity, for instance, the church,
the drama society and the family. In his words, "the good life for man (woman)
is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man (woman)" (Macintyre,
1981: 204). However, to sustain one in the quest of achieving the good life,
one needs virtues such as courage, temperance, wisdom, judgement and
integrity to enable one to withstand the challenges besetting one's life as a
whole. Macintyre (1981: 204) poignantly notes: "the good life for man
(woman) is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man (woman), and the
virtues necessary for seeking are those which will enable us to understand
what more and what else the good life for man (woman) is".
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Moreover, Macintyre's account of the good life also introduces the concept of
tradition. In quest of the virtues (internal goods) one does not do so as an
independent individual but as a bearer of a particular social identity, as
someone's child, as a congregant of the church and as a citizen of a nation.
The roles one performs as a child, congregant of a church and citizen of a
nation have a historical dimension, that is, behind these roles lie a tradition of
practices which must be secured, sustained and challenged, if they are
corrupt. In the words of Macintyre (1981: 207) "the individual's search for his
or her good is generally and characteristically conducted within a context
defined by those traditions of which the individual's life is a part, and this is
true both of those goods which are internal practices ... ". It is this Maclntyrean
understanding of the good life in relation to achieving internal goods (caring,
conversational justice and political reasoning) vis-a-vis the notion of tradition
which forms the basis of my argument for Maclntyrean practical reasoning
along communitarian lines.
2.4.1 Caring
One of the central goods intrinsic to practical reasoning is possessing the
virtue of caring. It is not enough for an individual to be affectionate towards or
to be attached to others, which caring promotes. One has to be affectionate
towards or attached to a child in order to care. But this does not mean that
one just has to please a child even if one's actions are not in the best interest
of the child. A child might want to do canoeing in smooth water of a lake and
later on down a stream in canoe racing without having been educated to
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Consider the example of a family at anyone of a number of stages of
Western history, a family in which the parents have generally done well
by their children, by the best standards available to them in their
particular time and place. The mother has given them excellent
prenatal and natal care, supported in this by the father, aunts, uncles,
and grandparents, all of whom contributed appropriately at each stage
of the children's education. The father and the mother not only
maneuver the canoe backwards and sideways or to cope with winds and other
inclement weather conditions. It would please the child if you allow her to
paddle a canoe, which might not be in the best interest of the child's safety. If
one is really to acquire the virtue of caring for others and not just being
affectionate towards them, one needs to cultivate in others the capacity to
reach their own justifiable conclusions to which they are to be held
accountable by and to others for those conclusions - referred to by Macintyre
(1999: 83) as the ability to evaluate, modify or reject one's own practical
judgments. As the child is "taught" the procedures on entering and leaving,
paddling, steering and portaging (carrying) a canoe as well as about the
seasonal conditions to canoeing, and how she needs to paddle skillfully such
as taking difficult decisions in inclement weather, she has been initiated into a
practice of evaluating, modifying and rejecting her judgments concerning
handling a canoe. The child is cared for if she received good education about
canoeing as well as having acquired ways to discover her own version of the
sport. In turn the child will act prudently, that is, exercise practical reasoning.
Macintyre's (1999: 103) argument for caring in the family evinces this point:
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generally put the children in the hands of good teachers, but also were
actively supportive of those teachers. The parents, that is, through
exercising their authority prudently, showed themselves to be worthy of
authority. The children have thereby learned to recognize that prudent
authority is an essential ingredient of what was given to them by way of
care and education, so that they could become what they now are,
independent practical reasoners.
To come back to the point raised about the child who received a good
education about canoeing, her educators (parents or trainers) did not just
impose on her their own understanding of canoeing but allowed her the
freedom of choice to reflect on and to modify and sustain the practice of
handling a canoe. The child has developed the capacity to make practical
judgments when she encounters unforeseen possibilities in water; she would
rationally make decisions that would not necessarily endanger her life and the
lives of other competitors; and after every major canoeing event she would
reeducate herself as to become more competitive in canoe racing. Caring
then, does not merely involve cultivating in ourselves "degrees of affection"
toward others but also when we encourage others to develop the capacities of
evaluation and modification, that is, what others consider to be sufficiently
good reasons for acting and to imagine alternative possibilities so as to be
able to rationally reeducate themselves, to become practical reasoners
(Macintyre, 1999: 83).
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2.4.2 Conversational justice
The kind of care individual practical reasoners (communitarians) practise will
not only help others to make rational choices, to be imaginative and to
reeducate themselves, but also to trust and rely upon those from whom they
have received care. This implies that both the givers and receivers of care in
the first place have to engage justly in conversation (deliberation) with one
another. Following Macintyre (1999: 111) "conversational justice requires
among other things, first that each of us speaks with candor, not pretending or
deceiving or striking attitudes, and secondly that each takes up no more time
than is justified by the importance of the point that she or he has to make and
the arguments necessary for making it". I want to elucidate some touchstones
of caring which I think constitute a Maclntyrean understanding of
conversational justice: "candor", "the importance of the point" and "arguments
necessary for making it (the point)".
Considering these touchstones of conversational justice, it emerges that the
concept is both a view of human experience and a moral value which
recommends a certain attitude and response to human engagement. On the
one hand, as a moral value, conversational justice conceives of the
relationship between the self and the other dialectically, that is, conversational
justice is the basis for engagement based on honesty, openness, sincerity,
truthfulness; moral aspects which link strongly with the notion of candor.
Candor implies that conversations should not be understood as always a
pleasant and willing sharing, but also as provocations, threats, and
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resistances which involve being honest, open, sincere and truthful to evaluate
and sometimes to abandon or to alter old ways (Fay, 1999: 233).
On the other hand, conversational justice as a view of human experience
encourages people to engage their differences and to present arguments to
justify "the importance of the point" in ways that explore possibilities for
productive and positive learning from each other. This involves situations
whereby, in the words of Fay (1996: 234),
People can learn about others and from others, thereby not only
learning about them and themselves but also opening up new
possibilities for themselves and other(s) in the processes of
engagement.
I shall now elaborate on this notion of conversational justice as engagement
whereby people not only encounter each other's differences, but also improve
possibilities for communication and deliberation through which they can
produce arguments to justify their points. Two significant features, namely
recruitability and respect, constitute engagement based on conversational
justice.
According to Fay (1996: 237),
Recruitability refers both to the capacity to elicit another's regard in you
and your capacity to become invested in the lives of others ... (It is) an
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enhanced ability to listen and respond to others; a deepened
appreciation of the ways others contribute to our own self-knowledge;
and an enlargement of our moral imaginations.
Enhancing our ability to "listen and respond to others" implies that people
have to be willing to hear and be open to accept what others have to say.
They have to interact with others who are different, and they should mutually
explore and share with others alternatives as a way to develop their own and
others' understanding. Walzer (1983: 310) makes the point that in genuine
democratic politics "(t)he citizens must be ready and able, when his (her) time
comes, to deliberate with his (her) fellows, listen and be listened to, take
responsibility for what he (she) says or does". To be able to "listen and
respond to others" in the first place implies that engagement on the part of all
people should be unconditional. In fact engagement should be congruent with
the notion of recruitability whereby the possibility is increased for people to
become unconditionally engaged by others. That is, for them to deliberate on
matters without any conditionality attached to their engagement. In this way,
suspicion and unnecessary antagonism among different people can be
removed, thus improving the credibility and legitimacy of human engagement
and their decisions by fostering greater co-operation and mutual respect
between and among themselves which would enhance their desire and ability
to extend their mutual relationships, eager to share with others.
But unconditional engagement of all people in societal matters would not by
itself ensure conversational justice. My contention is that mutual respect has
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to occur among people. In seeking to achieve mutual respect, for instance, in
the face of political disagreement, we need to attend to the way people hold or
express positions. For example, the way in which political opponents should
treat each other with regard to policy issues, even when the policy debate
ends in legislation and the state takes a position favouring one side of the
dispute, needs to be grounded in principles constituting mutual respect. In this
regard it is worth referring to Gutman and Thompson (1990: 76) who claim the
following:
Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree. But
mutual respect demands more than toleration. It requires a favourable
attitude, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one
disagrees. It consists in a reciprocal positive regard of citizens who
manifest the excellence of character that permits a democracy to
flourish in the face of (at least temporarily) irresolvable moral conflict.
In other words, mutual respect, unlike recruitable engagement, should not
merely be an unconditional acceptance of everything people say or propose-
people should agree to disagree. Voters who support the dominant political
party do not show respect for campaigning politicians by simply accepting
everything they say; campaigning politicians do not show respect for voters
merely by making electoral promises. Fay (1996: 239) makes the following
point about respect as constitutive of conversational justice:
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
72
Respect demands that we hold others to the intellectual and moral
standards we apply to our friends and ourselves. Excusing others from
o
demands of intellectual rigor and honesty or moral sensitivity and
wisdom on the grounds that everyone is entitled to his or her opinion no
matter how ill-informed or ungrounded, or - worse - on the grounds
that others need not or cannot live up to these demands, is to treat
them with contempt. We honor others by challenging them when we
think they are wrong, and by thoughtfully taking their (iustifiable)
criticisms of us. To do so is to take them seriously; to do any less is to
dismiss them as unworthy of serious consideration, which is to say, to
treat them with disrespect.
If voters of the dominant political party for example, prevent other political
parties of the right to campaign freely, and thus prevent other voters of the
freedom to exercise their choice of political party; or if campaigners of the
dominant political party are unable to handle intimidation and violence on the
part of their voters against other candidates and voters, their actions should
not be "beyond the pale of critical judgment" (Fay, 1996: 239). Respect does
also not mean that everything voters of the dominant political party do is "fine",
such as when they overtly attempt to destabilise the electoral campaigns of
minority candidates. Respect means that voters should be held accountable to
support and implement the issue of free and fair elections on the basis of self-
reflection. In this way, respect does not simply mean acceptance of everything
people do. Respect conceived as mere acceptance of everything people do or
say, negates conversational justice. According to Fay (1996: 240), this
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Mutual respect manifests a distinctively democratic kind of character -
the character of individuals who are morally committed, self-reflective
about their commitments, discerning of the difference between
respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to
the possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at
some time in the future if they confront unanswerable objections to their
present point of view.
understanding of respect "enjoins us to appreciate others but not to engage
them in mutual critical reflection". Once again, Gutman and Thompson (1990:
76) aptly explain mutual respect as follows:
With reference to South African politics, I agree with Lodge when he cautions
(1999: 74) against the uncritical acceptance of everything the African National
Congress (ANC) as a dominant majority party does, which in his view poses a
major threat to constitutional matters:
If every kind of opposition to government policy is viewed as sinister
and subversive - and this did seem to be the perception reflected in
Nelson Mandela's speech at the ANC's fiftieth conference (in 1997), in
its characterisation of parliamentary opponents as 'implacable enemies'
and of critical lobbying organizations as unpatriotic 'instruments of
foreign governments' - then constitutional safeguards will offer limited
solace for liberal democrats.
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requires citizens to strive not only for agreement on principles
governing the basic structure but also for agreement on practices
governing the way they deal with principled disagreements ... they can
value public deliberation as a critical means of subjecting their moral
commitments to critical scrutiny (and possibly change them in the
future); and they can give serious consideration to opposing points of
view as a manifestation of their respect for morally reasonable people.
Put differently, the existence of conflicting opinions in the political process
should not be seen as depravity on the part of political opponents but rather,
requires "an effort to appreciate the moral force of the oppositions of people
with whom we disagree" (Gutman & Thompson, 1990: 85). In essence, the
principles of mutual respect implies that the forums in which we conduct our
political conversation should encourage people to justify their actions with
moral reasons and give others the opportunity to criticize those reasons. In
the words of Gutman and Thompson (1990: 88), mutual respect
This brings me to a discussion of political reasoning.
2.4.3 Political reasoning
Macintyre's account of practical reasoning (communitarianism) introduces the
virtue of "shared rational deliberation" or " political reasoning". In seeking the
good and exercising political reasoning each individual has to contribute "to
the shared (rational) deliberations of the community in his or her own voice"
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(Macintyre, 1999: 140). It is as a political reasoner that one engages in
practical reasoning; and what cultivates political reasoning is that no one in
the community should be ignored and excluded from political deliberation. On
this communitarian view there is nothing which can limit people from
exercising their voices in communal and rational deliberation. According to the
virtue of political reasoning "each member of the community is someone from
whom we may learn about our common good and our own good, and who
always may have lessons to teach us about those goods that we will not be
able to learn elsewhere" (Macintyre, 1999: 135). Having a political voice, in
short, is a necessary and not merely an optional part of one's independent
and communal well-being.
But to have a political voice within this framework of practical reasoning,
external goods such as political structures, electoral and media resources
(including money to sustain political structures) must make it possible for
individuals first, to exercise their critical judgments in respect of shared
deliberative reasoning (Macintyre, 1999: 137); second, to have someone as a
proxy to be his or her "second self', to speak for him or her (Maclntyre, 1999:
139); and third to be assured of at least minimal security for him or her and
others "from external aggression and internal criminality" (Macintyre, 1999:
132).
First, as regards the individual's exercise of critical judgment in respect of
shared deliberative reasoning, Macintyre's account of critical inquiry seems
apposite here. For Macintyre (1999: 156) critical inquiry is essentially rational
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and social, that is, people are able to engage about their beliefs, conceptions
and presuppositions only in and through relationships with others. This makes
critical inquiry a shared public discourse as opposed to a private one. But
what makes critical inquiry rational, more specifically reasoned deliberation?
Taylor claims (1985: 139), like Macintyre, that reasoned deliberation involves
being engaged in clear articulation of issues and attuning oneself to the social
world where possibilities may be contemplated, reflected upon and deepened.
Put differently, shared rational deliberation does not only mean individuals are
part of a whole whose voices should be heard, but what they articulate to
others who may be interested in their perceptions and perspectives should be
in a clear, logically consistent and unambiguous manner as they seek to
improve their situations and contexts (Taylor, 1985: 139) (I shall elaborate on
this notion of rationality in the next chapter under a discussion of deliberative
democracy).
This brings me to a more central point concerning critical inquiry. Macintyre
(1999: 161) holds that "truthfulness about their (people's) shared practical
experience, justice in respect of the opportunity that each participant receives
to advance her or his arguments, and an openness to refutation are all
prerequisites of critical inquiry". And for the reason that critical inquiry ought to
constitute political reasoning whereby individuals' voices are not muted in
communal action, critical inquiry has to be practised in a truthful way.
Truthfulness is based on an understanding that one has to be honest, sincere
and willing in one's actions - more specifically in political reasoning. People
engaging in political reasoning have to be sincere, prepared and willing to
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(T)he virtue of public discourse is not just the willingness to participate
in politics, or to make one's views known. It also involves the
willingness to engage in a conversation: to listen as well as to speak, to
seek to understand what others say, and to respond respectfully to the
views of others, so as to continue the conversation.
desired goal, rather than a prerequisite. In other words, the agreement that
can be attained through openness, what Macintyre (1999: 130) describes as
coming to a "common mind", ought to grow out of shared deliberative
reasoning. Kymlicka (2002: 289) aptly makes the following claim:
Moreover this notion of openness draws upon the virtues of patience and
constancy that can cultivate in people the capacity for tolerance and mutual
respect for "reasonable" differences of opinion. In this way, through engaging
in political reasoning to achieve the "good life" the idea of critical inquiry is not
impeded. In defence of achieving political reasoning, that is, critical, rational
and shared, Gutman (1998: 31) claims the following:
A necessary (but of course not sufficient) condition of living well in a
society where people differ in their moral convictions is effective
teaching of the liberal virtue of toleration. A more distinctly democratic
virtue that a good society must also teach effectively is mutual respect
for reasonable differences of moral opinion. Mutual respect demands
more than the attitude of live and let live; it requires willingness and
ability to accord due intellectual and moral regard to reasonable points
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of view that we cannot deem ourselves as correct. In the political realm,
toleration is a precondition for peaceful competition and pragmatic
compromise; mutual respect is a precondition for democratic (political)
deliberation and moral compromise.
In essence, for people to exercise critical judgments in respect of shared
deliberative reasoning means that they have to be agents of critical inquiry. In
turn, critical inquiry demands that people are rational, truthful and open in their
pursuit of achieving "a common mind" through political reasoning. Kymlicka
(2002: 289) posits that open and rational political discourse also includes "the
willingness to set forth one's own views intelligibly and candidly as the basis
for a politics of (critical) persuasion rather than manipulation and coercion". He
calls such a virtue of critical inquiry "public reasonableness" whereby citizens
have to justify their public reasons as to make others understand and engage
with such reasons (Kymlicka, 2000: 289). This brings me to the link Macintyre
establishes between political reasoning and the notion of proxy.
To have a voice through political reasoning does not simply mean that one
has to be physically in the presence of others in order to be heard. To
illustrate this point, consider the high levels of illiteracy amongst eligible voters
in South Africa, particularly in rural and urban townships and squatter camps.
The argument can be used that despite the fact that voters were given a
secret ballot and that they had a good understanding of what general
elections are about, their voices are not taken seriously as far as demands for
employment, housing and education are concerned. Why not? For the simple
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reason that since the country's first democratic elections in 1994, poverty,
unemployment, housing shortages, crime and illiteracy have escalated
particular in townships and squatter camps. A survey conducted by the
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) showed that highest on
people's agenda was crime, followed by unemployment, housing shortage,
the economy, poverty, education and discrimination (Koeibie, 1998: 99).15The
point is illiterate voters need not to hold rallies and march to local
municipalities or Parliament to voice their right for better material conditions
after electoral promises had been made. For Macintyre people who are
"unable to speak", like illiterate voices that might not be in a position to make
their voices heard, should entrust someone as proxy", that is, someone to be
their "second self', to speak for them even in their absence. Macintyre (1999:
139) makes the point that a proxy entrusted to care for others who are unable
to speak should know those and be rooted in relationships with those whom
he or she is entrusted to speak for. Thus the idea of absolute majority rule
where only the dominant party decides for all is challenged since the proxies
of people (illiterate voters) should know and come from townships and
squatter camps. Yet, they might not be constituent members of such a party
or might not even come from townships or squatter camps. But, as proxies,
15 Of course, government delivery in key areas between 1994 and 2000 was beginning to
show in official statistics: 4 million people previously deprived now have access to clean
running water; 1,1 million housing subsidies have been allocated and about 700 000 houses
have been completed; houses are constructed at a rate of 200 000 per annum; 70 per cent of
households have electricity and 1,5 million new connections have been made; 4,2 million new
telephone connections have been made; over 600 new clinics have been built and free
healthcare provided for pregnant women and children under six years of age; 6 800 families
have been settled on farming land; 1 500 km road has been built as public works; 7 Spatial
Development corridors are under way worth R 11Sbn; R 3bn has been allocated for poverty
relief; and R 100 bn per annum is allocated to expenditure on social services (Christiansen
Cawthra, Helman-Smith & Moloi, 2001: 80).
16 Unlike the current system of local government where representatives of political parties are
proportionally elected, proxies should come from constituencies they actually represent.
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For no state can justify that assertion unless it is able to provide at least
minimal security for its subjects from external aggression and internal
criminality. And the provision of such security generally requires that
there be police officers, firefighters, and soldiers prepared, if need arise
- and it does arise remarkably often - to give up their lives in the
course of their duties.
they have to contribute to the shared deliberation of their community's
concerns, raising his or her voice as the community's voice. In this regard,
Lodge (1999: 8) makes the point that since the 1994 election and in a
situation in which thousands of most effective organisers have found
employment in legislatures and government, these people have considerably
distanced themselves from the communities they used to mobilise so
successfully; an indication of how far removed people have become alienated
from their communities, which of course troubles the notion of proxy. In
essence, political reasoning by proxy provides a significant constraint for
absolute majoritarianism (I shall address this issue in detail in later chapters)
in the sense that it prohibits an exclusionary position towards any individual
including those from minority groups.
Third, there is another aspect which needs to be in place in order for political
voices to be exercised in communal and rational deliberation: political and
legal sovereignty. Macintyre (1999: 132) correctly posits that any democratic
state should assert political and legal sovereignty over its subjects:
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Despite emphasising the importance of the modern state to provide minimal
security for its citizens from external aggression and internal criminality,
Macintyre hastens to caution that the need to ensure the good of public
security must not be allowed to obscure the modern-state's quest to achieve
the shared (common) goods of the community. The question now is: is such a
Maclntyrean view sound? Macintyre (1999: 132) delineates that the good of
public security is "a good without which none of us in our various local
communities could achieve our common goods". I agree. However, he states
that the good of public security must not be allowed to obscure the common
goods of a community. Consider for instance, that the South African
community's shared public goods in a Maclntyrean sense constitute the need
to cultivate tolerance, reconciliation, nation building and other democratic
goods among all of its citizens. Yet, without combating escalating levels of
crime in the form of hijackings, burglaries, rape, child abuse, gangsterism,
vandalism, drug trafficking, corruption, embezzlement of public funds and
domestic violence, the public goods of tolerance, reconciliation and nation
building would be difficult to achieve for the reason that shared public goods
cannot be separated from the material conditions in which those goods need
to be cultivated. How tolerant do we expect people to remain or how do we
expect them to embark upon nation building if they constantly encounter
violent crimes and aggression perpetrated against them, and if public safety
can no longer be secured? The point is that the good of public security is not
inseparable from achieving the common good of a peace-loving and
harmonious South African community. In a different way, a potential skeptic of
Maclntyrean communitarianism might not find his line of argument defensible,
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
83
for the reason that the good of public security should itself be a shared
(common) good of the community. In this regard Van Tonder (1996: 28) quite
correctly claims "if factors like rising poverty, unemployment, socio-economic
decay, violence and crime can be arrested and then decreased by positive
economic growth ... only then can the frail base of tolerance, cooperation,
trust and acceptance be expanded and made dynamic, replacing the focus on
differences and contradictions". This view is echoed by Bohman (1996: 238)
in his explanation of deliberative democracy in the following manner:
The success of a deliberative (and communitarian) form of democracy
depends on creating social conditions and institutional arrangements
that foster the public use of reason. Deliberation is public to the extent
that these (secured public) arrangements permit free and open
dialogue among citizens, who make informed and reasoned judgments
about ways to resolve problematic situations.
However, such a departure from Macintyre's position on the separation of the
good of public security from the common public good should not detract from
the fact that political and legal sovereignty is a necessary condition for the
exercise of individuals' political voices, that is their "political reasoning".
In summary, virtues or internal goods which constitute practical reasoning or
communitarianism include the exercise of caring, conversational justice and
political reasoning to sustain the excellence and development of: first,
people's capacities to act reasonably and to imagine alternative possibilities
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so as to be able to rationally reeducate themselves; second, honesty,
openness, sincerity, truthfulness, that is, moral aspects which link strongly
with the notion of candor, as well as engagement through recruitability and
respect whereby people not only encounter each other's differences, but also
improve possibilities for communication through which they can produce
arguments to justify their points17; and third, for all people to exercise their
voices in communal (shared) and rational deliberation (I address this issue in
further detail in the next chapter under a discussion of deliberative democracy
with specific reference to the seminal ideas of Habermas). In essence, the
exercise of virtues or internal goods necessary to frame "communitarianism of
the left" can lead to an understanding where "the achievement of one's
individual good is understood to be inseparable from the achievement of the
common good" (Macintyre, 1999: 113).
2.5SUMMARY
In this chapter I analysed and explored various strands of liberalism which
include, utilitarianism, liberal equality and communitarianism. I showed how
each variant of liberalism invokes the notion of community, and
simultaneously challenges the idea of atomism or self-centred individualism. I
focused primarily on "communitarianism of the left", in particular its emphasis
on collective deliberation on the part of members of a community, which to my
mind, is best illustrated in Macintyre's plea for practical reasoning or
"reasoning (deliberating) together with others". I showed that caring,
17 8enhabib (1996: 87) notes that practical rationality is the possibility of free public
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conversational justice and political reasoning constitute the notion of
Maclntyrean communitarianism. In turn, communitarianism, as "reasoning
together with others" cannot be seen in isolation from securing the legitimate
interests of most people in political decision-making. In a democracy like
South Africa, people should have rights and opportunities, which can make
the idea of "reasoning together with others" an attainable political discourse -
what Bohman (1996: 54) refers to as that joint political activity "when a
plurality of agents who act together try to convince one another (through
deliberation) to coordinate their activities in particular ways". It is my
contention that securing people's rights and opportunities depend on a
particular understanding of democracy which considers collective deliberation
on the part of members of a community as central to the practice of political
discourse.
In the next chapter I shall explore the tradition of South African liberalism
particularly in relation to freedom, equality and the rule of law. In this way, I
would be able to establish links between the liberal tradition in South Africa
and the intellectual roots of liberal strands as espoused in this chapter.
deliberation about matters of mutual public concern.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TRADITION OF LIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I shall examine essential moments in the history and theory of
the liberal tradition in South Africa, in particular how liberal thinkers view
liberalism coterminous with community and democracy. Thereafter, I shall
analyse some of the gaps within such a snapshot of the liberal tradition with
the view to construct a credible notion of liberalism. In doing so, I shall subject
weaknesses which I have identified in the liberal tradition in South Africa, to
scrutiny in terms of deliberative democracy in order to come to a deepened
and more justifiable account of democracy (including the eradication of socio-
economic injustice) in a divided South African society.
3.2 ANALYSING LIBERAL PERSPECTIVES OF COMMUNITY AND
DEMOCRACY
Liberalism has never been a dominant force in the actual practice of South
African politics. Yet, the liberal tradition in South Africa has a long and
distinguished history which acquired an organised and political voice in the
Liberal and Progressive Federal Parties since the 1950s. By the late 1980s,
the Democratic Party (OP) succeeded the Progressive Federal Party and had
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grown to become the official opposition within the current democratically
elected Parliament. Van Zyl Slabbert (1987: 403), then leader of the PFP,
claims that the party was not the Liberal or even a liberal party, although it
inherited some aspects of South African political liberalism. For him, its history
has been far too diverse and complicated simply to depict it as a pure liberal
party. Yet, it was nevertheless committed to the creation of a liberal
democracy in South Africa, and as such has been the closest example of a
conventional liberal political party. Broadly speaking, throughout its long
history South African liberalism commonly rejected racial discrimination18,
preferred reform over revolution and federalism over centralisation,
considered market-driven economies as superior over command economies,
and reviled Marxist-Leninism (Johnson, 1998: 377). It is instances in this
tradition of South African liberalism that I wish to explore in relation to its
views on the notions of community and democracy.
3.2.1 Liberalism and freedom
SouthAfrican liberalism has been centrally concerned with freedom (liberty) of
. individuals and communities, particularly those communities shattered by
industrialisation, urbanisation and racial discrimination through apartheid
(Butler, Elphick & Welsh, 1987: 4-5). South African liberals have rarely
endorsed an atomistic view of society and vigorously defended individuals
against unjust laws and abusive administration (Butler, Elphick & Welsh,
1987: 4). Instances in the history of Cape liberalism prior to Union in 1910
18 Anyone who challenged racism in South Africa amongst the liberals, were usually labeled
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attest to this purported non-atomistic view of society on the part of liberals:
Between 1860 and 1880 the Cape government wished to promote Black
entrepreneurial activity; White Cape merchants together with political
administrators, missionaries, lawyers, editors and the government's opposition
of the day advocated the rights of Black peasants; and the pro-Boer and pro-
Black positions of liberals like Merriman and Schreiner in the 19th century
(Davenport, 1987: 27-30). These instances in the tradition of Cape liberalism
confirm liberalism's non-attachment to the rights of exclusive groups of people
at the expense of other people's rights. Instead, as stated by Davenport
(1987: 30), "Cape liberalism ... sought to protect the members of all groups in
what it regarded as a common society". This situation confirms liberalism's
non-atomistic view of society and that a 'sense of community involved
collaborating with and protecting others. Another example in point is when the
PFP under the leadership of Van Zyl Slabbert explored "selling itself' in the
Coloured and Indian Chambers of the then Tri-cameral Parliament. The PFP
met with determined rejection by most extra-parliamentary organisations
which opposed the implementation of the 1983 Constitution (Van Zyl Slabbert,
1987: 403). Simkins (1986: 5) reports that a considerable number of White
liberals have worked at culturally strategic parts of the interface between
White and Black society as missionaries, educators and philanthropists:
Prior to the 1950s, and especially in the reserves, a great deal of the
development work which was done in education, health, and even
production among black people, was done by missionary and
as "pro-Native", or pejoratively, with "kaffer-boetie" (by mainstream adherents of the national
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philanthropic organisations ... For a liberal, these organisations were
and are more than merely places where bossy whites could find scope
for indulgence of the desire to dominate. They are places where some
of the most interesting and precious components of our political
philosophical tradition were formulated.
Instances of liberal sentiments before the Union of 1910 were dealt a severe
blow with the incorporation of large numbers of Africans into the Colony which
sparked off White fears that unless they changed the electoral rules they
would lose political control of the Cape legislature. This resulted in the Cape
Parliament systematically restricting Black representation by limiting their
access to the franchise and removing Black voters from the common roll by
challenging their registration (Davenport, 1987: 32). This anti-liberal stance in
Cape politics resulted in a surge towards racial discrimination (Davenport,
1987: 32). Despite this upswing in racial discrimination, between 1910 and
1948, South African liberals fought a rearguard action focusing on questions
of welfare rather than on those of power, on influencing the dominant political
actors rather than on superseding them (Butler, 1987: 82). Thus, although
instances in Cape liberal history certainly suggest that liberalism's main
concern was to procure both the freedom of the individual in relation to other
people, that is, the community, paradoxically, it has also been concerned with
procuring the rights of minorities, in the instance of Cape liberalism, White
minorities in order to secure their political hegemony. The point I am making is
that it seems as if the liberal tradition in South Africa had a concern with the
Party), South Africa's version of "nigger lover" (Butler, 1987: 81).
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procurement of minority rights for the reason that an overwhelming majority
might exclude and marginalise their political voices. In this regard Butler,
Elphick and Welsh (1987: 7) posit that in the past many liberals in South
Africa "have shrunk from full democracy out of fear that the majority would
subvert liberal values". In other words, liberals advocated a notion of
democracy which invoked non-majoritarian rule. To explain this liberal
commitment towards non-majoritarian rule, it is worth referring to the ideas of
Hoernie (a liberal) who argued that White aversion to assimilation would
procure a sense of liberalism in South Africa. In other words, Hoernie (1939)
contended that total separation between Whites and Blacks should be the
liberal's choice, and to have chosen total assimilation was to condemn Whites
to domination by Blacks. His fear towards domination of Whites by Blacks
included the following elements:
A fear of being swamped, of being forced to live in an environment
dominated by alien (Black) customs and symbols ... A fear of the loss
of being treated deferentially and of having to defer to others formerly
considered inferior ... A fear of being exposed to greater competition
for income, position and power ... A fear of expropriation of assets ... A
fear of loss of liberty (Hoernlé in Simkins, 1986: 27).
Another example in case is Adam's (1983) argument for a rejection of total
assimilation of Whites and Blacks, as well as the liberal view that if political
power were to be wrested away from Whites, South African society would
become inhospitable to the exercise of liberal principles:
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A realistic discussion of constitutional 'solutions' in South Africa rests
on several crucial assumptions: (1) Any fundamental change can be
achieved with the cooperation of, and not against, the dominant section
in the ruling group. This follows from the second assumption that (2)
neither side can defeat the other, i.e. impose its solution on the
opponent; and (3) even if a unilateral victory of one (Black) antagonist
were possible, the price would be too high to make it worthwhile ... It
follows from the above that neither the white unilateral designs or neo-
apartheid, nor the black preference for one person one vote in a unitary
state, have a chance of relatively peaceful realisation (Adam, 1983:
140).
Moreover, liberals' concern with absolute (simple) majoritarianism is also to be
found in the ideas of Welsh and Van Zyl Slabbert (1979: 113):
• As simple majoritarianism has in no deeply divided society had a
democratic outcome, the principle of power sharing among all groups must
be institutionalised;
• The incentives of the political system must, as far as possible, provide
incentives for coalescent rather than adversary politics, that is to say, the
zero-sum style of politics must be avoided;
• The operation of the political system, must as far as possible, deny or
minimise the pay-off to racial or ethnic appeals, and conversely, it must
provide rewards to coalescent, linkage, or simply interracial movements;
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• Without rejecting or diminishing the informal safeguards, such as a
justiciable bill of rights, the fundamental safeguards for groups and
individuals must as far as possible be woven into the operation of the
political system itself; and
• As far as possible, potentially disruptive issues must be settled by inter-
party negotiations that avoid submitting them to open competitive politics.
In essence, on the one hand it seems as if liberalism's main concern was to
secure the freedom of all people or groups, thus repudiating the idea that
liberalism advocated an atomistic-liberal view of community. On the other
hand, liberalism's intent to secure minority rights (especially those of Whites)
clearly indicates its lack of support for democracy governed by absolute
majoritarianism ("winner-takes-all" rule). Instead, liberals in part identified with
the "middle ground" - a liberal position which emphasised compromise,
accommodation, peace-making and reconciliation (Butler, Elphick & Welsh,
1987: 7)19.
3.2.2 Liberalism and equality
Inherent in South African liberalism's emphasis on freedom was the
procurement of equality. Liberals insisted on equal opportunities for all
members of society, in particular Blacks and other exploited groups. However,
this notion of liberal equality was not extended to equality in people's final
19 Liberals are often regarded as altruists or paternalist humanitarians who worked for the
betterment of the daily lives of Africans the Coloured poor (Butler, 1987: 97). This altruistic
tradition is rooted in the close ties established between South African liberalism and activist
Christianity (Butler, Elphick & Welsh, 1987: 5).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
93
attainments and possessions, since this would have minimisedWhite privilege
(Butler, Elphick & Welsh, 1987: 10). Between 1910 and 1948, among the
largely disenfranchised majority Africans, Coloureds and Indians, there were
great limitations on education, property ownership and occupational mobility.2o
A small number of privilegedWhites, together with a small minority of Africans
and Coloureds (liberals) during this period, did emerge as "paternalist
humanitarians" working for the betterment of the daily lives of these people,
but failed in their appeal to the dominant White enfranchised for establishing a
more inclusive and egalitarian society (Butler, 1987: 82). Further proof of such
an egalitarian liberal position is to be found in the examples of Margaret
Ballinger and Edgar Brookes (Africans' two White parliamentary
representatives in the 1940s) who not only called for the abolition of the pass
laws and reconsideration of the whole Native policy, but also pleaded for the
full acceptance of Africans as South African citizens (Lewsen, 1987: 103-104).
Another White parliamentary representative of Africans, Donald Molteno (in
the 1940s) persistently called for the extension of democratic rights to African
and the complete defeat of the policy of racial segregation (Lewsen, 1987:
106).
I want to come back to the claim made earlier that although liberals insisted
on equal opportunities for all, they did not encourage equality in the
possessions of all Africans, Coloureds, Indians and Whites. According to
Simkins (1987: 225) liberals do not consider the equalisation of material
outcomes in terms of people's utilities (possessions) as relevant to the debate
20 The overwhelming proportion of African men and women were labourers and domestic
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about equality in the South African context. This is so for the reason that
people's freedom, particularly those of wealthy Whites, might be constrained
in the sense of decreasing their income and wealth. Instead, Simkins (1987:
233) posits that liberals favoured affirmative action strategies to address the
inequalities of opportunity of those economically worst off. In his words, "while
liberals are not vulgar materialists, they have no grounds for refusing to attend
to economic inequality" (Simkins, 1987: 233). Certainly the concept of
community espoused by liberals has been shaped by non-racial principles.
The history of the Liberal Party (1953-1968) shows that it strongly opposed
job reservation, the Whites-only make-up of official trade unions, and the
inadequate education and training available to Black apprentices during the
1950s (Irvine, 1987: 126). The apartheid government's crackdown on the
Liberal Party in the 1960s through banning of its members, warnings and
other forms of intimidation and harassment suggest that liberalism in the
1960s embraced a non-racial sense of community which was intolerable to
apartheid's segregationist ideology. In fact the Liberal Party strongly moved
towards the idea of an anti-communist social democracy (Irvine, 1987: 118)
which could further equalise opportunities for disfavoured Africans, Coloured
and Indians. This liberal type of anti-communist social democracy clearly
indicates liberals' concern with equalising opportunities in terms of affirmative
action procedures, but not complete equality according to people's utilities -
an idea that seems to support liberals' concern with retaining White privilege.
servants, while Coloureds and Indians were in an intermediate position but still far from equal
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3.2.3 Liberalism and the rule of law
The rule of la~1 and the advancement of human rights have always ranked
among the main priorities of liberals in South Africa (Dugard, 1987: 271). The
credit liberals may take for their concern for human rights in South Africa is
best illustrated through the voice of Helen Suzman in Parliament, the crusade
of the women's activist organisation, the Black Sash, the vigilance of
newspapers such as the Rand Daily Mail and Cape Times, and the firm
stance of human rights lawyers and scholars towards highlighting injustices in
order to encourage the judiciary to adopt a more watchful role, to initiate a
debate over a Bill of Rights, and to transform Afrikaner attitudes toward law
and justice (Dugard, 1987: 279).
Moreover, during the 1950s and 1960s the Liberal Party's approach to the rule
of law supported a commitment to extend political rights to all South Africans
(Irvine, 1987: 117). Its primary emphasis was on the protection and extension
of civil and political rights, in effect an emphasis on procedural rather than
substantive rights. In other words, liberals were more concerned with a
nonracial suffrage, a common electoral roll in order to secure the political
rights of all voters and the legal protection of basic civil rights through the
ordinary courts, rather than with the content of the rights themselves. Certainly
for liberals the entire purpose of the rule of law became to resist incursions
with Whites (Butler, 1987: 82).
21 The liberal commitment to the rule of law is best explained by the following pronouncement
by the International Commission of Jurists in Lagos in 1961: "The rule of law is a dynamic
concept which should be employed to safeguard and advance the will of the people and the
political rights of the individual and to establish social, economic, educational and cultural
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into the rights of speech, assembly, association, and the like. Yet, the liberals'
concern to expand the rule of law to embrace socio-economic justice in the
fullest sense could never really materialise. This is so, for the reason that
Afrikaner natlonalisrrr" was not only hostile to liberalism, but also the fact that
the pursuit of the rule of law on the part of liberals was never allied in a
realistic way which could have involved a settlement of the broader economic
and political issues that divided South Africans (Mathews, 1987: 287). During
the oppression under National Party rule, liberals advocated the application of
the rule of law which further entrenched the unequal status of a divided South
African society. In the words of Mathews (1987: 286), "In advocating these
constitutional measures, liberals were in practice untrue to the narrow doctrine
of the rule of law to which they gave intellectual adherence, since they sought
to preserve the economic and property rights of the privileged by entrenched
restraints of law". Procedurally Africans had a right to education which could
legally be defended in a court of law. However, the fact that educational
opportunities were unequal under apartheid rule (and which could not be
defended in a court of law) confirms their lack of possessing substantive
rights. Similarly, Coloureds and Indians had a procedural right to own
property. But the fact that they could only acquire property in certain areas
suggests that they did not possess substantive rights to do S023. In essence, it
conditions under which the individual may achieve his dignity and realize his legitimate
aspirations in all countries, whether dependent or independent (Mathews, 1987: 282).
22 Nationalism is an ideology, an action-oriented system of ideas, according to which the
highest political loyalty is owed to the nation (Degenaar, 1987: 236).
23 Somewhat paradoxically a secondary value of liberalism is rooted in the conviction that
private ownership will tend to foster the liberal values of freedom, equality, prosperity and
justice (Butler, Elphick & Welsh, 1987: 7). Yet, disadvantaged property owners under
apartheid rule were in fact not free, equal and justly treated. Moreover, although many liberals
did not regard capitalism as the core of liberalism, some argue that the distressing features of
apartheid society - racism, human exploitation, inequality and poverty - are repeatedly
attributed to capitalism (Butler, Elphick & Welsh, 1987: 9).
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seems that for liberals the rule of law was a means to preserve the privileges
of the dominant classes and that the associated idea of procedural rights as
against substantive rights was designed to protect Whites24 against the full
force of democracy under Black majority rule (Butler, Elphick & Welsh, 1987:
12).
In essence, my cursory analysis of essential moments in the liberal tradition in
South Africa indicates that three distinct features of liberal thought always
seemed to have influenced liberalism's agenda in South Africa: (1)
Liberalism's non-atomistic view of society which involves procuring the
freedom of the individual in relation to others, together with a non-majoritarian
notion of democracy in order to safeguard minority rights; (2) the equalisation
of opportunities through affirmative action measures as opposed to providing
complete equality according to people's utilities in order to safeguard White
privilege; and (3) the provision of procedural rights as opposed to substantive
rights for disadvantaged groups within the parameters of the rule of law.
Despite these deeply rooted liberal influences in South African society, no
liberal party has ever governed the country. Before I explore some of the gaps
within a liberal notion of community and democracy in South Africa as
espoused above, I shall firstly conclude this section with a brief discussion of
the country's final Constitution, considered by many liberals as an "ironic
victory" since liberalism never penetrated the ranks of political power
(Johnson & Welsh, 1998: 21).
24 Degenaar (1987) claims that liberalism has always been concerned with the right of (White)
minorities. Even the word "liberalism" affirms the rights of individuals, of minorities, and of
institutions against the power of the state; it asserts freedom of speech and assembly; it
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98
Constitutive features of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of
1996 embody a transition from authoritarian rule towards the deepening of
democracy. The Constitution is the product of the negotiation process which
took place among 26 political parties with the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa (Codesa) in 1991.and the Kempton Park negotiations through
1993 (Van Tonder, 1996: 12). The constitutive features which link strongly
with principles of liberal democracy are embedded in the following sections
which broadly make up the Constitution: constitutional sovereignty, a set of
immutable constitutional principles and basic values, fundamental rights, a
constitutional court, an electoral system of proportional presentation, a
government of national unity, a constitutional assembly, 11 official languages,
a new flag and two anthems, nine provinces with legislative and executive
functions, and a system providing for comprehensive local government (Van
Tonder, 1996: 14).
I agree with arguments that the Constitution contrasts sharply with classical
liberal documents, whose chief purpose was to secure individual freedom,
rights and property from governmental imposition. Liberals claim that the
Constitution enshrines core liberal principles: the protection of human rights
and the rule of law (Welsh, 1998: 21). This kind of constitutional liberalism is
corroborated by the fact that it is possible, liberals would argue, to read it as
an embodiment of "the idea that the power of community can (and must) be
deployed to achieve goals consistent with freedom, (and) that collective power
affirms the rule of law, the insistence that no governmental official is above the law which is
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can be tapped to create social circumstances that will nurture and encourage
people's capacity for self-determination" (Klare, 1998: 153). Thus one finds
that the Constitution draws a close connection between individual political and
collective socio-economic rights. In this regard the Preamble of the
Constitution announces that the purpose of democratic transformation is to
establish a society based on social, as well as political justice. Section 1 of the
Constitution envisages equality across the existential space of the social
world. Dugard (1998: 23) posits that constitutionally the liberal ideal has
triumphed in South Africa since the Constitution of 1996 reflect hallmarks of
liberal democracy: a representative government, political accountability,
proportional representation, an independent judiciary, a Bill of Rights,
guaranteed press freedom and free speech, and a non-prescriptive approach
towards economic policy. However, there are concerns expressed by liberals
that the Constitution is not entirely liberal and therefore not a triumph for
liberalism. Jeffery (1998: 42) argues that the constitutional guarantees of
individual freedom have been constrained by the "hate speech" and
emergency provisions. Particularly disturbing for liberals is the fact that the
guaranteed rights have been turned into a code of obligations for individuals
and the private sector which could have disturbing implications in enforcing
conformity to new policies with strong ideological overtones (Jeffery, 1998:
42). Also worrying for liberals is the extension of socio-economic rights to
include the rights of access to housing, health care, and so on, which they
argue will increase the power of the state while undermining privatisation
(Jeffery, 1998: 43). It is not my intention to discuss the liberal or illiberal
ultimately created and sustained by the people's will (Butler, Elphick & Welsh, 1987: 8).
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tendencies of the Constitution since this requires substantial constitutional and
political analyses beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, I shall explore
some of the gaps within the liberal tradition identified earlier with reference to
notions of community and democracy with the view to construct a credible
notion of liberalism. Thereafter, I shall subject constitutive features of
liberalism, namely, non-majoritarianism to procure minority rights, equalising
opportunities through affirmative action and providing procedural rights to the
disadvantaged, to deliberative democratic scrutiny in order to suggest ways to
deepen democracy in a divided South African society.
3.3 GAPS WITHIN THE LIBERAL ARGUMENT
In the previous section, I have identified three distinct weaknesses which can
be associated with liberalism in South Africa: the need for non-majoritarianism
to procure minority freedoms; equalising opportunities through affirmative
action measures and providing procedural rights to the disadvantaged. I shall
address these weaknesses in detail in order to point to several gaps within
liberal thought in South Africa.
3.3.1 Absolute majoritarianism vs non-majoritarianism
A weakness of liberalism in South Africa is best illustrated in its concern to
procure the freedom of the individual. Liberalism does not fully invoke the
notion of community for the reason that it considers an exclusive (absolute)
majority (within the same community of South Africans) to be dismissive of
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minority political voices. In other words, liberalism seems to advocate that a
Black majority would dominate a White minority. This brings me to a
discussion of some of the inadequacies associated with such a view of
majoritarianism. Of course, liberalism seems to have a justifiable argument
against strict (absolute) majoritarianism if it were to be accepted that the
Afican National Congress (ANC), notwithstanding its alliance with the South
African Communist party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU), is likely to remain a majority political party for the
immediate future. Liberals claim that many of electoral voters constituting an
ethnic majority are not necessarily convinced that other political parties could
enact socio-economic justice, political emancipation and nation building,
which makes it rather unlikely that the ANC is going to be forced to coalesce
with other smaller and competing parties in order to gain an electoral
advantage. This would mean that a commitment to power sharing with
minority parties depends largely on the ANC. By implication, minority groups
seem to have few guarantees apart from the general ones guaranteed by the
Constitution to individual citizens. What follows from this, is that the possibility
seemingly exists for the ANC to exclude the "voices" of minority partles" as
liberals suggest. It is in this regard that Koeibie (1998: 14, my italics) claims
that majoritarianism "is not a particularly emancipatory form of democracy and
negates the claims made by the ANC of liberation for all population groups ...
25 Results of the 1999 National Assembly elections indicate that the ANC secured 66,4 per
cent of the vote, some 4 per cent more than in the 1994 elections, and added 14 to its
previous 252 seats in the National Assembly. The DP experienced a major boost in the
election, securing 9,6 per cent of the votes in 1999 as compared to 1,7 per cent in the 1994
elections. Other minority parties secured the following percentages: ACDP (1,4), Afrikaner
Eenheidsbeweging (0,3), AZAPO (0,2), Federal Alliance (0,5), Freedom Front (0,8), IFP (8,6),
Minority Front (0,3), NNP (6,9), PAC (0,7), United Christian Democratic Party (0,8) and UDM
(3,4) (Christiansen Cawthra, Helman-Smith & Molai, 2001: 6).
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(causing the party to face) serious obstacles in building a new sense of nation
and community ... ". Now if South Africa's liberal democracy can exist under
conditions of exclusion which entails the primacy of the voices of the majority
over marginalised minorities, such a form of democracy according to liberals
can seriously infringe upon the personal freedom of minorities to pursue their
own conceptions of the common good.26 In this way majoritarianism might
restrict individuals from minority constituencies to "enjoy the maximum degree
of non-interference (negative liberty) compatible with the minimum demands
of social life in order optimally to pursue their conceptions of the good"
(Hudson, 2000: 94). When minorities are excluded or marginalised they are
prevented from realising their potential as "autonomous (moral) beings"
(Berlin, 1969: 136). Thus it seems as if strict majoritarianism undermines the
positive and negative bases of genuine liberal democracy - a claim that finds
expression in liberal thought. Of course, the problem with an ANC majority is
that within our ethnically divided society where a section of the community has
dominance in numbers (particularly Blacks), there always exists the concern
of members of minority constituencies that they might be marginalised. But
this is where I want to take issue with liberalism. In the first place, besides not
all ANC members being Black and that Whites, Coloureds or Indians are also
members of ANC constituencies or support the ANC for that matter, liberalism
assumes that absolute majoritarianism will always hold sway in South African
politics and that the voices of the numerically inferior minority political parties
will be marginalised and excluded. Certainly the argument seems justifiable
26 I use the "common good" as that which inspires the establishment of a moral, social and
political system for enhancing the well-being of people in a community. These goods include:
the desire for peace, freedom, respect, dignity, security and satisfaction to which all
individuals in a community have access (Gyekye, 1997: 46).
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which suggests that demands on the part of majority Blacks most adversely
affected by apartheid legislation are overwhelming, in the sense that they still
see the ANC as a government with a distinctly liberatory agenda. But then, the
perpetual liberatory concerns of many Blacks should not necessarily pose a
concern for other groups amongWhite, Coloured and Indian who contend that
socio-economic justice (for example, affirmative action, land restitution and
employment opportunities) advantage Blacks.Why not? Liberals consider the
Constitution to be an "ironic victory" for them, which in itself does not
announce strict majoritarianism. This is so, for the reason that the
parliamentary distribution of power is balanced between the National
Assembly where all legislation is passed, and the Council of Provinces, which
has limited veto rights over legislation and which directly affect the provinces
(Koeibie, 1998: 59). This indicates a "weak form of federalism" pervasive in
South Africa's liberal democracy. South Africa's federalism is further shaped
by the practice of proportional representation whereby each party is allocated
the percentage of parliamentary seats (400 seats in total) proportional to the
percentage of vote received by each party (Koeibie, 1998: 66). Moreover, that
the South African liberal democratic system is not strictly a "qualified
majoritarian system" is demonstrated by the Constitution's concern to rely on
several "watchdog" institutions which, along with the courts, monitor the
actions of the state and government. These include: the Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic
Communities, the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender
Equality, the Electoral Commission, the Public Protector, the Auditor General
and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (Koeibie, 1998: 68). Thus, what
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this discussion illustrates is that the South African liberal democratic system
vis-a-vis the freedom of individuals in association with a sense of community
"tempers majoritarianism with PR (proportional representation), and/or
federalism, and/or reserved positions for minorities" (Koeibie, 1998: 69).
Therefore, for some liberals to assume that majority rule poses a threat to
minority freedoms is to ignore the fact that majoritarianism can also be non-
exclusive, which in turn can be restrained constitutionally (This issue will again
be addressed in chapter 4).
Moreover, liberalism's argument for non-majoritarianism in order to procure
the freedoms of individuals is in itself not plausible. Why not? Certainly in
liberal scholarly circles curtailing the political power of the majority is related to
a concern that this deeply divided South African society with its complex
ethnic, language, racial, socio-economic and class divisions will not be able to
contain and manage inherent conflict in a liberal democracy with majority rule
(Van Tonder, 1996: 27). Therefore liberals purport that non-majoritarianism
seems to be a more feasible option. But how is this at all possible in any form
of decision making? Surely discussions and deliberations cannot occur
endlessly without reaching some agreement as to what course of action
needs to be taken or what decision ought to be implemented? Before any
decision is accepted by all parties involved in deliberation there has to be
some procedure involved which can avoid a possible stalemate. If this were
not to be the case, then governments might as well cease to exist since very
few decisions will ever be made or for that matter implemented. It is for this
reason that I agree with Van Niekerk (1999: 115) who recognises the
105
importance and value of majority rule in democratic decision making
processes. However, he correctly cautions that the situation in a pluralistic
society such as South Africa does provide serious limitations to the
"unqualified" use of majority vote. The thrust of his argument is that if the
majority consistently thwarts the needs and aspirations of the minority, the
situation in pluralistic societies could result in increasing conflict which could
pose a major threat to the legitimacy of the majority ruling party (Van Niekerk,
1999: 115). In a Popperian sense he posits that democracy ought not to be
identified with simple majority rule, but much rather with the entrenchment of
lnstltunons'" or "standardised life forms" (for example, courts, Parliament,
schools, regular elections, and so on) that enable or facilitate criticism and the
abandonment of unworkable policies in favour of better ones.
"Standardised life forms" such as to institutionally organise public opinion
through quality discussion and debate among citizens are more important to a
liberal democracy than simple majority rule. This sort of "habitual action" or
interchange between institutions and their publics is important to deliberative
democracy for the reason that it not only permits innovation and social
change; it makes the institutions that organise deliberation more responsive
27 Rossouwand Van Niekerk (1990) explain institutions as follows: "Social and cultural
institutions are established, generally accepted and standardised customs, habitual patterns
of action and stable relationship structures that are prescribed by society and in compliance
with which we order our daily lives. We can also call such institutions standardised life forms
and practices. Each institution entails a body of obligations and expectations that are normally
acknowledged spontaneously, and to which we try our utmost to comply. Examples of such
social and cultural institutions include the monogamous marriage and all its accompanying
practices; various interpersonal codes of conduct; the ways in which we work together,
conduct business or share the product of our concerted labour (or neglect to do so); the way
in which authority is regulated, disputes settled and right administered; the method for the
gathering and distribution of knowledge, and according to which education takes place; in
short, all the social traditions to which we daily conform. Such social and cultural institutions
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and effective (Bohman, 1996: 239). In fact Van Niekerk (1996) contends that
political decision makers should be less concerned with what is good for all
citizens, but should rather concentrate their efforts on formulating creative
policy options which could be publicly evaluated through elections,
referendums and open critical debate - all those institutions that need to exist
in a society that would facilitate deliberation. Majority rule in institutions where
deliberation occurs - courts, universities, the stock market, political parties,
and so on - should only be resorted to in the event of irreconcilable
differences amongst people (Van Niekerk, 1999: 115) - a view I support and
shall argue for in chapter 4. The point I am making is that the challenges of
deliberative democracy (which I discuss in detail in chapter 4) can only be met
when institutions are organised in ways which enable citizens to deliberate
together and make public use of their reason in new ways. In the words of
Bohman (1996: 238) "(t)he success of a deliberative form of democracy
depends on creating social conditions and institutional arrangements that
foster the public use of reason".
Van Niekerk is not alone in advocating a view which curtails the power of
"unqualified" majority rule. Popper (1945: 124-125, 265-266) also expresses
his concern with "unqualified" majoritarianism with discussions on "the
paradox of democracy" and "the paradox of tolerance". On the one hand, with
reference to "the paradox of democracy", he does not see democracy as
merely the election of governments by the majority of the ruled. He questions
the moral basis of an "unqualified" majority vote for a "democratic" Fascist or
reflect the dominant life values and accordingly the accepted way of life of the particular
Communist government which curtails the freedom of the individual and
institutions, and encourages people to actively resist such a government.28 On
the other hand, with reference to "the paradox of tolerance", he argues that in
some circumstances a tolerant minority or majority must be prepared to
restrain the advocates of intolerance (minority or majority) through rational
argumentation. However, if those who oppose tolerance denounce rational
argumentation, they should be resisted "by force" (Popper, 1945: 265). The
upshot of Popper's paradoxes of democracy and tolerance is that an
indefensible form of majority rule, that is, absolute majoritarianism or a
situation in which a majority decides to end freedom, is not an option and
should unquestionably be challenged and undermined; a position I shall argue
for in this dissertation. In essence, on the one hand, absolute majoritarianism
could have debilitating implications for the sovereignty of South Africa's multi-
party democratic system. But then, on the other hand, non-majoritarianism
does not seem to be realistic at all since decision making in politics cannot
afford to result in stalemates. Consequently, my contention is that the notion
of majority rule needs to be looked at in a manner consistent with a notion of
deliberative democracy I shall explore in the next chapter. It is such a notion
of deliberative democracy, which I shall argue for, that breaks with both
absolute majoritarianism and the liberal argument for non-majoritarianism. Put
differently, majoritarianism does not have to be a procedure which
undermines and marginalises minority freedoms. But then, one requires a
community or cultural group".
28 Magee (1973: 79) claims that Popper has no moral basis for active resistance against a
Nazi regime for which the majority has voted. Such a government can be removed by
violence or "tyranny" if all attempts have failed to replace it by "reason".
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notion of majoritarianism which could transcend the unrealistic non-
majoritarian concerns of liberalism - an issue I shall explore in chapter 4.
3.3.2 Equalisation of opportunities equals better equality
The liberal argument advocates the need for equalising opportunities,
particularly those of the disadvantaged, instead of making a case for complete
equality among people. I agree with this position although not for similar
reasons proffered by some liberals. In this section, unlike liberals, I shall firstly
argue that the equalisation of opportunities can actually lead to better equality
if it is not simply considered as a means to afford procedural rights as
opposed to substantive rights to the majority of the previously disadvantaged
people - a view I contend could enhance the notions of community and
democracy in South Africa. Secondly, I shall briefly assess whether the liberal
position on affirmative action is the only answer to achieve enhanced
standards of welfare for all South African citizens. To begin with, some liberals
do have a case when they argue for non-complete equality among people.
What makes this argument defensible? One response to this question is found
in Taylor's (1985) idea of distributive justice. Before I explore how distributive
justice can frame the idea of non-complete equality among people, like Taylor,
I again refer to Rawls' (1993) celebrated theory of justice as fairness, which
formulates some conditions for the use of the concept. The two principles as
expounded upon in chapter 2 which constitute Rawls' theory of justice can be
summarised in the claim that justice as fairness is firstly conceived as a
framework of deliberation which can lead to sufficient convergence of points of
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view necessary to achieve effective and fair social cooperation among equally
conscientious persons (Rawls, 1993: 368). Secondly, this framework of
deliberation guarantees the freedom and equality of citizens as persons
capable of being fully cooperating members of a democratic society (Rawls,
1993: 369).
The appeal of Rawls' justice as fairness thesis is that it purports to disclose
conditions of securing "reasoning together with others", that is, deliberation,
cooperation and compromise - referred to by Rawls as "sufficient
convergence of judgment". Deliberation can be sustained insofar as citizens
learn to mutually respect one another and cooperate in a spirit of fairness and
willingness to compromise. A condition of justice as fairness, what Taylor
refers to as "separate human beings ... collaborating together", distinguishes
it from other conditions which impose limits on people cooperating together,
for instance, when individuals function independently from one another or
when majority political groups unjustly marginalise minorities. In aRawisian
sense, justice as fairness is premised on conditions whereby (a) citizens are
engaged in cooperation as free and equal persons, and (b) citizens deliberate
in order to achieve "free agreements fairly arrived at and fully honored"
(Rawls, 1993: 265). Most of these conditions of justice which presuppose that
people cooperate, deliberate and compromise in a society can be engendered
by the idea of deliberative democracy I develop in detail in the next chapter.
However, whether people should in fact engage in public deliberation as
"equals" is a matter challenged by the idea of deliberative democracy. In the
previous chapter I have argued that the notion of deliberative democracy
affords people an equal opportunity (which is in tune with Rawls' second
condition of justice) to engage in public deliberation, to willingly and rationally
justify their political arguments by subjecting it to scrutiny by others and to
reach convergent understandings, and to share in the inter-subjective
deliberations within their socio-political contexts - conditions necessary to
ensure that justice as fairness prevails. Yet, this does not mean that people
necessarily embark upon public deliberation as complete equals. Of course
both illiterate and literate voters are equally entitled to cast their votes or to
articulate their political arguments justifiably through public deliberation. But
this would be tantamount to sham equality. It is like saying that there is
equality in entitlement when each person has the right to articulate good
political arguments, even though illiterate citizens would in all probability be
unable to exercise such a right to which they are entitled (South African
citizens are equally entitled to own property or to gain a university
qualification, but due to financial constraints most are unable to). The sort of
point I am making is that people might be afforded an equal opportunity to
engage in public deliberation or might be equally entitled to do so, but this
does not necessarily mean that they would actually be doing it on the basis of
complete equals. It is for this reason that I concur with the liberal position of
non-complete equality. People in society do have different levels of
educatedness and political arguments articulated by some would be better
than or even override those of others which makes egalitarian public
deliberation difficult, if not impossible, to pursue.
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What follows from the above is that it would be difficult to conceive of justice
on the grounds that people deliberate, cooperate and compromise as
complete equals. It is here that the idea of deliberative democracy breaks with
Rawls' first condition of justice, which accentuates the cooperation of persons
as "equals". Deliberative democracy frames an understanding of justice on the
basis that people have a political voice in order (a) to exercise their critical
political judgments in respect of shared deliberative reasoning, and (b) to have
someone as a proxy to be his or her "second self', to speak for him or her. To
have someone as a proxy entrusted to care for others who are unable to
speak overrides the condition of justice that persons should deliberate in each
other's presence as complete equals. A proxy in the first place represents the
political voices of people who cannot (and do not have to) function as
complete equals in public deliberation. I shall now focus my attention on such
an understanding of justice (a view I presume liberals would argue for), which
obliterates the chances of people deliberating as complete equals.
Taylor (1985: 303) identifies two meanings of justice, which do not consider
persons as complete equals in society. His view of distributive justice
recognises: first, the issue of "differentials" which advocates "allowable
differences between wages or incomes received for different kinds of work";
second, the issue of "equalization policies ... which attempt to redistribute
income or economic prosperity, or life opportunities; either by transfer
payments, or by special programmes to develop certain regions, or to allow
certain disfavoured groups to catch up in one way or another (e.g., in
education opportunity)". Both constitutive meanings of distributive justice
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invoke a notion of equality which departs from the idea that people publicly
deliberate as complete equals. On the one hand, the differential idea
considers equality of income (remuneration) as unjust since "it would dry up
the stream of outstanding contributions" (Taylor, 1985: 306). Certainly in
South Africa equality of income would be wrong for the reason that citizens
(engineers, scientists, political philosophers, and so on) who have acquired
higher intellectual skills should justifiably earn more than others (say, income
tax clerks or debt collectors) on the basis that higher capacities are
considered to be key to the country's economic, social, cultural and political
stability. In this sense certain individuals seem to merit an "allowable"
favourable position in society than others. Put differently, justice does not
mean that a society should be one of "completely equal shares" (Taylor, 1985:
313). Complete equality of income would also mean that people do not differ
in the contributions they make to societal development. It is in this regard that
I agree with Taylor (1985: 306) when he posits "that highly talented people
ought to be paid more than the ordinary, that professions requiring high skill
and training should be more highly remunerated, and in general that complete
equality of income, or distribution according to need, would be wrong".
On the other hand, providing equal opportunities for "disfavoured" people to
improve their conditions in life, whether social, economic, political or
educational, involves giving appropriate consideration to distributive justice. In
South Africa, the majority of the population has been disadvantaged by the
previous apartheid policies. By implication, and in tune with the "equalization
policies" idea, measures need to be taken which can ensure redress and a
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more equitable distribution of resources "to help poorer regions" (Taylor, 1985:
315). What follows from this is that (a) the differential idea can ensure a
degree of justice between individuals on the basis of "allowable differences" in
income, and (b) the "equalization policies" idea can establish some degree of
justice between different (that is, favoured and "disfavoured") communities, as
well as within those communities. By implication, distributive justice is attuned
to the idea of deliberative democracy, which emphasises that a person fulfills
the role of "proxy" as opposed to all citizens engaging in public deliberation as
complete equals. In this regard, to use Taylor's (1985: 311) words, public
deliberation that makes provision for "allowable differences" whereby citizens
do not have to participate as complete equals, as well as equal opportunities
for particularly "disfavoured" groups are to be considered as "much more
equal" - an idea implicit in liberal thought, although with the aim to procure
White privilege. In contrast to this liberal stance, I shall address later on how
deliberative democracy can enhance the equalisation of opportunities idea
without being concerned about only procuring White privilege in South Africa.
The question arises: Is affirmative action - as suggested by liberals like
Simkins (1986) - really the only way to equalise opportunities particularly for
the majority disadvantaged? Statistics documenting South Africa's inequalities
with respect to unemployment and income distribution are often quoted to
justify affirmative action. In 1994 unemployment as a percentage of the labour
force was estimated at 32,6 per cent by the team of economists who wrote the
government's Macro-economic Strategy and, if broken down by race gives an
even more alarming result: African unemployment rate for 1994 reached 41
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per cent compared to rates of 6,4 percent, 23 per cent and 17 per cent for
Whites, Coloureds and Indians respectively (with African women being worst
off with an unemployment rate of 50 per cent); and 1995 figures show that the
poorest 20 per cent of South Africans received only 3 per cent of national
income while 63 per cent went to the richest 20 per cent (Jafta, 1998: 322-
323). While it is obvious that these socio-economic conditions are
unacceptable, it is less obvious that affirmative action is the only answer to
eradicate them. Affirmative action based on race and gender attributes can be
credited with being able to eliminate past economic inefficiencies such as
inefficient resource allocation, labour market distortions, depressed domestic
aggregate demand deriving from inequitable distribution of income (resulting
in lower economic growth), higher cost structures and poor international
competitiveness (Department of Labour in Jafta, 1998: 323). At the firm level it
is claimed that affirmative action will result in the following: a better
understanding of and respect for different cultures and values; increased
loyalty and commitment towards company goals; enhanced racial sensitivity,
mutual respect and trust leading to better teamwork; less stress on all
employees by nurturing their full potential; eradication of discrimination;
improved industrial relations to increase productivity; improved company
image; improved and harmonious interpersonal relations and focus on
performance (Eskom in Jafta, 1998: 323). Yet, after more that twenty to thirty
years of affirmative action measures in various countries around the world,
including Canada, the United States, India and Malaysia, Sri Lanka,
Zimbabwe and Namibia, indicators of success (or lack thereof) in the areas of
employment, education, income and wealth distribution, as well as improving
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general social conditions, can be attributed to considerable costs outweighing
realised benefits (Jafta, 1998: 327).29Likewise, despite affirmative action's
noble intentions, such policies have generally undesirable side effects: (1) the
emphasis of race-based affirmative action measures on race leads to the
reinforcement of negative stereotypes, racial tension, and a stigmatisation
which thwarts the efforts of members of the preferred (now designated)
groups to pursue their goals on merit and hard work rather than preferential
treatment; (2) the claim that affirmative action programmes encourage a
culture of entitlement which undermines initiative, self-confidence, and self-
reliance, and the fact the beneficiaries of racial preferences may always have
to prove their worth more than others because of lingering suspicions of
undue advantage; and (3) racial polarisation resulting from affirmative action
policies that insist on using race as a means of achieving racial harmony
(Jafta, 1998: 330-331). Thus, it needs to be asked whether considerable
resources with high costs invested in affirmative action measures (bearing in
mind undesirable side effects) actually achieved desired results and whether
such resources could not have been put to better use. My contention is that
affirmative action (as some South African liberals argue) is necessary but
should not be considered as the most important measure to redress socio-
economic imbalances created in the past. It is here that I find the idea of
deliberative democracy pertinent to ensuring that all South Africans, in
particularly the majority disadvantaged - those with least access to
29 High Costs include the following: direct costs derive from the expansion in the bureaucracy
in order to create the institutional machinery to implement affirmative action measures;
indirect costs constitute real costs in the sense that delays in hiring and recruiting are caused
by time-consuming affirmative action regulations, for example, the private sector and
educational institutions; opportunity costs which allocate human and financial resources away
employment, food, security and productive assets - become better off. Now
that I have shown that affirmative action efforts are not entirely sufficient to
redress the socio-economic imbalances in South Africa, I shall address later
on how deliberative democracy with it emphasis on building capacity through
co-operation can ensure benefit to all citizens (minorities and majorities).
3.3.3 Procedural rights vs substantive rights
Earlier I have identified liberalism's concern with the procedural rights of the
disadvantaged which are dependent exclusively on the political processes
through which they are secured and not on the substantive (non-procedural)
content of the rights themselves. My contention is that liberalism's failure to
reconcile a substantive, non-procedural procurement of rights with a
straightforward procedural conception of rights not only undermines the rights
of the disadvantaged, but also further entrenches discrimination and socio-
economic inequality. My exploration into the question of rights (substantive
and procedural) espoused by liberals is confined to those of political rights as
a form of basic (human) rights. Basic rights are supposed to answer the
question of how any person ought to be treated and what kinds of actions can
be legally enforced by the state to ensure that a person is treated in a "morally
proper way" (Plant, 1991: 254). On the one hand, basic or human rights (first
order rights) primarily relate to civil and political rights (my focus) such as the
right to life, the right of citizens to have their dignity respected, and protected,
the right to freedom and security, the right to freedom of conscience, religion,
from areas of highest return which reduces possible productivity gains; and social costs
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thought, belief and opinion, the right to freedom of expression, the right to
freedom of association, the right to make political choices, the right to freedom
of movement (The Constitution, 1996: 6-8). On the other hand, basic rights
also encompass social and economic claims (second order rights) such as the
right to fair labour practices, the right to property, the right to have access to
adequate housing, the right to have access to health care services, the right to
a basic education, and the right of citizens to use the language and to
participate in the cultural life of their choice (The Constitution, 1996: 8-11).
Different from basic (human) rights are legal rights which refer to those rights
a person has and can exercise in relation to the legal rules or law under which
a person lives as a citizen (Plant, 1991: 254). Legal rights include the right to
administrative action that is lawful, the right to have any dispute that can be
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a
court, and the right to a fair trial (The Constitution, 1996: 13). My focus is not
so much on the distinction between different kinds of rights, but rather how
liberalism's exclusive emphasis to procure procedural rights as opposed to
substantive rights for the disadvantaged entrenches discrimination,
marginalisation and socio-economic inequality.
Illiterate adults living in rural squatter camps, for example, might possess
procedural rights to free, fair and regular elections, since literacy is
procedurally not necessary for elections to be held in a society where illiterate
adults live; and for that matter, still as an instance of the right to free, fair and
regular elections, illiterate citizens do not have to bother to develop their
associated with enforced race- and gender-based affirmative action (Jafta, 1998: 327-329).
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intellectual capacities within the area of political understanding. However, for
an illiterate person to possess procedural rights to free, fair and regular
elections does not necessarily mean that actually exercising these rights
would improve their life conditions. If one recognises that the right to free, fair
and regular elections is one way through which one can make informed and
rational political choices, then some minimal degree of capacity to make such
choices requires that one substantively assist illiterate persons to develop the
ability to think and act for themselves. In other words, illiterate persons' right
to free, fair and regular elections can be enabled by assisting them to
understand the political setting in which they live, and to make them see that
they could do something about it. The point is, the rights of illiterates would
only be substantive if conditions exist that could enhance the possibility for the
occurrence of informed and rational political practices. Illiterate adults in rural
and urban squatter camps who lack the capacity to make informed and
rational political choices cannot be left on their own to procedurally cast their
vote. If the freedom to vote is important for its effect on a society's dignity,
then anything else that promotes people's dignity - such as providing support
to illiterate adults so as to make informed choices - is also important. Hence,
it is inconceivable that every citizen should just possess the procedural right to
free, fair and regular elections if he or she is not assisted to develop an
intellectual inclination in order to exercise such a political right in an
autonomously rational way, that is to say, in a substantive way.
The question arises: How could one prevent such a procedural view of
political rights? Deliberative democracy (as I shall argue for in chapter 4)
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invites most citizens to be attuned with the political "order of things", and with
other citizens for the common good of it. This not only involves citizens
contributing, if they so wish, to public deliberations on what constitutes a good
political life but also implies that citizens in a Rawlsian sense share in the
coercive political power that they exercise over one another by establishing
conditions for free, fair and regular elections to flourish. This is different from
saying that every citizen has the procedural right to free, fair and regular
elections. Rather, most citizens need to be attuned with the order of good
political processes which involve the assistance of illiterate citizens whose
capacity for self-determination has not progressed far, condltlons" that could
lead to the exercise of a rational (autonomous) and substantive political right
on the part of most citizens to free, fair and regular elections.
Earlier, I pointed out that it seems that for liberals the rule of law was a means
to preserve the privileges of the dominant classes and that the associated
idea of procedural rights as against substantive rights was designed to protect
the interests of a White minority - an idea which further entrenched socio-
economic injustice towards the majority of people in South Africa. For the vast
majority of South Africa's citizenry, democracy encompasses liberation and
the achievement of socio-economic justice after decades of apartheid
legislation. For the majority of citizens, a substantive demand for improving
material aspects through a redistribution of economic resources, access to
education, health care services, housing, electricity, water, food, shelter and
clothing, as well as providing employment opportunities, is high on the
30 Citizens should at least have been taught the procedures of how to complete a ballot form
agenda. Koeibie (1998: 24) posits that the majority of South Africans maintain
that the country must adopt a social democracy with certain redistributory
elements such as a limited welfare state governing housing, education, social
security, and, to some extent, employment if democratic practices are to be
solidified.
Yet, despite the above substantive demands of South Africa's vast majority,
"global forces impinge upon South Africa's economic strategy and therefore its
politics of transformation" (Koeibie, 1998: 10). The emergence of a global
market-driven economy and the hegemony of liberalism meant that
governments would no longer playa substantive role in making sure that the
price of travel, basic commodities, health, education, as well as utilities such
as electricity and water, remain within certain bounds. The market has
become the new regulator, which means that costs and profits of individual
airlines, hospitals, telephone companies, electricity and water are left to the
private companies to set, frequently, at considerable financial pain to the
individual consumer (Said, 2000: 9). The ANC government is now facing the
same constraints placed upon them by the very same global corporate sector
that assisted it in bringing and end to apartheid (Koeibie, 1998: 19). But, for
the vast majority of South Africans a redistribution of resources, major socio-
economic reforms and development are necessary to stabilise the country's
newly found democracy. This implies that the demands of the majority of
citizens for socio-economic justice in South Africa, seems to be at variance
with the "logic of globalisation". In other words, global economic conditions
and to cast a ballot. Similarly it is the responsibility of the political parties to justify their
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can prevent individual voters among the majority of South Africans from being
able to effectively exercise substantive rights vis-a-vis their procedural rights
to socio-economic reform. In essence, a liberal democracy as understood and
practised in South Africa lends itself to socia-economic injustice towards the
majority of people. Such an understanding and practice of democracy
establishes conditions unpropitious to the maximisation of the substantive
rights of individual citizens. Now if substantive rights cannot be guaranteed by
South Africa's formal liberal democracy, I contend that a different form of
democracy is required that can cause all citizens to fulfill their potential. This
can only be achieved if both substantive and procedural rights of citizens are
guaranteed - a situation in turn, liberalism seemingly finds difficult to address.
It is for this reason that I shall, in the next chapter, use the idea of deliberative
democracy which can transcend the substantive-procedural dichotomy of
political rights procurement seemingly advanced by liberalism.
3.4SUMMARY
In this chapter I have brought into question three issues: (1) whether the
liberal idea of non-majoritarianism is an option in South African politics, and
whether majority rule would necessarily undermine the position of minorities
(Whites, Coloureds and Indians); (2) that the equalisation of opportunities idea
propounded by liberals cannot strictly be applied in relation to affirmative
action measures and with the intension to preserve White privilege; and (3)
that the liberal emphasis on procuring procedural rights for the majority
political decisions and opinions to citizens (illiterate or not) before they decide to vote.
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disadvantaged independent from achieving substantive rights seems to be
highly problematic. For now, my next move is to explore, analyse and reflect
on how the idea of deliberative democracy can construct a credible notion of
liberalism in South Africa.
Dahl's (in Lijphart, 1999: 48) proposed eight criteria of democracy still
command widespread support: (1) the right to vote, (2) the right to be elected,
(3) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, (4) elections
that are free and fair, (5) freedom of association, (6) freedom of expression,
(7) alternative sources of information, and (8) institutions for making public
policies depend on votes and others expressions of preference. Gutman
(1996: 340) also notes the following: "... democracies, are characterized by
guarantees of free political speech, press, association, and equal suffrage for
all adults, the rights of all adults above a certain age to run for political office,
the rule of law and frequent, competitive elections that are procedurally fair".
Moreover, according to Dahl (2000: 38), an ideal concept of democracy
implies "a complex body of enforceable rights and opportunities: to participate
I
CHAPTER4
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters I have shown how liberalism can assume various
faces in relation to its views on community and to a lesser extent democracy. I
now want to show how deliberative democracy seems to be an appropriate
discourse to ensure that a political community remains loyal to the value of
collective deliberation on the part of its members - a claim supported by
"communitarians of the left".
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in electing representatives; to freedom of expression, inquiry, discussion, and
deliberation in the widest sense; to form associations with others for inquiry
and political action; rights and opportunities to citizenship; and more".
Likewise for Akkerman (2001: 73), democracy involves actual participation in
political life through consultation, negotiation and/or deliberation among
representatives of government, civil society and citizens. In a different way, for
people to actually participate in political life by exercising their rights and
acting upon the opportunities guaranteed to them, constitute criteria of
democracy. In this regard,Walzer (1983: 311) states the following:
Democratic politics ... is a standing invitation to act in public and know
oneself a citizen, capable of choosing destinations and accepting risks
for oneself and others, and capable, too, of patrolling the distributive
boundaries and sustaining a just society.
In this chapter, I shall explore a concept of deliberative democracy that can
help to bring to light (1) conditions that are favourable for the advancement of
what Dahl refers to as public "deliberation in the widest sense" with reference
to three major statements on deliberative democracy - Habermas' rational,
consensus-oriented discourse, Rawls' public reason and Benhabib's
discursive democracy. Thereafter, I shall move on to the central question as to
what (2) general principle constitutes deliberative democracy. Followed by
this, I shall argue as to why the general principle of deliberative democracy,
namely rationality, is a (3) necessary condition to engender political discourse
in South Africa which does not advance a preference for absolute majority
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political decision-making. Finally, I shall use constitutive features of
deliberative democracy to (4) try and close some of the gaps associated with
the liberal tradition in South Africa.
4.2 DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC DELIBERATION
According to Gutman (1996: 341), "Democracy, Winston Churchill noted, is
the worst form of government except for all the others that have been tried so
far". Despite having been described by Churchill as "the worst form of
government", democracy has survived because there is a sphere for debates
and a set of rules (meanings) that people follow even if they do not benefit
from them (Torres, 1998: 425). This notion of democracy accentuates three
interrelated aspects central to an understanding of democracy: democracy as
a system, democracy as a sphere for debates and democracy as a set of
meanings. The first two descriptions of democracy, that is, democracy as a
system and democracy as a sphere for debates, can be linked to two broad
conceptions of democracy. Firstly, democracy as a representative system of
political decision-making and, secondly, democracy as a sphere for social and
political life in which people enjoy equal opportunities and are engaged in self-
development, self-fulfillment and self-determination (Carr & Hartnett, 1996:
40).31 In this regard, a representative democracy maximises citizens'
opportunities for self-determination, hence, "they must live in association with
others ... (which) necessarily requires that they must sometimes obey
31 Van Niekerk (1999: 113) who draws on the ideas of Raphael (1981) also supports this
notion of democracy as a form of social life ('nn algemene sosiale ideaal of waarde") which
manifests in phenomena such as education systems and management structures and is
different from state or governmental forms of democracy.
of the competitive market society - a product of successfully developing
collective decisions that are binding on all members of the association" (Dahl,
1989: 89).
Representative democracy basically means that collective deliberations that
concern the whole of the community are taken not directly by its members, but
by people elected for this purpose (Bobbio, 1987: 40). Schumpeter (1940:
269) defines democracy as a representative form of government whereby
decision-making is restricted to elected representatives, electors having voted
without participating any further. Democracy as a sphere for social and
political life is constituted by values of positive liberty (freedom of self-
development) and political equality (Carr & Hartnett, 1996: 41).
On the one hand, democracy is seen as a representative system of
qovernrnent.F In this regard Macpherson (1966: 36) descriptively identifies
three models of a democratic representative system of political decision-
making:
1. Western liberal democracy which was brought into being to serve the need
capitalist market societies. Liberal representative democracy created by
capitalism (with its capacity to appropriate wealth) relocates power and
domination from the state to civil society, to private property and the
32 Dahl (1996) notes that even restricting oneself to modern democratic systems, since 1993
at least thirty more countries have attained democratic political systems, adding to the twenty-
one that were defined as having reached that 'somewhat arbitrary threshold' by 1950.
Furthermore, there are also instances of non-democratic regimes replacing democratic
governments fifty-two times between 1900 and 1985.
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compulsions of the market (Wood, 1994: 5). It is a kind of liberal
democracy that accentuates the predominance of individual rights over
collective rights, power of the people over any other regulatory institution
and equal rights for all citizens. Individual (negative) liberty or the right to
private property is to be secured by the state against interference
(Pateman, 1979: 24).
2. Non-liberal Communist democracy, whereby a class state was created by
the proletarian revolution. It had the job of holding down the old ruling
class while transforming the whole society in such a way that there would
be no more basis for exploitative classes and no more need for a class
state, thus paving the way for a fully human society.
3. Non-liberal, non-Communist democracy in Third World States, which
rejects the competitive ethos of the market society and sees no need for
the competitive system of political parties. It sees the possibility of a
classless society and state (Macpherson, 1966: 35-36).
On the other hand, democracy is described as a sphere of social
relationships; social democracy undermines class distinctions and advocates
equality of opportunity for all citizens (Birch, 1993: 46). This notion of social
democracy can be extended to that which postulates radical equality in class,
racial, ethnic and gender interactions. Social democracy is primarily aimed at
welfare-oriented reforms within a market-related capitalist society (Gould,
1988: 10). For Pateman (1979: 27) social democracy emphasises
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participation on the grounds of equality and liberty; that is, people have the
right to control their own lives, and to become competent at self-management
and self-governance. She articulates this kind of democracy as a direct or
participatory form of democracy whereby people directly participate in
economic, political and social life.
My emphasis is on democracy as a concept that is constituted by meanings in
which all or most people in a society "has the opportunity jointly to play an
essential if not always very formative role in the determination of legislation
and policy" (Christiano, 1990: 151, my italics). Walker (1998: 12) identifies
four meanings of democracy according to their positions on representation
and participation in political discourse: democratic elitism, democratic
egalitarianism, left anarchism, and demarchism. For purposes of this
dissertation, I shall briefly analyse democratic elitism, democratic
egalitarianism and demarchism, emphasising how each does not satisfy the
criterion of public deliberation. Thereafter, I shall make an argument for
deliberative democracy as it unfolds in the ideas of Habermas, Rawls and
Benhabib.
4.2.1 Democratic elitism
Schumpeter's (1940: 269) seminal ideas on democratic elitism explain
democracy as a form of representative government, which restricts political
decision-making to elected representatives and thus excludes electoral voters
from any further political participation. In his words, democracy refers to "that
128
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1940: 269). Such an elitist understanding of
democracy restricts political participation on the part of electoral voters to
voting and invests political power in the hands of representative leaders. It
may be argued that many people do not want to participate in political activity
as long as an elected elite adequately represents their political interests. But if
the interests of the masses are not well served, then such an elitist form of
democracy could be damaging for political life since those who are led would
not have the opportunity to participate (other than voting) in decision-making
processes as to ensure that their political interests are promoted more
effectively. In a different way, democratic elitism does not leave much scope
for citizens to provide well-considered opinions on policy issues and to
publicly deliberate among themselves and representatives of government,
which can lead to improving the quality of political decision-making.
4.2.2 Democratic egalitarianism
Democratic egalitarianism advocates an understanding of democracy as a
form of social/political participation, which undermines class distinctions and
promotes equality of opportunity for all citizens (Birch, 1993: 46). This notion
of democracy can be extended to that which postulates radical equality in
class, racial, ethnic and gender interactions. Democratic egalitarianism is
primarily aimed at welfare-oriented reforms within a market-related capitalist
society (Gould 1988: 10). For Pateman (1979: 27) democratic egalitarianism
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emphasises participation on the grounds of equality and liberty; that is, people
have the right to control their own lives, and to become competent at self-
management and self-governance. She articulates this kind of democracy as
a direct or participatory form of democracy whereby people directly participate
in economic, political and social life. The point about democratic
egalitarianism is that representative political decision-makers are not assumed
to be "epistemically superior to the mass of citizens" (Walker, 1998: 16).
Citizens need to participate in political decision-making processes "to
enlighten the elected leaders about the interests of their constituents and
other members of the polity" (Walker, 1998: 16). In others words, egalitarians
endeavour to make representative political decision-makers accountable to
their constituencies so as to ensure that the rights of citizens are satisfied and
opportunities for participation maximised.
However, do possessing rights and opportunities on the part of citizens to
participate in political activity necessarily secure public deliberation? That
clearly is not the same. In South Africa, for instance, the illiteracy rate in some
communities is as high as 60 percent, thus making it difficult for these citizens
to understand what their rights and responsibilities are under the Constitution
(Ramphele, 2001: 4). Ramphele posits that the Constitution effectively
disenfranchises such citizens, particularly rural women and the young
unemployed, since it is "inaccessible to them as a tool for understanding and
asserting their (political) rights" (Ramphele, 2001: 4). She argues that these
illiterate masses are not in a position to make informed choices in exercising
their citizenship and are left at the mercy of local and national demagogues
who take it upon themselves to interpret what citizenship entails in the young
democracy (Ramphele, 2001: 5). The point is that the right and opportunity to
participate in political life does not, by itself, guarantee greater participation,
and hence, effective public deliberation on the part of all legitimate interest
groups in society.33
4.2.3 Demarchism
Walker (1998: 21), expounding on the ideas of Burnheim, explains
demarchism as a form of representative democracy which abolishes political
elections through a process of statistical democracy. In a demarchist society,
the representative centralised state is replaced by a variety of functionally
decentralized autonomous and specialised agencies "each performing one
specific function, and coordinated by negotiation among themselves or by
quasi-judicial arbitration ... (with) each agency ... controlled by a group of
trustees politically representative of all people with a legitimate interest in the
running of the body, each interest statistically represented to the degree that it
is affected by the body's decisions". Statistical representation is considered to
deal with the issue of electoral corruption on the basis that political decision-
makers of "functionally specialised autonomous agencies" are nominated as
representatives of the people concerned with limited terms of office (Burnheim
in Walker, 1998: 22-23). At face value demarchism seems to favour a form of
democracy, which necessitates that individuals and groups be able to
deliberate on and influence decisions affecting their legitimate material
33 Gutman notes (1996: 346) that "participatory democracy not only takes too many meetings
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interests, without having to rely on elected representatives in parliamentary
democracies who cannot always ensure that legitimate interests of people will
be represented (Walker, 1998: 21). In South Africa, it can be conceived that
the African National Congress (ANC)-Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU)-South African Communist Party (SACP) alliance manipulates
blocks of votes into concentrations of political power for their own
aggrandizement, with the effect of disempowering minorities whose interests
are actually affected by policies influenced by the alliance; a situation, which
does not seem to favour the notion of inclusivity in public deliberation.
However, my concern is more with the empirical conditions accentuated by
Burnheim in order for a demarchy to exist. Burnheim (in Walker, 1998: 24)
acknowledges that empirical conditions for a demarchist community include,
"a well-educated population that is reasonably democratic and tolerant in its
social attitudes ... ample productive technology, a willingness to participate in
matters that interest one and to leave alone those matters that do not, and a
desire to avoid rigidity and concentration of power ... conditions (that) are
reasonably secure in the 'advanced' countries". Considering that prior to 1994
"black South Africans ... were not only denied the rights of citizenship, but
also the kind of education that would prepare them to become morally
autonomous agents" (Ramphele, 2001: 3), it follows from this that
demarchism does not favour the South African community. In fact, Ramphele
(2001: 3) claims that people from former tribal chiefdoms "often do not
understand what it means to be a citizen of a true democracy". In this way, the
but also disrespects the people who would, quite reasonably, rather be represented than
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precondition that people should be "well-educated" and "reasonably
democratic" in order for a demarchy to exist in South Africa makes it politically
foolhardy for the country to consider moving towards such a form of
democracy. For citizens to be "well-educated" and "reasonably democratic"
cannot be a prerequisite for a South African community, but rather, that an
education for democracy should be institutionally organised and nurtured on
the basis of a politics of public deliberation. Put differently, demarchism does
not seem to be a sufficient condition to engender a tenable form of democracy
in South Africa. For this reason I shall argue for a concept of deliberative
democracy which in my view can maximise the political participation of most, if
not all South Africans, as well as securing formal representation (in the form of
governmental structures and processes) of their legitimate material interests.
4.2.4 Deliberative democracy
In this section I shall make a few preliminary remarks about deliberative
democracy before exploring the concept in more theoretical detail vis-a-vis
major statements of Habermas, Rawls and 8enhabib. Deliberative
democracy, a term that is currently much in vogue, simply refers to "a
conception of democratic government that secures a central place for
reasoned discussion (rational deliberation) in political life" (Cooke, 2000: 947).
For Gutman and Thompson (1996: 1) a deliberative democratic theory offers
"a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion
in political life". They argue that the promise of a deliberative democratic
represent themselves".
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theory lies in a concern for "finding terms of cooperation that each citizen can
accept" for the reason that contemporary societies are driven by deep conflict
and moral disagreement (Gutman & Thompson, 1996: 26). Benhabib (1996:
68) explains democracy as "a model for organizing the collective and public
exercise of power in the major institutions of a society on the basis of the
principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a collectivity can be viewed
as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among
individuals considered as moral and political equals". Bohman, another
contemporary defender of deliberative democracy, posits that democracy in
some form implies public deliberation, that is, "(t)he deliberation of citizens is
necessary if decisions are not to be merely imposed upon them ... consent, is
after all, the mean feature of democracy" (Bohman, 1996: 4). In other words,
political decision-making is legitimate insofar as policies are produced in "a
process of public discussion and debate in which citizens and their
representatives, going beyond mere self-interest and limited points of view,
reflect on the general interest or on their common good".
Other defenders of deliberation such as Walzer (1983: 304) posit that
"(deliberative) democracy puts a premium on speech, persuasion, rhetorical
skill ... and the citizen who makes the most persuasive argument - that is, the
argument that actually persuades the largest number of citizens - gets his
(her) way". Benhabib (1996: 69) pertinently posits that "the deliberative model
of democracy is a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality
with regard to collective decision making processes in a polity, that the
institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the
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common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation
conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals. The more
collective decision-making processes approximate this model the more it
increases the presumption of their legitimacy and rationality." She argues that
participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and
symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to
interrogate, and to open debate; all have the right to question the assigned
topics of conversation; and all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments
about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are
applied or carried out (Benhabib, 1996: 70).
Rationality (reasoned, reflexive discussion) or what Habermas (1996a: 147)
would refer to as deliberation, can be considered as "unhindered
communicative freedom ... (which involves) rational opinion- and will-
formation" and always potentially leads to a transformation in people's
preferences. My emphasis is on Habermas' notion of "unhindered
communicative freedom" as a constitutive good of deliberative democracy. If
an exchange of arguments or points of view in a Habermasian sense should
be unconstrained, it follows from this that no individual or group of people
could legitimately exclude others from deliberating on political matters that
interest them. The rights of people to participate in deliberation are legally
institutionalised without any individual being excluded from the political
process. Habermas (1996b: 305) cites Cohen who plausibly explains
deliberative democracy as follows:
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(a) Processes of deliberation take place in argumentative form, that is,
through the regulated exchange of information and reasons among
parties who introduce and critically test proposals. (b) Deliberations are
inclusive and public. No one may be excluded in principle; all of those
who are possibly affected by the decisions have equal chances to enter
and take part ... (d) Deliberations are free of any internal coercion that
could detract from the equality of the participants. Each has an equal
opportunity to be heard, to introduce topics, to make contributions, to
suggest and criticize proposals. The taking of yes I no positions is
motivated solely by the unforced force of the better argument.34
Moreover, if according to Habermas each individual has "an equal opportunity
to be heard" in the deliberative process, then deliberative democracy
underpins a concern for the inclusion of minority viewpoints, and sets limits on
what the majority can legitimately do. Of course, Habermas' argument that
political deliberation must be concluded by majority decision-making does not
seem to undermine the views of minorities. In this regard, he claims the
following:
Political deliberation, however, must be concluded by majority decision
in view of pressures to decide. Because of its internal connection with a
deliberative practice, majority rule justifies the presumption that the
fallible majority opinion may be considered a reasonable basis for a
34 Participants in the political process recognize the "better argument" as the most justifiable
rational articulation in defence of a point of view, which of course is determined by those
participants (members from both minority and majority parties) most persuaded by its
reasonableness.
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common practice until further notice, namely, until the minority
convinces the majority that their views (the minority's) are correct
(Habermas, 1996b: 24).
Habermas conceives majority decision-making in analogy with
reasonableness. For him, the reasonableness of majority decision-making
depends on two elements: (a) political deliberation must be concluded by
majority decision-making; (b) and the principle of majority decision-making
functions as a rule of argumentation requiring minority participants to
persuade the majority of the "correctness" of their views. The point Habermas
makes is that de facto majority decision-making cannot be the criterion of
better and reasonable argumentation but rather, deliberative majority rule
"considered as a reasonable basis for a common practice ... until the minority
convinces the majority that their views are correct". In other words, democratic
decisions by majority rule may be revised (and possibly reversed) on the basis
that minorities have good reason to question the legitimacy of the majority
outcome. Put differently, the future possibility of reversing majority outcomes
means that minority views are not permanently excluded from the democratic
decision making process. The kind of majority outcome envisioned by
Habermas grows out of a compromise reached between majorities and
minorities after agreement could not be negotiated on the basis of
deliberation, that is, the majority could not convince the minority of its views
and vice versa. Thus, a deliberative democracy endeavours to seek ongoing
deliberation in search of the "better" argument between majorities and
minorities after the parties have temporarily reached a compromise for the
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sake of progress. By implication, a deliberative democracy actually compels
the majority to take the minority into account, that is, making reasons
answerable to minorities. In the words of Bohman (1996: 184) "majority rule
provides a perfectly acceptable basis for such (deliberative) cooperation so
long as minorities have the reasonable expectation of being able to affect and
to revise political discussions, including decisions about the character and the
conditions of political participation". The point is that majority rule should not
be abandoned for ongoing debate, reflexive discussion and a means to
permanently exclude minorities but, instead, should be used as a temporary
aggregative procedure of voting to prevent the occurrence of impasses
between majorities and minorities. In a Habermasian way, majority rule is a
revisable and compromising decision taken not only to ensure that minority
opinion is respected - such as the modification of majority views to meet the
objectives of minorities - but rather, to safeguard an open and honest
deliberation of an issue prior to taking a decision by majority vote (I again refer
to this notion of deliberative majority rule in the next chapter). Thus the
discussion has to shift from the question of the prevalence of simple majority
decision-making in deliberative processes, to one of what constitutes better
and reasonable argumentation. To some extent, Habermas (1996a: 24)
recognises this point:
In contrast, a discourse-theoretic interpretation insists on the fact that
democratic will-formation draws its legitimating force both from the
communicative pre-suppositions that allow the better arguments to
come into play in various forms of deliberations and from the
procedures that secure fair bargaining processes.
Before I explore the question as to what constitutes better and reasonable
argumentation, I first need to look comparatively at different theoretical
understandings of deliberative democracy. In this way, I would be better
positioned to expound on the general principle of deliberative democracy
which in turn, as I shall show, evokes an understanding of better and
reasonable argumentation. It is my contention that it is with reference to the
notion of rationality that the strength of better and reasonable argumentation
can come to the fore without having to appeal to the preference of absolute
majority political decision-making.
4.3 THREE THEORETICAL STATEMENTS ON DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY
Theoretically defined, deliberative democracy (as has been alluded to earlier)
refers to the notion that legitimate political decision making emanates from the
public deliberation of citizens. In other words, as a normative account of
political decision making, deliberative democracy evokes ideals of rational
legislation, participatory politics and civic self-governance, that is, "it presents
an ideal of political autonomy based on practical reasoning of citizens"
(Bohman & Rehg, 1997: ix). The upshot of such a theoretical grounding of
democracy based on public deliberation presupposes that citizens or their
representatives engage in reasoning together about laws and policies they
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ought to pursue as a political community, that is to say, to bring about the "use
of public reason" (Bohman & Rehg, 1997: x). The theoretical critiques of
liberal democratic models such as democratic elitism, democratic
egalitarianism and demarchism and the revival of participatory politics
developed through the 1970s. Only in the 1980s, the concept of deliberative
democracy began to assume some form of theoretical identity with the ideas
of Joseph Bessette who first used the concept as a critique against elitist
interpretations of the American Constitution (Bohman & Rehg, 1987: xiii).
Since then, several deliberative theorists have endeavoured to develop
plausible conceptions of deliberative democracy. For purposes of this
dissertation I shall explore some theoretical statements of the concept with
reference to the ideas of Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib.
4.3.1 Habermas' model of rational, consensus-oriented discourse
Habermas (1997) offers an account of democracy which places practical
reasoning amongst citizens at the core of political discourse. For Habermas,
practical reasoning guides an understanding of political practice in terms of
self-determination or self-realisation and rational discourse (Habermas, 1997:
39). This practice of practical reasoning for Habermas empowers citizens to
decide upon the rules and manner of their living together in a self-determined
way, thereby producing co-operative life practices "centred in conscious (and
rational) political will-formation" (Habermas, 1997: 41). In short, Habermas
contends "a politics radically situated in this world should be justifiable on the
basis of reason ..." (Habermas, 1997: 41). Moreover, as has been alluded to
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earlier, democratic legislature for Habermas decides by consensus at the level
of inter-subjective deliberation guided by argumentation which in turn,
dismisses programmed decisions in the public sphere (Habermas, 1997: 57).
In the event that consensus seems unrealisable and political deadlock
imminent, Habermas proposes majority decision making as "a conditional
consensus" based on conditional rational discussion and argumentation: "A
majority decision may come about only in such a way that its content is
regarded as the rationally motivated but fallible result of an attempt to
determine what is right through a discussion that has been brought to a
provisional close under pressure to decide ..." (Habermas, 1997: 47). But
then, such a "conditional consensus" does not require minorities to abandon
their aims, but rather, "... that they forego the practical application of their
convictions, until they succeed in better establishing their reasons and
procuring the necessary number of affirmative votes" (Habermas, 1997: 47).
Habermas' emphasis on citizens' "better establishing their reasons" in political
processes has some connection with discourse theory that allows "the better
arguments to come into play in various forms of deliberation" (Habermas,
1996a: 24).35The "better argument" in a Habermasian way works with high
levels of rational discourse that flow through both parliamentary structures and
informal networks of the public sphere. This suggests that deliberative politics
for Habermas works within and outside the parliamentary complex where
deliberations "constitute arenas in which a more or less rational opinion- and
will-formation can take place" (Habermas, 1996b: 28). When the "better
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argument" does not seem to yield the desired political result, Habermas
suggests the application of a compromise or shared consensus amongst
citizens possessing competing political interests: "The political interests and
values that stand in conflict with each other without prospects of consensus
are in need of balancing ..." (Habermas, 1996b: 25). In essence, Habermas'
discourse-theoretic reading of democracy aims to achieve consensus shared
by the citizenry according to procedural rules of discourse and argumentation
whose fallible results enjoy "the presumption of rationality" (Habermas,
1996b: 29). In short, Habermas proposes a rational, consensus-oriented
discourse of deliberative democracy.
4.3.2 Rawls' public reason
For Rawls, public reason" accords a central role to reasoning amongst equal
citizens who, as a collective body, exercise political power over one another in
enacting laws and amending their constitution, what he refers to as
"constitutional essentials" (Rawls, 1997: 94). Public reason insists that citizens
be prepared to explain or justify the basis of their actions to one another in
terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse with their
freedom and equality (Rawls, 1997; 97). In other words, the ideal of public
reason specified by Rawls involves in particular the ability to justify one's
actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject. And, in the
35 Rawls (1995: 139) explains Habermas' discourse theory as that which "tries to layout
completely the presuppositions of rational and free discussion as guided by the strongest
reasons ... (arriving at) rational consensus ......
36 For Habermas (1995: 123) Rawls introduces "reasonable" as a property of moral persons
who possess a sense of justice and are willing and able to take account of fair conditions of
co-operation.
process of justifying the grounds of their actions to others, citizens are
expected to show a willingness to listen to others, as well as demonstrating a
"fair-mindedness" to make reasonable alterations to their views. For instance,
public reason rejects voting as a private or even personal matter. Rather,
voters need to justify their political decisions to others, that is, their
constituency, who in turn are persuaded by the reasonableness or
"correctness and criteria of justification" (Rawls, 1997: 99). In this regard,
Rawls (1997: 99) considers voting as ideally expressing one's opinion as to
which preference and interest best advances the common good. The point is
that voting merely involves a symbolic act of external political decision
making. The actual political decision is justified to people in terms of proffered
reasons, what Rawls refers to as the outcome of reflective thought and
reasoned judgement.
Rawls (1997: 114) recognises several difficulties associated with public
reason as outlined above. I want to address one particular difficulty as
articulated by Rawls. Public reason often allows more than one reasonable
answer to any particular question. I agree, since many people can offer many
justifiable opinions in defence of their political persuasions and standpoints.
However, if such a situation predominates, agreement would be lacking and
some would say that public reason fails to resolve the question. Rawls himself
posits that public reason does not favour results attained through political
compromise (Rawls, 1997: 97). Consequently, I agree that public reason does
offer scope to engender deliberative politics primarily because of its concern
with reasonableness. But my concern with public reason is not its emphasis
143
144
on reasonableness of political arguments, but, rather, its seeming lack of
interest in agreement and compromise. For this reason, Rawls' public reason
does not seem to be an adequate notion of deliberative democracy in order to
reconstruct liberalism in South Africa. The diverse political persuasions of
different political groups would invariably require of citizens to justify their
political views - Rawls' argument for "reasonability". What Rawlsian public
reason cannot offer is to allow scope for consensual agreement or
compromise which is definitely required by a South African politics of
difference and divergence as I shall show in the next chapter.
4.3.3 Benhabib's discursive democracy
Benhabib (1996: 75) questions Rawls' idea of public reason as follows: Firstly,
Rawls restricts the exercise of public reason to deliberation about
"constitutional essentials" and questions of basic justice. I agree with this
criticism since public reason for Rawls "is the reason of equal citizens who ...
exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws
and in amending the constitution" (Rawls, 1993: 214). For Benhabib the
deliberative model insists upon the openness of the agenda of public debate.
In other words, she argues that legitimacy in complex democratic societies
must result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all citizens
about matters of common concern, and not just about a specific subject
matter involving constitutional issues and questions of basic justice
(Benhabib, 1996: 68).
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Secondly, Rawls considers public reason as a regulative principle imposing
limits upon how individuals, institutions, and agencies ought to reason about
public matters. The limits of public reason are determined by a "political
conception of liberalism". For Rawls (1993: 226), "(t)he ideal of public reason
is that citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the
framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based on
values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse and each is, in
good faith, prepared to defend that conception so understood. This means
that each of us must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what
principles and guidelines we think other citizens (who are also free and equal)
may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us". On the contrary,
Benhabib (1996: 75) views public reason as a process of reasoning among
citizens. In her words: "According to the deliberative model of democracy, it is
a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to
collective decision making processes in a polity, that the institutions of this
polity are so arranged that what is considered in the common interest of all
results from processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly
among free an equal citizens" (Benhabib, 1996: 69). Put differently decisions
affecting the well-being of a collectivity are viewed akin to the outcome of a
procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as
moral and political equals.
Thirdly, for Rawls the limits of public reason are not applicable to personal
deliberations and reflections about political questions or what he refers to as
"reasoning about them by members of associations such as churches and
universities" (Rawls, 1993: 215). In other words, the reasoning of corporate
bodies and associations is "public" with respect to its members, but not "non-
public" with respect to political society and citizens in general, that is, the
state, including the legal sphere and its institutions. Benhabib's discursive
notion of democracy, unlike Rawls' idea of public reason, does not separate
the personal from the political precisely because "politics and public reason
are always seen to emerge out of a cultural and social context" (Benhabib,
1996: 76). In a different way, for Benhabib reason is always situated in a
context that it can never render transparent all the cultural and social
conditions that give rise to it. Hence, for Benhabib deliberative democracy
does not restrict the agenda of public conversation but rather, encourages
discourse which integrates the public and the private, as well as being more
interested in the ways in which political processes interact with cultural and
social contexts.
In summary of this section, despite the existence of different and nuanced
theoretical understandings of deliberative democracy, deliberative theorists
such as Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib generally agree on one specific
issue: political processes involve more than self-interested competition
governed by bargaining and aggregative mechanisms. In short, deliberative
democracy involves open, uncoerced deliberation of political issues at stake
with the aim to arrive at rationally agreed upon judgments. To my mind this
notion of rationality constitutes the general principle of deliberative democracy
which I shall now explore in further detail.
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4.4 RATIONALITY AS THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY
My argument that rationality, with reference to the ideas of Taylor (1985), best
elucidates the ideal of better and reasonable argumentation most congruent
with deliberative democracy, has four main normative elements: (a) the view
that rational articulation of arguments is a valuable part of human agency, (b)
the view that political formulations have to be consistent and without
contradiction, (c) the view that everyone should in principle be attuned with
"the order of things", and (d) the view that relevant arguments need to be
advanced in inter-subjective processes of rational deliberation.
I shall now elucidate these normative conceptions of better and reasonable
argumentation.
4.4.1 Rational articulation
By "rational articulation" I mean the individual's readiness to express and
provide reasons in support of his or her self-interpretations and judgments in a
lucid, coherent and logical manner. Support for such a view of rational
articulation can be found in Taylor's (1985: 137) idea of rationality: "(Rational
articulation) seems to involve being able to say clearly what the matter in
question is ... (in such a way that) we have a rational grasp of something
when we can articulate it, that means, distinguish and layout the different
features of the matter in perspicuous order". In short, citizens engaged in
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public deliberation along the lines of democratic decision-making should
articulate their preferences, that is, supply well-ordered reasons in support of
their claims to others of their subjectively held views and judgments. In doing
so, they open up their subjectively held political views and judgments to
rational challenge by others. In other words, individuals do not impose their
"private reasons" on the democratic process without justifying and subjecting it
to any form of public critical scrutiny. Bohman (1996: 5) accentuates the
importance of rational articulation vis-a-vis public scrutiny for deliberative
democracy by arguing that it is crucial for citizens and their representatives to
test their interests and reason in a public forum before they decide. This
implies that the deliberative process demands that citizens justify their
decisions and opinions by appealing to common interests or by arguing in
terms of reasons that 'all could accept' in public debate. The point is that the
ensuing collective decision should in some sense be justified by public
reasons, that is, persuasive reasons acceptable to everyone participating in
the process of deliberation.
What follows from the above, is that unless majority political decision-makers
can provide well-ordered reasons and sufficient justification for their particular
evaluations, open to public scrutiny by others, rejecting minority views on the
grounds of quantification only seems to be antecedent to, and forever
removed from, the process of political deliberation. This view of rational
articulation, particularly subjecting one's views to critical scrutiny by others,
finds expression in the ideas of Galston (1991: 176) who argues for four main
points: (1) An understanding of means-ends relations sufficient to play an
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active, independent role in the economy and society; (2) each individual's
understanding of himself or herself as similar to others for certain purposes,
that is, as properly governed by general social rules; (3) the ability to respond
to rational persuasion (as opposed simply to force and threats); (4) when
deliberating publicly in matters requiring collective action, the disposition to
employ public reasons, open to inspection by others, whenever possible.
Similarly, Macintyre (1988: 394) considers rational articulation as the supply of
justifiable reasons in support of one's arguments through engaging in critical
inquiry. For Macintyre, rational articulation comprises a set of modes of action
and of interpretative rules for actions which exhibit an intelligible and justifiable
mode of reasoning which has not previously been the case, and which
requires of such persons to engage, to whatever degree is appropriate, both
in the ongoing arguments in a critical way. Hence, it is the prospect of
articulating justifiable reasons for political decisions that makes deliberative
democracy more attractive than its competitors. This is so primarily because
justifying reasons offered for deliberation in a political discourse concerns a
process on the basis that most people in the deliberative process find the
reason acceptable." Of course, one can find a situation whereby reasons are
provided and argued for, yet opponents remain unconvinced. In this instance,
a compromising decision (as Habermas suggests) needs to be taken on the
part of proponents (say, majorities) and their opponents (minorities), that is, to
temporarily accept the view which might be reasonable for the majority, but
unreasonable for the minority or vice a versa. The majority and minority
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should recursively, at a later stage, continue seeking to revise or modify the
compromising decision in order to meet the objections of the mlnority." With
regards to the acceptance of reasons, I agree with Bohman (1996: 35) when
he posits that in deliberative discourse reasons backing a political decision are
public (and acceptable) when they are convincing enough to motivate most
citizens, even a dissenters, to continue to operate in deliberation even after
the decision has been made.
Reasons of this sort attained through a process of deliberation are more
convincing rather than based on power asymmetries such as majority vote.
Lijphart (1999: 2) contrasts the majoritarian and deliberative (consensus)
models of democracy by arguing that the deliberative model does not differ
from the majoritarian model in accepting that majority rule is better than
minority rule. Rather, the deliberative model accepts majority rule only as a
minimum requirement. In other words, instead of being satisfied with narrow
decision-making majorities, it seeks to maximize the size of these majorities.
Its rules and institutions aim to establish broad participation in government
and broad agreement on the policies that government should pursue (I shall
argue this point in the following chapter).
37 It's not just a matter of voting for a political decision but, rather, for participants to establish
reasonable conditions for deliberation to take place prior to, if necessary, any voting
grocedure.
8 I am by no means creating the impression that deliberation and majority decision making
stand in opposition to each other. On the contrary, I contend (as have been argued for earlier
in the chapter) that deliberation simply seems to be a mechanism of refining majoritarianism,
as well as optimising its legitimacy in a way proposed by Habermas; to temporarily use
majority rule in the event of deadlock.
4.4.2 Consistent political formulations
My discussion of rationality also aims to show why consistent political
formulations constitute part of a convincing defence for better and reasonable
argumentation and hence, deliberative democracy. It makes no sense for
individuals in political processes to articulate their self-interpretations and
judgments with ambivalence and contradictions. The beneficial effects of
rational articulation can accrue only if the individuals concerned articulate their
political preferences with consistency in deliberative politics. Taylor (1985:
137) makes the point that to strive for rationality in deliberative politics is to be
engaged in articulation, in finding the appropriate formulations. Yet, he also
invokes the understanding that a standard intrinsic to the activity of
formulating is that the formulations be consistent. Put differently, nothing is
clearly articulated with contradictory formulations which makes "consistency is
plainly a necessary condition of rationality" (Taylor, 1985: 137).
Once again the argument for absolute majoritarian preference in political
deliberation becomes insufficient for the reason that, in defence of the better
argument, majority views might not always be consistent and unambiguous
political formulations. Absolute majority preference provides no criterion for
assessing the quality of arguments; rather, consistent political formulations
provide such a criterion. Rational argumentation in this sense means that
everyone is deemed capable of making informed and consistent judgments on
political matters, more precisely, that no-one's consistent and reasonably
articulated arguments should be discounted on grounds of majority or minority
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preferences. The point is, every citizen's contribution in deliberative politics, if
consistently articulated, must be seen worthy of consideration. Bohman (1996:
7) states that deliberative democracy accords to beliefs and actions a rational
character insofar as they can be supported publicly by good reasons. And, the
exchange of reasons takes place in "a discourse in which participants strive to
reach agreement solely on the basis of the better argument, free of coercion
and open to all competent speakers"."
4.4.3 Attunement with the "order of things"
By being rational individuals also have to be attuned with the "order of things",
in this instance, political decisions, procedures and issues of public policy. In
other words, individuals intent on producing the better argument have to be
engaged in an informed (with understanding and impartiality) and perceptive
way with his or her socio-polltlcal context, and with other persons for the
common good of it. Taylor (1985: 142) establishes a connection between the
idea of achieving the better argument and being in attunement with the "order
of things":
We do not understand (articulate the better argument) without
understanding our place in it, because we are part of this order. And we
cannot understand the order and our place in it without loving it, without
39 The better argument is "best" decided by persuasion. But, in the event of an impasse
between the majority and minority, majority rule can temporarily be used after which the
decision can again be revised on the grounds of more reasonable arguments provided by the
minority.
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seeing its goodness, which is what I want to call being in attunement
with it.
However, does being part of the "order of things" necessarily mean that every
individual should directly participate in deliberative politics? I do not think that
being part of the "order of things" on the basis of political participation implies
direct consent of every individual on every issue. Being attuned to political
issues does not mean that every citizen must be directly involved in the affairs
of government. Certainly in South Africa direct participation on the part of
every citizen would be unfeasible since the emphasis on direct democracy
would be more on getting the mass of citizens involved in political decision-
making rather than reflecting on the reasonableness of the decisions
themselves. Representative political structures dedicated solely to the debate
of political matters of public concern such as voting and elections can
counteract the difficulties associated with direct participatory democracy. To
say that every citizen should directly participate in political deliberation is to
assume (a) that individuals only have subjective beliefs, aspirations and
political values, which ought to shape democratic practices; and (b) that there
are no inter-subjective (common) meanings about political discourse which
individuals might collectively share. I agree with Taylor (1985: 36) when he
claims that people in any society have all sorts of beliefs and attitudes, which
may be thought of as their individual beliefs, and attitudes, even if others
share them. But what they do not own are the meanings constitutive of
political discourse. For example, public debate on political matters is not just
an arena where pre-formed interests or views of people are fought out,
It is not just that the people in our society all or mostly has a given set
of ideas in their heads and subscribes to a given set of goals. The
meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in the minds
of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, practices
which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are
essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action.
culminating in a majority vote. The point is that public debate is constituted by
inter-subjective meanings or a set of common terms of reference such as for
people to reasonably reflect on their views during the process of deliberation,
and for them to reach an agreement on what political decision should be
made on the issues in question. These inter-subjective meanings are rooted in
the political practice of public debate and could not be the single property of
individuals. Taylor (1985: 36) explains inter-subjective meanings as follows:
The idea of inter-subjective deliberation is also advanced by Bohman (1996:
57) as a process of dialogue, which involves "the mere give and take of
reasons". (with the aim) to produce (common) claims that are wide enough
in scope and sufficiently justified to be accountable to an indefinite public of
fellow citizens". Consequently, there are common, inter-subjective meanings
which form the basis of political discourse which can give people a common
language to articulate their points of view in a collective way, thus making the
idea of representation more hospitable to a deliberative political process than
an arrangement based on direct participation alone. The fact that there are
inter-subjective meanings which constitute political discourse, provide people
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with a common reference world they can share and in terms of which they can
represent one another, thus repudiating the idea of direct participation of all
individuals in political processes. In essence, being attuned to the "order of
things" in an inter-subjective way does not necessarily require the political
structures of a direct participative democracy. What it does require, is that
there be the means whereby political decision-making be done in a
deliberative and representative way with the distinct aim to reach justifiable
agreement among various political agents. In this regard, I agree with Gutman
(1996: 344) who argues that deliberative democracy has an advantage over
participatory democracy for the reason that it recognises the provisional
nature of justification in politics, that is, citizens' understanding of issues
change over time as well as through deliberative interchange - where
justification involves respecting many moral and cultural differences within and
across societies.
However, in order for representatives of political constituencies to reach
agreement among themselves thus attuning themselves to the "order of
things", does not mean that political decision-making should solely be
subjected to majority vote. Why not? Reaching agreement is to disclose a
sincere and rational way of securing "mutually respectful social co-operation"
(Callan, 1998: 62). Mutual social co-operation implies that people (majorities
and minorities) have to respect each other and be sincere to meet each other
half way, to compromise. Compromise, in the words of Bohman (1996: 89) "is
all about coming to an accommodation or making concessions. It involves
tradeoffs and balances of interests - making concessions of one's own for
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equal ones by others". The question can legitimately be asked how such a
compromise could be established and ensured. My contention is that
participants (say at parliamentary level) could temporarily make an agreement
based on majoritarian decision making, but should also procedurally build in
the deliberative process a reflexivity principle which allows for the public re-
examination of majoritarian decisions, what Benhabib (1996: 72) refers to as
that reflexivitlO condition which allows abuses and misapplications at the first
level (say, parliamentary level) to be challenged at a second meta-level of
discourse (say, at provincial levels and in public forums). Also, Gutman and
Thompson (1996: 43) argue that deliberative processes help distinguish true
moral disagreements from agreements that could be resolved by "bargaining,
negotiation or compromise" or by rational clarification. In this regard Lijphart
(1999: 2) claims the following:
A closely related difference is that the majoritarian model of democracy
is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus
(compromising) model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining,
and compromise; for this reason consensus democracy could also be
termed 'negotiation democracy'.
When people in a public debate compromise they do not merely advance the
position of their individual or group interests but, rather, develop a shared
willingness to make minimal use of controversial empirical premises. For
40 Schwandt (1997: 135) refers to reflexivity or reflectivity as two different ideas informing
inquiry: (1) the process of critical self-reflection on one's biases, theoretical predispositions,
preferences, and so on; and (2) critical examination of how one's personal and theoretical
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Bohman (1996: 91), in a compromise parties do not modify the framework to
achieve unanimity but rather, modify their conflicting interpretations of the
framework so that each can recognise the other's moral values and standards
as part of it. In other words, the framework is then common enough for each
party to continue to cooperate and deliberate uncontroversially with the other.
For example, people in a diverse society do little to push toward controversial
political views, which undermine their abilities to justify them so long as such a
society lacks a substantial body of uncontroversial political views. Habermas
(1996a: 324) posits that reaching mutual understanding (compromise) through
deliberative discourse guarantees that issues, reasons, and information are
handled reasonably. Thus, to avoid perpetual conflict, which may bring us
nowhere, we need to develop what Callan (1998: 76) refers to as "a shared
group-interest in compromise", a kind of shared loyalty that can push hard in
the direction of temporary agreement between majorities and minorities who
need to respect each other, until political decisions are again subjected to
reflexive re-examination at another "meta-level", that is, parliamentary
majoritarian decisions could be subjected to reflexive scrutiny at provincial
and local government levels. This kind of shared compromise is summarised
by Callan (1998: 76) in the following manner:
Patriotism (shared loyalty) can empower us to resist this kind of failure
(minority and majority egoism) to the extent that it gives us a shared
group-interest in compromise. We no longer broach the prospect of
compromise with wholly separate identities so that any gain for you is a
commitments serve as resources for generating particular constructions of meaning in
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loss for me and vice versa. The achievement of compromise is itself of
value to us because it affirms the unity and continuity of a political
community we both cherish.
In the context of pursuing respectfully and non-arbitrarily a deliberative
democratic discourse in a diverse South African society we have to develop "a
shared group-interest in compromise" which can prevent us pushing toward
convergent interpretations of politics. Rather, we (minorities and majorities)
need to develop compromising understandings of politics that can advance
our shared interests in a diverse political community. For this reason
Habermas (1996a: 331) makes the point that in a deliberative democracy" ...
all politically relevant collective actors enjoy roughly equal opportunities to
influence the decision-making processes that concern them; that the members
of the organisations determine the politics of pressure groups and parties
(minorities and majorities); and that the latter in turn are pushed by multiple
memberships into a readiness for compromise and the integration of
interests". The idea of "a shared group interest in compromise" also finds
expression in the work of Bohman (1996: 84) who posits the following:
... (W)hat is required in cases of deep conflict is a genuinely moral
compromise in which plural public reason is exercised in the process of
creating the framework for such an ongoing public consensus, now a
minimal one that demands only the willingness to continue to
cooperate.
particular contexts, meanings one would probably not have thought about.
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In summary, the general principle of deliberative democracy is rationality.
Rationality involves, what Habermas (1996a: 322) refers to as a process of
argumentation in which those taking part justify their reasons with consistent
and unambiguous political formulations.When a person is rational, he I she is
in principle attuned with "the order of things" in unconstrained inter-subjective
processes of deliberation. In a Habermasian way, rationality as "the
centerpiece of deliberative politics consists in a network of discourses and
bargaining (compromising) that is supposed to facilitate the rational solution of
pragmatic, moral, and ethical questions ..." (Habermas, 1996b: 320).
However, rationality can also be linked conceptually to Macintyre's notion of
practical reasoning as articulated in the previous chapter, namely, caring,
conversational justice and political reasoning. Thus far, I expounded upon
rationality as the general principle of deliberative democracy with respect to
four main points: (a) the view that rational articulation of arguments is a
valuable part of human agency, (b) the view that political formulations have to
be consistent and without contradiction, (c) the view that everyone should in
principle be attuned with "the order of things", and (d) the view that relevant
arguments need to be advanced in unconstrained inter-subjective processes
of rational deliberation. I shall now explore why these constitutive meanings of
rationality can also bring about caring, conversational justice and political
reasoning. In this way, I hope to show that deliberative democracy with its
guiding principle of rationality can bring about reasoned and justifiable
decision making in socio-political discourse vis-a-vis caring, conversational
justice and political reasoning - all features of Macintyre's idea of
communitarianism.
First, the rational articulation of arguments in a Taylorian sense brings into
question the notion of justification. People not only have to explain and justify
their political points of view, decisions or choices, that is, possess an ability to
logically construct and understand arguments and their appropriateness to
different political contexts (Raz, 1999: 68-70), but should also care about
making political arguments reasonable to other citizens. In other words,
rationality should also have the effect whereby people develop the capacity to
reach their own justifiable conclusions or inferences to which they are to be
held accountable by and to others for those conclusions or inferences. Clearly
Rawls' (1993: 243) idea of public reason subscribes to such an idea of
rationality. The idea of public reason requires of citizens to articulate justifiable
reasons to others who might consider these reasons as "reasonable" when
political questions are at stake. Rawls (1993: 243) explains public reason as
follows:
What public reason asks is that citizens be able to explain their vote to
one another in terms of a reasonable balance of public political values,
it being understood by everyone that of course the plurality of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by citizens is thought by
them to provide further and often transcendent backing for those values
... It is true that the balance of political values a citizen holds must be
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reasonable, and one that can be seen to be reasonable by other
citizens ....
Now for the reason that rationality is the general principle of deliberative
democracy, and bearing in mind that Rawls' notion of public reason implicitly
acknowledges the articulation and exchange of political arguments involving
caring, one can safely claim that deliberative democracy can ensure that
caring unfolds in deliberation. Public reason is presented by Rawls as an
essentially rational process of deliberation in which "political values a citizen
holds must be reasonable, and one that can be seen to be reasonable by
other citizens". Put differently, Rawls (1993: 218) opines that through public
reason people "should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one
another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as
consistent with their freedom and equality" - a matter of cultivating in others
the care to justify their actions and to which they are to be held accountable
by and to others for those actions. In this way, the rational articulation of
arguments in the domain of the public sphere makes the idea of a caring
possible.
Second, if rationality involves the capacity of people to articulate unambiguous
political arguments then it has to invoke the idea of conversational justice,
which demands that they (people) produce coherent arguments to justify their
points. Rawls' (1993: 220) idea of public reason, which embeds rationality, is
inextricably linked to "standards of correctness and criteria of justification". In
a Rawlsian sense "criteria of justification" not only refer to an articulation of
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arguments without contradiction, but also "a willingness to listen to others and
a fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should
reasonably be made" (Rawls, 1993: 217) - a matter of engaging in
conversational justice. By implication rationality as the general principle of
deliberative democracy can engender conversational justice through which
citizens willingly justify their political articulations to one another.
Third, if rationality involves the capacity of people to be attuned with "the order
of things" then it means that people have to be engaged in an informed,
perceptive and reflexive way with their socio-political context, and with other
persons for the common good of it. Thus, the idea of being attuned with one
socio-political context invokes the idea of political reasoning which holds that
each individual has to contribute "to the shared deliberations of the community
in his or her own voice" (Macintyre, 1999: 140). Rawls (1993: 252) explains
deliberative democracy in this same vain on the basis that citizens in a society
share in the political power they exercise over one another "when they engage
in political advocacy in the public forum, in political campaigns for example
when they vote on those fundamental questions". In other words, they are
attuned with their socio-political context. In his words, deliberative democracy
involves
... a political relationship between citizens within the basic structure of
the society (socio-political context) into which they are born and within
which they normally lead a complete life: it implies further an equal
share in the coercive political power that citizens exercise over one
another by voting and in other ways (Rawls, 1993: 217-218).
What follows from the above is that deliberative democracy can bring about
political reasoning through which citizens share in the inter-subjective
(rational) deliberations with their socio-political contexts. In essence,
deliberative democracy guided by the principle of rationality can enact goods
of practical reasoning (caring conversational justice and political reasoning)
associated with Macintyre's view of left communitarianism explained in
chapter 2.41
4.5SUMMARY
In this chapter I have shown how and why rationality constitutes the guiding
principle of deliberative democracy. Rationality involves (a) the view that
rational articulation of arguments is a valuable part of human agency, (b) the
view that political formulations have to be consistent and without contradiction,
(c) the view that everyone should in principle be attuned with "the order of
things", and (d) the view that relevant arguments need to be advanced in
unconstrained inter-subjective processes of rational deliberation. In turn I have
shown how three major statements of deliberative democracy emphasise the
notion of reasonable and justifiable deliberation in the socio-political sphere
with reference to the ideas of Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib. Finally I have
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41 I am by no means suggesting that deliberative democracy requires a communitarian crutch
but rather, the guiding principle of deliberative democracy (that is, rationality) can actually
cultivate notions of caring, conversational justice and political reasoning associated with
Macintyre's left communitarianism espoused in chapter 2.
shown how rationality can cultivate notions of practical reasoning associated
with Macintyre's idea of left communitarianism.
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CHAPTER 5
CLOSING LIBERAL GAPS THROUGH DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In chapter 3, I have shown that liberalism in South Africa can be associated
with three distinct weaknesses: the need for non-majoritarianism to procure
minority freedoms; equalising opportunities through affirmative action and
providing procedural rights to the disadvantaged. In this section, with
reference to constitutive features of deliberative democracy, I firstly argue that
majority rule does not have to be considered a threat to liberal democracy in
South Africa or as a means to exclude minority "voices", and that
majoritarianism can be considered as a temporary compromising mechanism
of deliberative discourse in order to avoid political impasses. Secondly, I
contend that equalising opportunities for all does not have to be considered
only as a means to ensure White privilege but rather, as a genuine attempt
(as deliberative democracy suggests) to move towards greater equity and a
heightened sense of community in South Africa after decades of political,
social and economic injustice. Thirdly, I argue that deliberative democracy can
help us to enable South African citizens to have access to both procedural
and substantive rights - a situation in turn, which can lead to a more
defensible form of liberal democracy.
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5.2 POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DELIBERATIVE MAJORITY RULE
The question arises: What is wrong with absolute majority rule? One might
find that some political decisions, which have been taken on the basis of
majoritarianism might be considered as reasonable by minorities. However, it
is the mere statistical exclusion of other albeit minority points of view which
brings into question the legitimacy of minority participation and hence,
accountability towards minority parties and their electoral voters. Why? To be
accountable in a political sense in the first place implies that one has to give a
justifiable explanation of one's proceedings and decisions. My contention is
that the mere statistical presentation of acquired votes does not always
sufficiently provide a justification for political decisions attained. The idea of
deliberative democracy directly challenges majoritarianism, more specifically
political decisions taken on the basis of simple majority vote. Both the National
Assembly and National Council of Provinces are constitutionally bound to
provide "a national forum for public consideration of issues" before legislation
can be passed which seems to be in line with the idea of deliberative
democracy. However, if political decisions which emanated from "public
consideration" have been taken on the grounds of simple majoritarianism, the
possibility exists that such decisions might exclude the legitimate interests of
minorities.
I shall now examine in more detail why a deliberative democratic framework
could engender better political accountability through public deliberation than
simple or absolute majoritarianism. Of course, my potential critic might argue
that "deliberation" is already advocated by liberals and therefore, sees no
need for accentuating this point. I agree, "deliberation" undoubtedly occurs in
the politics of liberals. However, my contention is that the political decisions
which ultimately emanate from "deliberative efforts" of politicians are mostly
determined by simple majority vote - as if good political decisions are always
necessarily the corollary of majoritarianism. I disagree. Kymlicka (2002: 290)
makes an argument for a "talk-centric" notion of democracy rather than just a
"vote-centric" one. He argues that after the Second World War, democracy
was understood almost exclusively in terms of voting: "Citizens were assumed
to have a set of preferences, fixed prior to and independent of the political
process, and the function of voting was simply to provide a fair decision-
making procedure or aggregation mechanism for translating these pre-existing
preferences into public decisions, either about who to elect (in standard
elections) or about what laws to adopt (in issue-specific referenda)" (Kymlicka,
2002: 290). However, increasingly this "aggregative" or "vote-centric"
conception of democracy was viewed with suspicion since it could not fulfill
norms of democratic legitimacy. This is so for the reason that preferences
formed prior to and independently of the political process, provided no
opportunity for citizens to try to persuade others of the merit of their views or
the legitimacy of their claims. In other words, the aggregative vote-centric
model does not expect or encourage citizens to meet in public to debate and
discuss in public the reasons for their claims (Kymlicka, 2002: 290).
Consequently, Kymlicka (2000: 290-291) posits that the aggregative model
provides a mechanism for determining winners and losers, but no mechanism
for developing consensus, or shaping public opinion, or even formulating an
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honourable compromise whereby outvoted citizens who might believe that
their claims are based on fundamental principles of justice had no opportunity
to persuade others of this claim, or to be persuaded by others that they were
mistaken. This he contends is particularly true for people belonging to a
marginalised minority group, who know in advance that they have little hope of
winning a majority vote. I agree, hence, my argument for deliberative
democracy and not complete majoritarianism.
Of course, as have been discussed earlier, in the event of any stalemate the
majority vote could be used as a temporary procedural mechanism for
achieving political decisions, but deliberation should remain the means
towards publicly re-examining such decisions. In the words of Benhabib
(1996: 72), "Parliamentary procedures of opposition, debate, questioning and
even impeachment proceedings, and investigatory commissions (need to)
incorporate this rule of deliberative rationality that majoritarian decisions are
temporarily agreed-upon conclusions, the claim to rationality and validity of
which (majoritarian decisions) can be publicly re-examined".
Liberalism, as has been argued for previously, considers non-majoritarianism
as a way to avoid possible unreasonable and unjustifiable exclusion of
minority points of view. For liberals it seems as if non-majoritarianism can
ensure better political accountability. My contention is that political
accountability can best be secured if political decisions are arrived at through
deliberation which may contribute towards achieving a defensible form of
multiparty democracy in South Africa. But this. does not mean that non-
5.2.1 Political accountability and shared rational deliberation
majoritarianism needs to be considered as an option in South African politics.
In the first place, public political procedures and decisions based on fairness
(in a Rawlsian sense of course), equitable access, non-exclusion, non-
biasness and participation cannot occur independently from rational
deliberation, the guiding principle of deliberative democracy. However, when
agreement in decision making cannot be achieved, majority rule can be used
as a temporary procedure to ensure any kind of indefensible stalemate - a
situation which might further enhance South Africa's multi-party democratic
system. Consequently, I shall show why and how a deliberative democratic
framework can shape political issues involving public deliberation, which can
hopefully ensure better political accountability and avoid liberalism's concern
with non-majoritarianism.
As has been argued for in the previous chapter, deliberative democracy
invokes an understanding of public participation whereby all legitimately
interested groups or political parties not only have to explain and justify their
points of view, decisions or choices, but should also make their arguments
reasonable to others and by which they are to be held accountable by and to
others for those arguments. For instance, majority party members are
expected to justify their arguments to other members of their party as well as
to members of minority parties. Justification requires that majority party
members are open to different points of view (including those of minorities)
and to seriously consider reasonable arguments produced by others. The
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point is that majority vote should not be a prerequisite or determining factor for
reaching political decisions but rather, that decisions should be subjected to
reasonable deliberation with majority rule used as a temporary procedural
mechanism to prevent any form of unjustifiable deadlock, and until parties
whose interests are negatively affected can find recourse to other methods for
the articulation and representation of their grievances. But then, all parties in
the first place need to engage with the deliberative process. They have to
participate. This form of participation demands that participants be capable of
justifying their views of how things should go to others, it requires that they be
open to a multiplicity of points of view, and it requires that a person be
capable of taking other persons' points of view seriously enough to
accommodate them (Christiano, 1990: 154).
Put differently, deliberative democracy creates space for a rational process of
deliberation in which people have to explain the basis of their actions to
others. Gould (1988: 291) defends rational public deliberation by tying it to a
number of character traits democratic institutions need to foster: a tendency to
rationally justify one's actions to others, openness towards others' views and
opinions and to take other people's interests seriously as on equal footing with
one's own. In tune with such a view of rational public deliberation, state
institutions (such as the National Assembly, National Council of Provinces and
provincial legislatures) cannot just subject legislation to public consideration
and scrutiny but, rather, must ensure that political issues of public importance
become a locus for rational deliberation. Here I would suggest the
consolidation of existing institutional structures and extra-parliamentary
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forums of civil society, as well as the establishment of new ones along the
lines of deliberative politics, which can ensure the scrutiny and public
consideration of issues that affect citizens. And, for the reason that
deliberation is linked to the achievement of a shared compromise (as has
been developed in the previous chapter), the outcome of deliberations vis-a-
vis political matters cannot merely be left to statistical (numerical) voting which
advantages absolute majoritarianism. A shared compromise through rational
and public deliberation has the potential to avoid discounting justifiable points
of view or even excluding minority views, which might otherwise not have
been considered using strictly majority decision making through
representative proxles.f In this regard Sartori (1987a: 137) quite correctly
posits "(t)he majority method connotes only a mathematical majority; it does
not denote an enduring major part of a collectivity". Likewise, a shared
compromise can also minimise the possibility of conflicting and divergent
understandings of political matters between say, minorities and majorities. It is
in this sense that a shared compromise can engender better political
accountability. I agree with Sartori (1987a: 33) that the idea of unlimited
majority rule may exercise its political power without restraints which inevitably
leads to treating the "non-majority unfairly and unequally". For this reason he
makes a convincing argument for democracy conceived as "majority plus
minority" and not non-majoritarianism. This he cogently explains as follows:
42 Radical pro-lifers and pro-choicers might have serious reservations about each other's
points of view on the issue of abortion. The point is that each group might justifiably articulate
rational, yet, divergent points of view. In this case, some shared compromise has to be found
in order to avoid endless controversy and conflict. The constitutive arguments of such a
shared compromise might yet not constitute the language of both groups. Therefore, unless
some compromise whereby pro-lifers and pro-choicers have to relinquish some of their points
of view on the issue is found, majority voting would further entrench the ensuing bitter and
infinite conflict between the two groups.
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... (I)f the majority criterion is turned (erroneously) into an absolute
majority rule, the real-world implication of this switch is that a part of the
people (often a very large one) becomes a non-people, and excluded
part. Here, the argument is that when democracy is assimilated to pure
and simple majority rule, by this assimilation a portion of the demos is
eo ipso converted into a non-demos. Conversely, democracy
conceived as a majority rule limited by minority rights corresponds to
the people in full, that is, the sum total of majority plus minority. It is
precisely because the rule of the majority is restrained that all people
(all those who are entitled to vote) are always included in the demos
(Sartori, 1987a: 32-33).
For instance, assume the majority party continuously exercises unrestrained
political power such as is arguably the case in Zimbabwe. Inevitably such a
majority, with reference to the unfair confiscations of white owners' farms
without reasonable compensation, treats the non-majority unfairly and
unequally. However, if the majority ruling party has to be restrained, all the
people (including minority whites) would necessarily be included in the
"demos". In this regard I agree with Kymlicka (2002: 291) who purports that
the "vote-centric" approach needs to be partially replaced by the "talk-centric"
one, which focuses on "processes of deliberation and opinion formation that
precede voting". What this means, is that aggregative procedures (as
liberalism's non-majoritarianism implies) should not in its entirety be dismissed
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for the reason that after arguments have been duly considered, some voting
or electoral procedure is required for resolving remaining disagreements.
Regarding the issue of political legislation, following Sartori (1987a: 92), a
shared compromise, which he refers to as "policy consensus" evokes dissent,
opposition, adversary politics, contestation and conflict - all positive features
of democracy through rational deliberation. In his words, policy consensus
(shared compromise)
... brings to the fore consensus-as-dissensus and sustains the view
forcefully stated by E. Baker that 'the basis and essence of all
(deliberative) democracy is 'government by discussion'. This is indeed
the context in which dissent, dissensus, and opposition emerge as
characterizing elements of (deliberative) democracy (Sartori, 1987a:
91).
In essence, political accountability can best be achieved through achieving a
shared compromise based on rational deliberation between majorities and
minorities at constitutional and societal levels. A shared compromise is aptly
summarised by Sartori (1987a: 229):
When saying (shared) compromise, we generally understand that the
parties to a settlement meet somewhere halfway on the specific matter
to be settled ... (whereby) each resolution may be long fought and end
in a middle-course solution. But there is more to it. What is peculiar to
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(political) committees is that their members engage in exchanges over
time and having especially in view a future time (for better political
accountability).
It is to a discussion of the reasonableness of "exchanges" between people or
parties (groups) regarding political decisions that I now return.
5.2.2 Political accountability and reasonable political decisions
Deliberative democracy has the effect whereby people (majorities and
minorities) not only produce coherent arguments to justify their political points
of view, but also willingly engage with and listen to others in order to make
reasonable decisions - a matter of educing conversational justice. But
reasonable decisions or "exchanges" are not just any kind of decisions people
willingly and engagingly come up with. For Sartori (1987: 221) political
decisions need to be "reasoned" and should be the result of "discussed
elaboration". He posits that the searchlights should not be so much focused
on the "rational voter" but rather on the "rational decision maker" (Sartori
1987a: 120). Since Sartori himself does not adequately explore this position, I
shall elucidate with reference to the work of Peters (1998) what constitutes
reasonable political decisions.
Peters (1998: 223) argues that a person engaging in an "activity of
justification", in this instance reasonable political decision making, articulates
with increasing understanding and imagination, aspects of the situation in
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which he (she) is placed, and in pursuing various differentiated forms of
inquiry he (she) will be instantiating, on a wider scale, the very values of
reasonableness. These values of reasonableness include the following:
respect for facts and evidence, precision, clarity, rejection of arbitrariness,
consistency, and the general determination to get to the bottom of things. In
order to "get to the bottom of things" in a reasonable way implies a form of
action whereby an individual inquires, explores and makes complex
judgments of perplexing situations through curiosity (Peters, 1998: 225) such
as to ask the Socratic question "What is the point of it ali?". A person who is
curious is a person who wonders about the things she explores and the
relevance of her concern. In other words, to be involved in political decision
making in a non-instrumental way is not always to do things for the sake of
extrinsic ends, but to enjoy and perform in a way related to "the point of the
activity" and to have "a sense of its connection with other things in life".
According to Peters (1998) this non-instrumental pursuit of imaginative inquiry
not only requires that a person stretches her intellectual powers through
rational assessment, but also enjoys the experience of wonder. Hence, the
non-instrumental justification of political decision making is grounded in both
reasonableness (thinking through) and imagination (moving beyond). This
brings me to a discussion of reasonableness as a form of self-examination
with its links to virtues such as truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of thought or
liberty, clarity of meaning, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance,
consistency, and respect for evidence and people. Reasonableness, as
explained by Peters (1998: 226), is a capacity to ask why, to develop grounds
for one's thoughts, and to give reasons which count for or against points of
view in a logical and systematic manner. Reasonableness also aims to
establish relevant connections between different ways of understanding,
inseparable from virtues such as, truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of
thought or liberty, clarity of meaning, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of
relevance, consistency and, respect for evidence and people.
First, reasonableness implies that political decision making has to be
practised in a sincere and truthful way. Sincerity and truthfulness are based
on an understanding that one has to be honest and willing in one's actions -
more specifically in political decision making. People engage in political
decision making, which makes the latter a form of public as opposed to a
private discourse, where the public aura of political decision making involves
decisions, which are "responsive and accountable to the citizenry at large"
(Sartori, 1987a: 233).
Second, achieving reasonableness is based on an understanding that
decision makers ought to have choices to exercise control over their lives; that
is, they practise a particular kind of liberty (freedom) accepted and supported
by all those involved in the decision making process (Jarvis, 1998: 95). But
what kind of liberty seems to be the most desirable to make sense of political
decision making vis-a-vis a shared compromise? Berlin's (1969: 131) view of
positive liberty seems to be the most appropriate kind of liberty, one that can
ensure the validity of reasonableness.
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I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's (women's)
Central to positive liberty is the notion that human beings are reasonable, that
is, self-directing and self-determining beings, who possess an awareness of
and an ability to deal with their political situation. Reasonableness is,
according to positive liberty, a way of attaining liberation. When the individual
rationally analyses, understands and then takes appropriate action, such an
individual has acquired self-mastery and is liberated. Berlin (1969: 131)
explains it as follows:
acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not causes which
affect me, as it were from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody;
a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed .... This is at
least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that my
reason distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world.
But taking appropriate action based on reasonableness does not mean that
one can do only what one wants to do, because this could seriously curb the
freedom of others. Here positive liberty undermines the notion of individual.
freedom, unhampered by the interference of other human beings, that is,
negative liberty. Whereas negative liberty limits the control of others to infringe
on the individual person's freedom, positive liberty is concerned with "what" or
"who" should interfere with the individual's activities. Positive liberty is
concerned with the individual's "higher self' as the source of control, that is, it
aims to increase the individual's willing enactment of one's own decisions and
177
178
actions in life, otherwise a person is not free. Hence political decision making
appeals to the notion of positive liberty identified with the idea that human
beings are by nature rationally self-controlling and self-directing. Berlin
(1969:136) emphasises this as follows:
The essence of men (women) is that they are autonomous beings -
authors of values, of ends in themselves, the ultimate authority of which
consists precisely in the fact that they are willed freely - then nothing is
worse than to treat them as if they were not autonomous, but natural
objects ....
Third, the idea of political decision making as a process concerned directly
with the pursuit of reasonableness, following Taylor (1985: 139), implies that
one has to communicate clear meanings to others. In other words,
reasonableness ensures that our political interpretations and knowledge are
articulated to others who may be interested in our perceptions and
perspectives in a clear, logically consistent and unambiguous manner (Taylor,
1985: 139). Consequently, the transforming of our experiences into
reasonableness heightens the importance of our interpretations and
constructed meanings as we seek to improve our political situations and
contexts. Hassard (in Hassard & Parker, 1993: 5) argues that when we
engage reasonably in political decision making, we involve ourselves in
dynamic meaning making within which we are agents of change who suggest
possibilities for new things.
Fourth, through reasonableness human beings individually and collectively
articulate political decisions which reject arbitrariness. When one engages in
political decision making, one does not do so as a solitary individual but as a
bearer of a particular political identity through shared experiences which
cause one to reasonably reject arbitrariness such as bias, one-sidedness,
prejudice and dogmatism. In this way, engaging reasonably in political
decision making offers space for participants to "develop their voices and
articulate their needs if they have their own spaces rather than if they are
absorbed in a consensual overarching public sphere" (Hernandez, 1997: 57).
In a different way, through reasonableness people in deliberation attempt to
reach agreement by appealing to more than just the distribution of power
among parties but rather, that they take each others' interests into account
"not merely to advance their own good but in order to advance everyone's
good" (Christiano, 1990: 161).
Fifth, a discussion of reasonableness invariably invokes some reference to
being impartial, that is, being unbiased or unprejudiced. In political decision
making impartial reasonable activity usually brings into focus a discussion of
objectivity identified with what Elliot (1998: 126) calls private, public and
objectivity. Private objectivity stresses the importance of attaining certainty
and universal validity, that is, "truth". A person who is unwilling to accept that
reality is not in the minds of people but "out there" independent of the value
judgments of people, is said not to be objective and, hence, not reasonable.
Elliot (1998: 126) notes that:
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Private objectivity is predictable primarily of persons, secondarily of
judgments: a person is objective if his state of mind in making a
judgment is disinterested, i.e. if his judgment is not influenced by
irrelevant factors of a subjective mind, especially the passions and the
will.
This kind of private objectivity in relation to reasonableness seems untenable
for the reason that human beings do not exist independently of their subjective
"forms of experience".
Public objectivity, on the other hand, breaks with private objectivity in the
sense that "truth" is not universally valid and the source of "truth" lies not with
the individual, but with each particular community or society, referred to by
Elliot (1998: 126) as "collective subjectivity" - a view that I would refer to as a
form of relativism. But does this mean that we would necessarily avoid bias
and a situation where everything goes? Relativists believe that there are no
universal truths. For them, all truths would be allowed expression and full
consideration. Bernstein (1983: 11-12) sums up the position of public
relativismwith reference to human beings, by claiming that for relativists:
... there is a nonreducible plurality of such schemes, paradigms
(cognitive frameworks), and practices; there is no substantive
overarching framework in which radically different and alternative
schemes are commensurable - no universal standards that somehow
stand outside of and above these competing alternatives.
What this means, is that political decisions must be understood relative to a
specific conceptual scheme or practice. Relativists claim that there are no
universal truths; for them all "standards" are relative to the particular context.
Both these claims contain within them universal terms like "no" and "ali",
reflecting a universal truth, but also seem to claim that this very statement has
universal validity. So the relativist argument is self-refuting since relativists
state that there is no universal truth. They appeal to the same "standards"
they so wish to refute. For this reason, "collective subjectivity" seemingly does
not engender an impartial form of reasonableness.
I shall now give attention to the notion of objectivity as opposed to private and
relativist "truth" claims. For Elliot (1998: 139) if we want our political
discourses to be objective, we should consider fostering reasonableness "free
from all arbitrary constraints" through the social, inter-subjective construction
of meaning. Elliot (1998: 139-140) claims:
All the participants (in political discourse) would have the same right,
and in practice an equal chance, to begin a discussion and to keep it
going, so that no opinion or point of view would be denied expression
and full consideration. Each participant would be free to initiate a
movement from the existing level of discourse to a more fundamental
level, and to call into question the conceptual framework originally
accepted or presupposed. Each would be free also to initiate enquiry
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into the genesis of existing knowledge, and even to question the
existing concept of knowledge (and political decisions).
In a different way, developing objective meanings is a practice of social
relation or inter-subjective action whereby individuals in a society or
community do not just have a given set of ideas or goals to which they
subscribe such as might be envisaged through predetermined political
outcomes. Inter-subjective political decisions are not the property of
individuals in a society, but are "constitutive of the social matrix in which
individuals find themselves and act" (Taylor, 1985: 36). Thus, inter-subjectivity
implies that human beings in society have a common discourse shaped by the
right and equal chance to initiate and to "call into question" their shared
political practices.
Sixth, reasonableness demands that human beings pay close attention to
unique and specific aspects of every context. By implication, reasonableness
means that no single political decision will be useful in the same ways in all
situations. In this regard, Hermes (1998: 158) posits that (political) discourse's
emphasis should shift from discourse for discourse's sake to discourse "that
serves a specific purpose or need of the community within which it is
situated". In a different way, reasonableness implies that political decisions
have to be relevant and socially accountable "primarily by supporting the
economy and promoting the quality of life of its citizens" (Gibbons, 1998: 1).
Moreover, reasonableness also guides political decision-making by using
reflexive and continually changing procedures of political discourse that act as
We have a rational grasp of something when we can articulate it, that
means, distinguish and layout the different features of the matter in
perspicuous order (that is, reasonable articulations devoid of
inconsistencies).
a "situated response" (Hermes, 1998: 157). Reasonableness engenders
political decision making as a "recursive process", that is reflexive activity
specific to the culture, the problems, and the dynamics of a particular political
context. Taylor (1985: 37) links reasonableness to being attuned with society
and to socially constructed meanings. In this way, reasonableness implies that
political decision making is no longer a self-contained activity carried out in
"relative institutional isolation", but involves, what Sartori (1987a: 226)
describes as interaction between those who have "intense" political views and
other views "not equally intense".
Seventh, reasonableness is linked to clearly expressed articulations free from
inconsistency. Taylor (1985: 137) accentuates this notion of reasonableness
as follows:
My emphasis is on Taylor's notion of "perspicuous order". He uses this notion
as referring to reasonably expressed articulations devoid of inconsistencies.
And, when people engage in political decision making they articulate their
views and opinions about problems in a consistent and coherent way, their
articulations make decisions transparent and illuminating. Hence, when their
political articulations clarify practices in such a perspicuous way, they are
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... prevents the state, and all groups within it, from denying anyone an
educational (political) good on grounds irrelevant to the legitimate
social purpose of that good (in this instance political decision making).
reasonable. In a different way, reasonableness constitutes the capacity in
human beings to articulate expressions in a consistent spirit, where
consistency refers to the articulation of points of views in a non-contradictory
manner.
Eighth, the idea of making reasonable political decisions provides an
important constraint to political discourse: the necessity for discourse to
proceed in relation to impartiality, non-arbitrariness and consistency, even if a
person or group introduces a "new vocabulary" which is incommensurable
with another person's view. This shows the necessity of respect for evidence
and people to proceed, even if one person (or group) justifiably introduces a
political viewpoint incommensurable with prevailing ideas. To exclude people
from political decision making or by denying them participation is to show
disrespect for them and to "stifle rational deliberation of competing
conceptions of good lives and good societies" (Gutman, 1998: 34). Gutman
(1998: 34) argues that the idea of respect for people is an important virtue of
reasonableness for the reason that it:
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5.2.3 Political accountability and inter-subjective deliberations
Deliberative democracy also involves the capacity of people to be attuned with
"the order of things", that is, to exercise political accountability that citizens
(political decision makers) share in inter-subjective deliberations for the
reason that "the order of things" are linked to the notion of intersubjectivity (as
argued for previously). The question arises: What makes political decisions
attained through inter-subjective deliberations politically more accountable
than those gained by absolute majority rule? Under absolute majority rule,
"the majority wins all, the minority loses all, and the majority can be said to
gain, with respect to whatever is at stake, what the minority loses" (Sartori,
1987a: 230). In other words, a "winner takes all" majority does not put to
efficient use the rational power of deliberations, and if anything, counteracts
such deliberations. For example, minority political groups (numerically inferior)
might have reasonable and justifiable arguments in support of political
decisions. Yet, these arguments are overlooked since political decisions are
decided by a majority vote. Sartori (1987a: 231) correctly asserts "(a) winning
majority that always wins builds up ... an intense, frustrated minority of regular
losers, which is likely, in turn, to slow down the (political) proceedings, to
engage in obstructionist rather than cooperative tactics, and in the end to
heighten the overall decisional costs to an unbearable point". In the need
then, deliberative advantages offered by a democratic framework would be
lost.
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Inter-subjective deliberations shun absolute majority rule, seek to maximise
majority and minority participation in political decision making processes
through representation, and allow space for consent to minority claims. In
summary, Sartori (1987a: 237) posits that a process of political deliberation
instead of absolute majority rule can be credited with the following merits:
(a) Optimal decision making through "reasoned" discussion;
(b) Account for the unequal intensity of majority and minority
preferences;
(c) Allow for a drastic reduction of external oppression of minorities
by majorities at minimal increase of the decision making costs;
(d) Produce positive-sum outcomes for the collectivity at large, that
is, all participants (majorities and minorities) stand to gain from
the political decisions (on condition that options are, to some
extent, compatible); and
(e) More intensely articulated minority claims stand a good chance of
being consented too.
Hence, deliberative democracy inspires inter-subjective deliberations in which
absolute majority rule is replaced by collaborative compromising rule. It is my
contention that the working principles of compromising rule depart from non-
majoritarianism and a concern with marginalising minority freedoms
embedded in liberal thought. A compromising political decision making
approach not only seems democratically feasible but can also ensure better
political accountability. I want to echo the view of Dahl (1989: 162) who claims
that by "rejecting (absolute) majority rule, the people in democratic countries
have not necessarily violated the democratic process or the values that justify
it. For under different conditions, the democratic process may properly be
carried out under different rules for making collective decisions". And, these
rules of collective political decision making need to be entrenched in
deliberative democratic discourse which seriously opposes the marginalisation
of minority freedoms, as well as a liberal concern with non-majoritarianism.
Deliberative democracy calls for shared, reasonable and inter-subjective
deliberations, which take into account legitimate minority and majority claims,
yet, allows for the temporary use of majority rule to complement deliberation in
the event of political deadlock and unresolved conflict. In essence, liberalism
conflates majoritarianism with absolute majoritarianism and its concern with
non-majoritarianism is not realistic. Deliberative democracy does not regard
majority rule as threatening if used only as a temporary procedure to avoid
political impasses after deliberations have not achieved desired results.
5.3 EQUALISATION OF OPPORTUNITIES AND ESTABLISHING
CONDITIONS OF JUSTICE FOR ALL
In this section I shall address how deliberative democracy can enhance the
equalisation of opportunities idea propounded by liberals in South Africa
without being concerned about undermining White privilege and just the
implementation of affirmative action procedures. In the first place, I agree with
the liberal rejection of complete equality on the part of all citizens, since it
conflicts with the differential idea of justice that provides for "allowable
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differences" as discussed earlier in this chapter. Illiterate and politically
uninformed citizens cannot "completely" and equally deliberate with informed
citizens on matters of public concern. Neither can illiterate citizens equally
enjoy "all rights" such as to deliberate on political issues that affect them if
they are already excluded due to an inability to justifiably articulate their
arguments or points of view. The egalitarian principle that "everyone" should
be subjected to "full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms" is
overwhelmingly concerned with individual privilege and aspiration, which
seem to ignore that people possess different levels of understanding and
knowing. Illiterate citizens can equally enjoy their right to public deliberation if
they can be allowed to take a politically informed person as proxy who in their
absence can represent their political concerns and aspirations. In this way
better equality can be ensured for the reason that citizens do not have to
deliberate on public matters as complete "equals" with their own choices,
aspirations or points of view but rather, as citizens whose interests can be
represented and enhanced by proxy. By implication, complete equality of
individuals on the basis of "equal" political participation can actually inhibit
rather than advance collective action.
However, my potential critic might argue that the South African multi-party
democratic system already operates on the basis of representatives having
been elected to government and who serve the legitimate interests of the
majority of clnzsns." However, many of these representatives do not
necessarily perform their political roles as proxies for the reason that, in the
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first place, such electors seem to be distanced from the constituencies whose
interests they have to represent, particularly because of the system of
proportional representation. Moreover, the ANC government is undoubtedly
committed to expanding educational facilities, job creation programmes and
health care to rural areas. Yet, service delivery in these areas remains lacking
as a consequence of local government representatives being "even further
removed from the rural citizenry" (Koeibie, 1999: 266) which in turn, brings
into question any genuine participation of individuals as proxies.
This brings me to a discussion of Taylor's notion of distributive justice, which
allows for the provision of equal opportunities for "disfavoured" citizens who
have been "disadvantaged by unfair discrimination". Undoubtedly the majority
of South African citizens who have been unfairly discriminated against along
racial lines warrant equality of opportunity whether in terms of employment,
education, economic prosperity, health care, property ownership and housing.
Like liberals, I agree. However, does this necessarily mean taking away
certain individuals' resources in order to promote the welfare of others, in this
instance, removing resources from advantaged (White, Coloured and Indian
minorities) to promote the welfare of the disadvantaged black majority? I do
not think so for the reason that equal opportunities within a deliberative
democratic framework has an enabling and caring function whereby others (in
this case, the disadvantaged) should be encouraged and assisted through
legislative measures (for example, affirmative action, land restitution and
educational development) to cultivate their capacities in order to improve their
43 Parallel to this argument, I also criticise the political weakness of proportional
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situation. Only taking away resources from advantagedWhite minorities would
not necessarily enhance the welfare of the disadvantaged majorities unless
the latter are encouraged and supported to improve their capacities. It is for
this reason that the equalisation of opportunities idea does not have to be
viewed by liberals as a political process which might erode the socio-
economic strength of the advantagedWhite minorities.
In fact deliberative democracy demands that minority advantaged citizens
should at least be assured minimal security from internal legislative measures
which might cause them to relinquish their resources, for instance, land and
other economic assets. The Constitution clearly speaks of legislative
measures, which need to be designed to protect or advance persons, or
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Yet, I share the
liberal concern that if employment opportunities along affirmative action
procedures continually favour majorities who have previously been
discriminated against, White minorities who might legitimately qualify for
employment opportunities might feel that they are discriminated aqalnst." My
argument is not in favour of retaining minority privilege (particularly those
people who have been advantaged in the past) as my potential critic might
purport, but rather, that all people (whether minorities or majorities) should be
assured of at least minimal security from, in this instance, unfair
discrimination. Unless people are assured of minimal security vis-a-vis their
status as minorities and majorities, it would be difficult to conceive that the
state would not "unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone ...
representation and the concomitant absence of a constituency-based electoral system.
(on the grounds of) race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture, language and birth" (The Constitution, 1996: 5).
In this regard, I find Walzer's (1983: 14-19) distinction between simple and
complex equality extremely useful, particularly in relation to the idea of
providing minimal security to minorities. On the one hand, simple equality
involves everyone having the same resources, that is, investments, property,
education, and so on. In South Africa simple equality is unattainable for the
reason that some citizens whether minorities or majorities would always have
more resources than others - a society of equals is "not a lively possibility"
(Walzer, 1983: 20). Even if resources were to be equalised "talented men and
women will enlarge the resources available to everyone else ... (again giving
rise to) attendant inequalities" (Walzer, 1983: 14). In other words, it is
impossible to imagine a society in which "everything is up for sale and every
citizen has as much money as every other" (Walzer, 1983: 14). On the other
hand, complex equality means "that no citizen's standing in one sphere or with
regard to one social good can be undercut by his (her) standing in some other
sphere, with regard to some other good" (Walzer, 1983: 19). Thus,
disadvantaged majorities may have fewer resources than advantaged
minorities, which make them unequal in the sphere of social life. However,
majorities and minorities will not be unequal as long as the less dominant
resources of majorities do not constrain their efforts to better opportunities in
any other sphere whether education, health care, employment, and so on. In
44 Of course, in countries such as the US affirmative action has been instituted to favour
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this way, complex equality seems to be an enabling good attuned to the
notion of deliberative democracy, which can avoid the practice of unfair
discrimination in relation to majorities and minorities.
Of course the argument can be used that disadvantaged majorities are in any
case inhibited by economic constraints to enjoy better opportunities in
comparison with advantaged minorities. But then, as has already been
pointed out earlier, legislative measures have to be taken (without
discriminating unfairly against minorities) which can hopefully ensure a more
equitable distribution of resources in order to assist the disadvantaged
majority. This argument seems to be in line with Rawls' (1993: 291) second
condition of justice, according to which inequalities between advantaged
minorities and disadvantaged majorities are justified only if they could bring
the greatest possible benefit to those most disadvantaged and simultaneously
prevent unfair discrimination against advantaged minorities. This brings me to
a discussion as to why affirmative action efforts are not entirely sufficient to
redress the socia-economic imbalances in South Africa. Instead, I shall argue
that deliberative democracy with its emphasis on building capacity through co-
operation can ensure benefit to all South African citizens (majorities and
minorities). In addition to the qualified use of affirmative action measures,
more efforts should be made to find ways in which all South Africans would be
better off, in particularly those who need it most. For instance, since the
poorest of the poor are predominantly found in rural areas (mostly women and
youth) a sustained effort to help the rural poor to help themselves could
minorities and not the majority.
contribute towards solving problems of marginalisation and inequality. Ingham
(in Jafta, 1998: 332) posits that such an attempt could conceivably include
measures to "increase the quantity and productivity of assets owned by the
poor; increase the prices of services yielded by assets sold by the poor
(including their labour time), and increase the volume of market sales by the
poor". The biggest obstacle to the efficient implementation of rural
development programmes seems to have been a lack of capacity in delivery
systems, that is, poor infrastructure coupled with provision of services which
hamper rural productivity, access to markets and limited access to financing
facilities, agricultural support services and skills capacity development. One
way to address this problem may be to cultivate better co-operation amongst
all levels of government, as well as the intended beneficiaries of such
programmes which, as deliberative democracy suggests, will expand
participation and delivery and hopefully spawn capacity development and
opportunities for investment amongst the rural poor (Jafta, 1998: 332). Better
co-operation invariably involves the promotion of local democracy through
worker participation, and the empowerment of the marginalised rural poor.
Cultivating the culture of participation, for instance amongst the rural poor, is
at the heart of the stated objectives of deliberative democracy.
In summary, deliberative democracy engenders a notion of justice, more
specifically distributive justice, which does not encourage one group of people
or individuals to dominate unfairly over another group of people or other
individuals, in this instance, advantaged minorities over disadvantaged
majorities and vice versa. Deliberative democracy challenges and undermines
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notions of justice and equality which undermine minority and majority
freedoms and rights for the reason that it would be difficult to provide minimal
security and to protect the legitimate rights of all citizens (minorities and
majorities). As has been argued for, deliberative democracy challenges the
liberal assumption that the equalisation of opportunities idea safeguards White
privilege and that equalisation can only be achieved through affirmative action
efforts. Rather, equalising opportunities for the disadvantaged in particular
aims to improve the conditions of both minority advantaged and majority
disadvantaged since a South African society where the minority enjoys a
privileged position at the expense of the majority disadvantaged cannot
ensure political, social and economic stability for all citizens.
5.4 PROCEDURAL RIGHTS PLUS SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS EQUAL
SOCIO-ECONOMIC JUSTICE
To begin with, a person is said to have a right, to be a rights holder, "when he
(she) has a claim, the recognition of which is called for - not (necessary) by
legal rules - but by moral principles, or principles of an enlightened
conscience" (Feinberg, 1972: 67). Feinberg clearly distinguishes legal or
procedural rights from those rights which embed moral aspects, that is to say,
substantive rights. And, a person is said to possess rights, to be a rights
holder when he (she) has a legitimate claim to both procedural and
substantive rights. Unlike the liberal tradition which predominantly focuses on
the procedural rights of people, deliberative democracy makes an argument
for procedural rights plus substantive rights. In this section, I shall use an
understanding of procedural plus substantive rights whereby individuals
conceive of themselves as autonomous holders of rights which does not
preclude them from the opportunity to be genuinely committed to a sense of
community. This explanation of procedural rights plus substantive rights finds
support in the ideas of Tomasi (1991: 536) who painstakingly argues that
rights are not always expressive of alienation and that liberalism needs to be
committed to the claim that individuals should always bear their rights
(procedural plus substantive) resolutely before them, that is, "for (the)
profound expression of community". I shall argue (later on) that the liberal idea
of procuring only procedural rights for the less advantaged would not
necessarily ensure that socio-economic justice would be achieved in South
Africa. In my view, procedural rights only would further entrench White
privilege which in turn, can lead to a kind of self-attentiveness amongst the
more advantaged citizens completely oblivious of their communal
responsibilities towards the less advantaged.
Liberals would argue that the Bill of Rights (chapter 2) of the Constitution
advocate the procurement of citizens' procedural rights with reference to
sections 7 (Rights), 9 (Equality), 10 (Human dignity), 11 (Life), 14 (Privacy,
which include: the right not to have their person or home searched, their
property searched, their possessions seized, or the privacy of their
communications infringed), 19 (Political rights), 23 (Labour relations, which
include: the right of every worker to fair labour practices, to form and join a
trade union, to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, to
strike, to form and join an employers' organisation, and to participate in the
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activities and programmes of an employers' organisation), 24 (Environment,
which include: the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or
well-being, and to have the environment protected for the benefit of present
and future generations through reasonable legislative and other measures),
25 (Property, which include: the right not to be deprived of property except in
terms of law, and the right to restitution of property or to equitable redress if a
person or community has been dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws and practices), 26 (Housing,
which include: the right to have access to adequate housing and the state
must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available
resources to achieve the progressive realisation of this right), 27 (Health care,
food, water and social security, which include: the right to have access to
sufficient food and water, and social security, including, if they are unable to
support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance), 28
(Children), 29 (Education), 36 (Limitation of rights) and 38 (Enforcement of
rights). However, whether these rights would in-fact be substantive depends to
a large extent on the socio-economic development of every human being
(Freeden, 1990: 492). In other words, the procurement of substantive rights
for people regards human development and social protection as
complementary to their procedural rights vis-a-vis constitutional matters.
My question is: How is the notion of procedural rights without substantive
rights supposed to operate within the context of South Africa's liberal
democracy? Take, for example, section 29 that "Everyone has the right to a
basic ... and further education". My emphasis is not on the procedural right to
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further education as a right to tertiary education but, rather, the "furthering" of
the individual's education in relation to the production of knowledge or ideas
through intellectual pursuit, that is, his (her) substantive rights. An individual
who has been endowed with the creative and imaginative talent of
inventiveness not only has the procedural right to develop such a capacity
through her own exertions and efforts, but also a substantive right through
self-attention in order to attain an appropriate intellectual, economic, social
and (perhaps) political status. For, after all, the individual has a substantive
right to develop her natural abilities and talents. Thus, arguments against the
substantive exercise of intellectual activity on the part of a self-assertive,
autonomous individual possessed of the capacity for inventiveness seem
absurd. However, if the individual in a self-determining way insists on her
substantive rights to invent or do harmful and degrading things, such as
making a device in order to inflict harm on people, the possibility of slipping
down the slope of selfishness when one is totally obsessed with the notion of
substantive rights to make bad choices, becomes quite real. In this way, an
individual might not show sensitivity to the well-being and interests of others.
In any case, as Gyekye (1997: 69) correctly argues, "one's right not to be
harmed imposes a responsibility on others not to harm one". And, for the
reason that "responsibility" involves "a caring attitude or conduct that one feels
one ought to adopt with respect to the well-being of another person or others
persons ... (which) include the responsibility to help others in distress, the
responsibility and concern for the needs and welfare of others, the
responsibility not to harm others" (Gyekye, 1997: 66), the pursuit of
substantive rights has to be attained on the recognition of others' rights.
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Hence,what a deliberative democratic ethic would enjoin, is a dual imperative,
that is, possessing both procedural and substantive rights that will reflect the
development of the individual's personal well-being and capacities through
self-attention, together with the necessary requirement that the individual be in
a position to fulfill her responsibilities to others. In this regard, Gyekye (1997:
69) aptly posits:
Yet, in paying due regard to responsibilities people feel they owe to the
community and its members, the moderate communitarian political and
moral theory does not imply, by any means, that (substantive) rights
are not important; nor does it deny responsibilities to the self ... As an
autonomous, self-assertive being, the individual should, within limits,
care for her own well-being or needs just as she cares for the needs of
others. Altruistic concerns cannot obliterate responsibilities to self. This
is because the concern for the interests and needs of others cannot
imply dissolution of the self ... (since) the individual has a life to live
and so must have plans for her life and must see to the realisation of
those plans ....
I want to come back to the claim made earlier that the liberal idea of procuring
only procedural rights would not necessarily ensure that socio-economic
justice be achieved in South Africa. I shall argue that procuring only
procedural rights for the less advantaged would further entrench White
privilege which in turn, can lead to a kind of self-attentiveness amongst the
more advantaged citizens completely oblivious of their communal
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responsibilities towards the less advantaged. If the majority less advantaged
citizens in South Africa could only possess procedural rights, say, in relation
to housing, social services and rudimentary amenities, then such rights can be
defended according to the rule of law. But this does not necessarily mean that
such a majority would actually possess or be granted substantive rights. And,
if the majority less advantaged does not possess substantive rights which can
lead to the upgrade of the quality of life in impoverished areas as a
consequence of high government or private sector investment, political
progress towards procuring their legitimate basic rights would be significantly
impeded. In such a context the political rights of majority of the country's
underprivileged might be difficult to protect even with "a justiciable Bill of
Rights" (Lemmer, 1987: 395).
Given the extraordinary service backlog South Africa faces, procuring
procedural rights for the majority disadvantaged would not translate political
rights into social rights, thus undermining substantive rights. While the present
ANC government has achieved some fairly impressive delivery targets, the
quality, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability are increasingly in doubt. For
instance, in the case of housing, delivery has been of poor quality, plagued by
inflated costs, rampant corruption (often involving high-placed government
officials), and poorly integrated with other developmental objectives such as
spatial desegregation (Heller, 2001; 147). The point I am making is that
possessing mere procedural rights to services without substantive rights
would do little to redress the severe socio-economic inequalities that
characterise South African society. Another aspect which brings into question
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the act of service delivery, in this instance, housing delivery, involves the poor
quality of its process. The fact that delivery must take precedence over
process has been rationalised on the basis that the majority disadvantaged
has a procedural right to social services. Yet, the fact that the quality and
sustainability of these services are increasingly in doubt, suggests that the
majority disadvantaged does not actually enjoy substantive rights to quality
services. In addition, the lack of substantive rights on the part of a
disadvantaged majority also brings into question the absence of effective
community participation in the process of delivery in order to secure
sustainable services. Heller (2001: 147) refers to the case of water delivery
whereby two-thirds of the projects put in place since 1994, had fallen into
disuse in the absence of effective community participation. Deliberative
democracy with its emphasis on procuring procedural plus substantive rights
not only offers a framework to redress the staggering seclo-economic
inequities of apartheid, but also a neo-liberal agenda to mobilise participation
and to engage citizens and government in sustained consultation, that is,
much more deliberation.
5.5SUMMARY
In summary, with regard to closing the gaps within the liberal tradition in South
Africa, my argument was as follows:
Firstly, I have argued that a deliberative democratic framework can frame an
understanding of majority rule, whereby political decision making needs to be
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predominantly a corollary of deliberation and engagement with majoritarianism
being used as a temporary compromising mechanism to avoid any kind of
political stalemate. Political decision making cannot exclusively be the result
of a superior numerical advantage through an unqualified "winner-takes-all"
majority vote which continuously marginalises and excludes minority points of
view. Majority rule as opposed to absolute majoritarianism does not have to
be considered as a threat to South African politics as liberals would like us to
believe for the reason that it provides a temporary procedure to counteract
political deadlocks with the distinct aim that political decision makers revise,
rethink and reconstruct better and more defensible arguments in a dynamic,
reflexive and recursive way. The point is, majority rule does not mark the end
of deliberation, but merely a temporary compromising "break" for political
decision makers (minority and majority groups) to come up with more credible
political justifications. Secondly, deliberative democracy challenges the liberal
idea that equalisation of opportunities along the lines of affirmative action
measures are necessary to safeguard White privilege. On the one hand,
equalising opportunities aims to address the welfare of all citizens, whereby
the worst off has to benefit the most. On the other hand, affirmative action
along race and gender attributes only as opposed to other constructive ways
to improve the living conditions of the majority disadvantaged can have
several negative side-effects which can lead to racial polarization in an
already divided South African society. Finally, deliberative democracy
reconstructs the liberal idea of procuring procedural rights only to that of
procedural rights plus substantive rights which in turn, can better redress the
socio-economic injustices of South Africa's inherited past.
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Of course, deliberative democracy also has its critics. Benhabib (1996: 7)
claims that defenders of the "agonistic model" of democratic politics such as
Mouffe and Barber object to how all deliberative democrats place the rules
that structure deliberation beyond "contestation". I agree with her response
when she claims that while fundamental principles of deliberative democracy
must be at least partially contestable, "participants must recognise one
another's entitlement to moral respect and reciprocity in some sense ... (of
which) the determination of the precise content and extent of these principles
(without being oblivious about conflict and the politics of difference) would be
a consequence of the discourses themselves" (Benhabib, 1996: 79) (I shall
address some critiques of deliberative democracy in detail in chapter 5).
In the final chapter, I shall provide a philosophical critique of deliberative
democracy with the intention to show that the concept is not without
contradictions and ambivalence. Despite these limitations, deliberative
democracy does enhance the liberal position on community and democracy to
one that is more feasible to South Africa's quest to deepen the spirit of
democracy particularly in relation to achieving a high degree of citizenship.
CHAPTER 6
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP
6.1 INTRODUCTION
My arguments in defence of deliberative democracy as an attempt to bridge
the gaps within South African liberalism are located within the following
constitutive goods: inclusiveness, in the sense that citizens of the community
engage equally in political decision making; rationality, in the sense that
decisions are achieved through the discourse of deliberation and consensual
compromise; and legitimacy, in the sense that every citizen has some
understanding as to why certain decisions have been taken even if he or she
was not entirely convinced by the arguments offered. Although deliberative
democracy seems to be best suited to reconstruct liberalism in South Africa,
the concept does not escape powerful criticism. In this chapter I shall explore
some of the weaknesses associated with deliberative democracy before
moving on to a discussion of how deliberative democracy can cultivate
citizenship in South African society. My contention is that citizenship is a
unifying force which can hold a diverse South African society together along
the lines of communitarianism, that is, "reasoning together with others" in
order to secure the legitimate interests of most people in political decision-
making.
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6.2 CRITICISMS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Critics of deliberative democracy justifiably ask the following question: Is it
possible for large and complex societies to be governed by deliberative
associations? Now if one considers that deliberative democracy requires
ample time for reflection, listening and discussion it would seem as if
participants who engage in deliberation would require unconstrained time and
opportunity to achieve political outcomes. This is so for the reason that one
cannot assume that public deliberations would always result in unanimous
decisions. The point is, deliberative democracy with its emphasis on
consensus and the force of the better argument is time consuming; that a high
degree of consensus or unanimity on public issues could only be attained at
the cost of silencing dissent and curtailing minority viewpoints (Benhabib,
1996: 77); and that a high level of education and economic welfare is
presupposed if such a system can be viable (The latter criterion will be
discussed later on with reference to minimum and realisable social conditions
which need to be put in place in order for a deliberative democracy to be
exercised).
My response to this is that though a deliberative democracy cannot be easily
instantiated, it can nevertheless be approximated sufficiently closely to
provide a framework for democratic participation that can address the looming
dangers of absolute majoritarianism discussed throughout this dissertation.
Deliberative democracy, following Habermas, must employ a majority decision
procedure aimed at achieving a consensual compromise among participants
engaged in deliberative politics. In other words, deliberative democracy does
not in any way demand that discussion and deliberation should continue
unrelentingly without reaching some sort of consensus, albeit a temporary
one. One of the primary aims of deliberative democracy is to achieve
consensus amongst most, if not all, contending parties. In the event that
consensus is not attained on a particular political issue, parties can agree to
reach a temporary decision to avoid political deadlock, subject to the condition
that the decision has to be reviewed and even rescinded (if necessary) in the
light of more and better arguments. The point is that deliberative democracy
strives to attain more informed and better political decisions than any of the
systems or procedures associated with the democratic ideal. In fact, not using
deliberative democracy in political decision making can make oppositional
politics even more cumbersome than the alleged time-consuming spirit of
deliberation, since if oppositional and minority groups already know that they
are going to be outvoted in decision making then they might prolong matters
through unnecessary and sometimes unjustifiable delaying tactics. Therefore,
the argument that deliberative democracy is perhaps too time-consuming may
not necessarily have to hold water.
Moreover, the criticism that a high degree of consensus could only be attained
at the cost of silencing dissent and curtailing minority viewpoints does not
seem to be fair. The mere fact that deliberative democracy appeals to the
notion of consensus does not mean that dissenting views might be
undermined. Consensus, certainly in a deliberative sense, means that a
shared compromise has been reached amongst most, if not all, contending
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political groups about the most appropriate decision for political action. Of
course, dissenting voices will always challenge this kind of consensus
attained, but then, dissenters can once again prepare better arguments after
all parties have reflexively analysed (after an agreed upon time) the political
decision on which consensus was attained. In this way, the claim that
dissenting voices will be marginalised through deliberative consensus does
not seem valid at all. Similarly, the criticism waged against deliberative
democracy involving the decision of majority vote which undermines the
rationality and legitimacy claims of the discourse does not have to hold sway
(Miller, 2000: 143).
Of course, if the decision reached depends on an arbitrary procedure of
majority voting then the argument can be used that the emphasis on the
weight of the "better argument" is superfluous since political outcomes are
ultimately numerical procedures. But then such critics of deliberative
democracy seem to ignore what Benhabib (1996: 72) refers to as the reflexive
condition of deliberative discourse. This condition of reflexivity requires that a
temporary agreed-upon decision reached on the basis of majority voting,
should later on be subjected to further scrutiny, questioning re-examination. It
is more time-consuming to implement a political decision which had not been
subjected to sufficient scrutiny, for the reason that contending political groups
might time-consumingly (and legitimately I might add) challenge the decision
at a different political level. I refer specifically to the majority ANC party
decision to have had the Constitution amended in such a way that it
encourages "floor-crossing", that is, political party members can autonomously
decide (without consulting with their constituencies) to change their allegiance
to a different party. If prior consensus had been attained on the issue through
deliberative consensus, it would not have been so time-consuming to refer the
matter to the Constitutional Court.
Moreover, Elster (in Christiano, 1998: 167) argues that a deliberative
democracy demands "an unusually high degree of participation from citizens"
and that it would be unrealistic to assume that "all will participate equally
extensively". He contends that in certain circumstances deliberation "may go
on far too long in that the quality of decisions may deteriorate" (Elster in
Christiano, 1990: 167). In the first place, a deliberative democracy invokes the
notion of proxy which does not assume that all citizens participate "equally
extensively". The idea of proxy at least ensures democratic participation on
the part of most citizens. Also, the criticism that the quality of political
decisions may deteriorate does not make sense if the point of deliberation is
compromise since people are "bound only by the results of deliberation and by
the preconditions for that deliberation" (Cohen, 1986: 22). In essence, a
deliberative democracy does offer South Africa a politically better accountable
framework which can at least reconstruct some of the gaps left by the
country's liberal tradition.
By far the most powerful critique against deliberative democracy is the
argument that the discourse is biased against historically disadvantaged
groups, for example, South Africa's majority poor and illiterate citizens.
Understandably, a discourse which demands rational articulation and
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justification of arguments does favour citizens who posses the skills of
eloquence, persuasive speech and rational reflection. In this way, deliberative
democracy would seem to privilege those citizens who possess "speech that
is assertive and confrontational" (Miller, 2000: 146). Thus, it could be argued
that deliberative democracy does not protect citizens' basic rights and
freedoms, in particular those who have been disadvantaged in terms of
education. Benhabib (1996: 78) posits that deliberative democracy requires
that each individual possesses the same symmetrical rights to various speech
acts, to initiate new topics and to ask for reflection about the presuppositions
of the conversations. However, citizens who do not posses such deliberative
skills might justifiably claim that deliberative democracy is elitist and
exclusionary. But then, as I have argued for in chapter 4, deliberative
democracy also emphasises that a person fulfills the role of "proxy" as
opposed to all citizens engaging in public deliberation as complete equals.
The point I making is that although it does seem as if norms of deliberation
are loaded against the educationally disadvantaged who might not always
provide coherent arguments in defence of political points of view, they have
the prerogative to appoint someone as "proxy" who possesses deliberative
skills to persuade people of the merits of their proposed political alternatives.
Hence, the argument that historically disadvantaged group are in fact
excluded from deliberative politics does not hold water.
However, my potential critic might justifiably claim that my argument for
deliberative democracy seems unconvincing since it neglects the social
conditions required for effective fulfillment of constitutive practices of
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deliberative democracy which include, reasoned (rational) and collective
discussions through debate, reflexive questioning and interrogation. In other
words, my potential critic's concern might not be to question the capacity of
reasoned discussions and reflexive argumentation to further reconstruct a
credible notion of community and democracy in South Africa, but rather
whether deliberative democracy can occur without the establishment of
realisable social conditions that could develop and sustain it. Taylor's (1985:
190-191) "social thesis" tells us that the capacity to exercise and sustain a
conception of the good (in this instance, deliberative democracy) can only
happen within the context of realisable social conditions in which people can
share their experiences, make autonomous (I would argue deliberative and
meaningful) choices and organise their public spaces. Like Taylor, Rawls
(1971: 563) and Dworkin (1985: 230) also recognise that individual autonomy
cannot exist outside social condltlons'" that provide public spaces for
deliberation and which support the capacity of people to achieve meaningful
choices. The lack of minimum and realisable social conditions often seem to
limit the potential for deliberation (Bohman, 1996: 109). I shall now focus my
discussion on the challenge to establish minimum and realisable social
conditions in order for deliberative democracy to be exercised and perhaps
sustained in South Africa.
My contention is that the nurturing of deliberative democracy in South Africa
would be difficult if it does not address questions about minimum and
realisable social conditions - whether it involves increasing at least the level
45 They particularly recognise and discuss the role of the family, schools, and the larger
of education of the population, economic empowerment of citizens, time
availability to engage in deliberative activities and the interest of politicians to
foster such practices among their constituencies. For purposes of this
dissertation I shall consider three conditions for the exercise of deliberative
democracy: one about the need to improve organised public spaces or shared
forums that provide people with opportunities for collective inquiry; a second
about the need to establish social unity among people with different and
competing ways of life; a third about the need to secure basic social rights.
First, organised public spaces (or institutions) according to Crowley (1987:
282) refer to those spatial locations below the level of the state in which
people share experiences and language where they" ... can discover and test
their values through the essentially political (and non-politicised) activities of
discussion, criticism, example, and emulation ... (where they) test ideas
against one another ... (and) come to understand a part of who they are".
Some examples of spatial locations below the level of the state are to be
found within and between groups and associations below the level of the state
which include, friends, family, religious institutions, cultural associations,
professional groups, trade unions, universities and the mass media. Before
invoking deliberative democracy, one first needs to encourage people
operating in spatial locations below the level of the state to create
opportunities for themselves and others "to give voice to what they have
discovered about themselves and the world and to persuade others of its
cultural environment in cultivating individual autonomy.
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worth" (Crowley, 1987: 295). Bohman (1996: 108) aptly makes the following
claim:
In order to be minimally effective in deliberation, a deliberator must be
able to initiate public dialogue about an issue or theme, in which his or
her reasons may receive deliberative uptake ... (P)ublic actors must
have the ability to avoid being excluded from public life and to avoid
having their concerns consistently ignored.
By implication, one first needs to improve the forums (institutions) of civil
society under conditions in which freedom of speech and association can
ensure that individuals make their autonomous choices, collectively share and
evaluate their experiences which deliberative democracy (as I shall argue for
in chapter 3) value so highly. In short, people in organised public spaces first
need to encourage collective activity and shared inquiry, referred to by Rawls
(1971: 543) as "free social union with others", before deliberative democracy
can be exercised. Deliberative democracy cannot be taken for granted to
naturally arise and sustain itself in both state and non-state forums. Instead,
its occurrence in society requires secured and organised public spaces in
which people come to understand and pursue collective inquiry and
autonomous individual choices.
Second, if different groups of people such as to be found in South Africa do
not want to stay together in a single state, then no amount of agreement on
deliberative democracy will keep a state together. This suggests that the
212
nurturing of deliberative democracy requires a sense of social unity among
different and competing individuals and groups that goes deeper than the
sharing of the principles which govern their society. People or citizens must
feel that they belong to the same South African society. In this regard,
Kymlicka (2002: 257) aptly posits the following:
They (citizens) must have a desire to continue to live together and
govern together, and to share the same fate, rather than seeking to
form their own separate country, or seeking to be annexed to some
foreign state. Social unity, in short, requires that citizens identify with
each other, and view their fellow citizens as one of 'us'.
Such a notion of shared belonging can help sustain the relationship of trust
and solidarity needed for citizens to accept the results of democratic decisions
(Miller in Kymlicka, 2002: 257) and, in the context of this dissertation, the rules
of deliberative democracy. The point I am making is that if citizens within a
state share a way of life, then they will want to live in a single state, want to
govern together, and also accept the legitimacy of deliberative democratic
decision making. I agree with Kymlicka (2002: 258) when he makes the point
that citizens sharing a way of life will want to make sacrifices for people who
not only have different and competing ways of life, for instance, to redistribute
resources to the less well-off, since in helping co-citizens they are
simultaneously strengthening their shared way of life, and in that sense
helping themselves. What underlies this form of social unity is that citizens
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share a national identitl6 and yet might share very little in terms of ethnicity,
religion, or conceptions of the common good. In essence a deliberative
democracy can better be nurtured if a sense of social unity is established
which can increase the likelihood that citizens fulfill their obligations towards
cultivating deliberative democracy.
Third, it would be difficult to exercise a politics of deliberative democracy if the
state does not secure basic social rights to citizens which include the right to
move freely, to earn a living, and to receive social benefits, health care and
education. In other words, providing basic social rights47 to citizens would help
secure loyalty to a politics of deliberative democracy. For example, state
intervention (certainly in South Africa) through legislation has to be aimed at
minimising high levels of unemployment in the country. In this way socio-
economic injustices rooted in the economic structure of society can be
reduced which in turn, could secure large numbers of jobless citizens a right
to earn a living, thus enabling them to escape from poverty. The point I am
-
making is that large disparities in people's life-chances and standards of living
brought about by the fact that some people have rewarding and fulfilling
careers while others do not have jobs at all could poison relations between
them (the poor and other members of society) which in turn, may harm
people's ability to pursue a politics of deliberative democracy. Similarly, the
right to education on the part of all citizens in South Africa should not just be
46 Kymlicka (2002: 266) would argue for a considerable 'thinning' of national identity so as to
emphasise national unity without requiring cultural assimilation into the hegemonic conception
of the good life.
47 Kymlicka (2002: 329) explains social rights as "the right to gain certain common benefits
through common public institutions operating in a common national language, so as to meet
basic needs while simultaneously creating a common national identity".
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confined to a right to education just to meet some need for rationality, literacy,
or knowledge, but also to educate all citizens in a way that will help integrate
them into the national culture. The point is, that unless basic social rights are
provided to a large part of the population which can increase their economic,
social and educational prosperity, a politics of deliberative democracy would
be difficult to exercise.
In essence, deliberative democracy can ensure that political decision-making
becomes more legitimate since most people (particularly minority or
marginalised citizens) would have a chance to have their views heard and
considered through non-coercive reasoned discussions. But then, minimum
and realisable social conditions have to be met if a politics of deliberative
democracy is going to have any real influence in the formation of public
opinion and the shaping of political decision making. In the words of Bohman
(1996: 105), "(t)he success of a deliberative form of democracy depends on
creating social conditions and institutional arrangements that foster the public
use of reason".
In summary, I have examined some critiques of deliberative democracy which
suggest that the discourse might possibly extend itself broadly enough to be
truly inclusive. However, as I have argued for in chapters 3 and 4, deliberative
democracy can contribute to eliminate the inefficiencies associated with South
African liberalism and also to establish a sense of justice - a goal to which the
aggregation of pre-political preferences is a quite incongruent means (Elster in
Benhabib, 1996: 85). Of course critics might not agree with all aspects of
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deliberative democracy, particularly the consensus-oriented version espoused
by Habermas, Rawls' democracy as public reason, and Benhabib's reflexive
discourse. However, it cannot be denied that deliberative democracy does
offer necessary spaces for discussion among free and equal citizens,
particularly spearheaded by Habermas' idea of rational consensus-oriented
discourse which challenges the mere aggregation of preferences model of
democracy. Elster (1998: 8) recognises skeptical claims against deliberative
democracy, yet, simultaneously points out the extensive overlap among
conceptions of deliberative democracy, recognising in particular the common
good that all conceptions include "decision making by means of arguments
offered by and to participants who are committed to values of rationality and
impartiality". It is such a deliberative discourse framed akin to the principle
whereby justifiable arguments are offered "by and to participants" which holds
the promise of enhancing the liberal position on community and democracy in
South Africa. This discourse of rational argumentation offered "by and to
participants" also brings into play the notion of citizenship which combines
ideas of individuality and community necessary to reconstruct liberalism in
South Africa. It is my contention that deliberative democracy can cultivate a
form of citizenship necessary to lay the foundations for a communitarianism of
the left which requires of citizens to be or become practical reasoners -
citizens who care and engage collectively in just and reasonable deliberation.
I shall now explore the notion of citizenship, particularly showing its
connection with deliberative democracy in cultivating conditions for practical
reasoning. To my mind, it is in the exploration of the conceptual and pragmatic
6.3 DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP: A
links between deliberative democracy and citizenship where the potential for
future and more nuanced research in the area of political philosophy resides. I
consider my contribution as another voice making a contribution to this debate
and simultaneously offering pathways for future research.
COMMUNITARIAN OBJECTIVE
In contemporary political philosophy the theory of citizenship seems an
obvious candidate to link ideas of individual rights with that of communal
sentiments. Kymlicka (2002: 284) poignantly states the following:
Citizenship is intimately linked to liberal ideas of individual rights and
entitlements on the one hand, and to communitarian ideas of membership
in an attachment to community on the other. Thus it provides a concept
that can mediate the debate between liberals and communitarians.
Miller (2000: 82) distinguishes between a liberal and communitarian
conception of citizenship. On the one hand, a liberal conception explains
citizenship as a set of rights and corresponding obligations people enjoy
equally as citizens of a political community. In other words, to be a citizen is to
enjoy rights to personal security, to freedom of speech, to vote, and so forth.
Correspondingly, as espoused in the work of Rawls, people are obligated to
uphold the rule of law, and generally not to interfere with other's enjoyment of
their rights. On the other hand, a communitarian conception of citizenship,
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while not denying the importance of citizen rights, places more emphasis on
the idea that citizens engage actively with others in shaping the future of
society through political deliberation. The point about these different views of
citizenship is that to be a citizen one must think and act in a certain way: one
must have a sufficient measure of "public virtue" (Miller, 2000: 82).
Moreover, interest in citizenship has been sparked by a number of political
events and trends throughout the world - increasing apathy and long-term
welfare dependency in the United States, the resurgence of nationalist
movements in Eastern Europe, the stresses created by increasingly
multicultural and multiracial populations in Western Europe, the failure of
environmental policies that rely on voluntary citizens cooperation, disaffection
with globalisation and the perceived loss of national sovereignty (Kymlicka,
2002: 284). These events indicate that the stability of modern democracies
depends not only on the justice of its institutions (for instance, in the case of
South Africa on its Constitution, Bill of Rights, Constitutional Court and multi-
party democratic system), but also on "the quality and attitude of its citizens:
e.g. their sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of
national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and
work with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate
in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold authorities
accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal
responsibility in their economic demands, and in personal choices which affect
their health and the environment. Without citizens who posses these qualities,
democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable" (Kymlicka, 2002:
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285). The point I am making is that South Africa's democracy would not
necessarily function effectively in the absence of an especially responsible
citizenry. Each person cannot just pursue her own self-interests without
regard for the common good, neither would procedural-institutional
mechanisms such as a Constitution, Bill of Rights and multi-party democratic
system of government be enough. Citizens also require what Galston (1991:
217) and Macedo (1990: 138) refer to as some level of civic virtue and public-
spiritedness - which requires a richer and more subtle understanding of
citizenship. In other words, effective policy implementation relies on
responsible citizenship. For instance, the state would be unable to provide a
basic education if citizens do not act responsibly with respect to their own
education, in terms of attending school (both teachers and students),
eradicating the vandalism of school buildings, and fostering communal
involvement in school activities. Attempts to implement policy would flounder
without the cooperation and self-restraint of citizens, that is, the exercise of
civic virtue - citizens' willingness to participate, ability to trust, their sense of
justice (Putnam in Kymlicka, 2002: 286).
Galston (1991: 221-224) posits that responsible citizenship is constituted by
four types of civic virtues: (i) general virtues: courage, law-abidingness and
loyalty; (ii) social virtues: independence and open-mindedness; (iii) economic
virtues: work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic
and technological change; and (iv) political virtues: capacity to discern and
respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for,
ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in
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public discourse. Many of these virtues are to be required by South African
citizens, particularly the ability and willingness to question political authority,
and to engage in public discourse about matters of public policy, since they
are precisely the goods necessary to enact political deliberation. It is for this
reason that Kymlicka (2002: 293) cogently claims that a deliberative model of
democracy requires that people act with a profound sense of citizenship:
"Democratic citizens must be not only active and participatory, critical of
authority, and non-dogmatic, but also committed to seek mutual
understanding through deliberation rather than exclusively seeking personal
benefit through bargaining and threats. Without citizens who display these
virtues, liberal democracy cannot fulfill its promise of justice, and may indeed
slowly succumb to undemocratic or illiberal forces".
In essence, there must be a sufficient number of citizens who posses the
virtues of democratic citizenship to a sufficient degree, particular those virtues
associated with people's commitment to public participation, respectful
dialogue, or critical attention to government, that is, "the need for people to be
active citizens who participate in public deliberation" (Kymlicka, 2002: 293).
For people to be apathetic and passive, as well as withdrawing into the private
sphere of family, career and personal projects, referred to by Habermas
(1996b: 78) as the "syndrome of civic privatism", poses a serious challenge to
the effective functioning a deliberative democracy - a situation South Africa
can ill-afford to let happen.
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The question arises: How can this "syndrome of civic privatism" be overcome
in order to live up to the demands of democratic citizenship? One way is to
persuade people to accept the activities associated with political participation
and public deliberation to be intrinsically rewarding. This Aristotelian view
holds that political participation and deliberation are superior to private life
involving the family, work, religion and leisure, which most people often find
burdensome and sacrificial (Kymlicka, 2002: 297). Most people, certainly in
South Africa, do not necessarily accept the intrinsic value of political
participation and deliberation as rewarding since they will find their greatest
joys and projects in other areas of life, including the family, work, the arts, or
religion. If this were to be the case, and one has good reason to believe it is,
the least people could do to cultivate citizenship would be to learn the social
virtue of "civility" or "decency" since it applies not only to political activity, but
primarily to our non-discriminatory actions in everyday life, on the street, in
neighbourhood shops, and in diverse institutions and forums of civil society
such as stores, corporations, churches, charities, support groups, unions and
families. Walzer (in Kymlicka, 2000: 305) posits that the civility that makes
democratic politics possible (that is, participatory and deliberative) can only be
learned in associational networks of civil society. According to Glendon (1991:
109) it is in voluntary organisations of civil society such as those mentioned
above, that human character, competence, and capacity for citizenship are
formed for it is here that people internalise the idea of personal responsibility
and mutual obligation and learn the voluntary self-restraint which is essential
to responsible citizenship. However, Okin (1992: 65) posits that these
associational networks of civil society can also teach deference to authority
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and intolerance towards other faiths, prejudice against other races, and male
dominance over women, which do not make these networks defensible
"seedbeds of civic virtue" (Glendon, 1991: 109). It seems clear that no single
institution can be relied upon as the exclusive "seedbed of civic virtue".
Therefore, I agree with Kymlicka (2002: 307) who argues that virtues of
democratic citizenship can "best" be learned in schools. In his words, "schools
must teach children how to engage in the kind of critical reasoning and moral
perspective that defines public reasonableness ... (and) promoting these sorts
of virtues is one of the fundamental justifications for mandatory education
(Kymlicka, 2002: 307). Of course, historically, schools have often been used
to promote deference, chauvinism, xenophobia, and other illiberal and
undemocratic practices, but this does not detract from the fact that schools
can be reorganised, particularly in South Africa, to be effective "seedbeds of
civic virtues". According to Gutman (1987: 30), education for democratic
citizenship should inevitably involve equipping children with the intellectual
skills necessary for civility. In this regard it is worth referring to a passage of
Kymlicka (2002: 308):
(C)ommon (public) schools teach civility not just by telling students the oral
value of civility, but also by insisting that students sit beside students of
different races and religions, and cooperate with them on school projects
or sports teams. Similarly common schools teach public reasonableness
not only by telling students that there are plurality of religious views in the
world, and that reasonable students disagree on the merits of these views.
They also create the social structures whereby students can see the
reasonableness of these disagreements. It is not enough to simply tell
students that the majority of the people in the world do not share their
religion (or culture and differences) ... To learn public reasonableness,
students must come to know and understand people who are reasonable
and decent and humane, but who do not share their religion (or culture).
The kind of learning espoused above requires the presence of a classroom
with people of varying ethno-cultural and religious backgrounds such as those
of South Africans. Certainly in this way, public schools can in a forward-
looking way cultivate the civic virtue of democratic citizenship required of
citizens to enact a deliberative democracy in South Africa as has been argued
for in this dissertation.
I essence, the point about citizenship is that people (citizens) are required to
act responsibly. Citizens should not merely get involved in public deliberation
and decision making, but they have to try to promote the common good. For
Miller (2000: 83) promoting the common good involves securing a set of equal
rights for all citizens, to encourage people to respect the rule of law, and to
take active steps to defend the rights of others, particular the least privileged.
But then, as I have argued for throughout this dissertation, deliberative
democracy seems to be an appropriate discourse to cultivate such a notion of
the common good. In short, deliberative democracy can frame a notion of
citizenship which can imbue in citizens the virtue of practising a rational,
consensus-oriented deliberative discourse in a reasonable and reflexive way.
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In this way, citizens could enhance their capacities as practical reasoners who
deeply care about building a just, equal and deliberative society.
Of course, my potential critic might correctly claim that my idea of producing a
virtuous citizen who can participate in deliberative politics is too idealistic and
that the secret of democracy does not lie in the character of the citizens, but,
rather, in the cogency and efficacy of the rules of the political system, for
instance, as contained in the Constitution. I shall now respond to such a
potential criticism.
I agree that the rules of liberal democracy are embedded in political
institutions and systems, and the efficient running of such institutions and
systems invariably influence the mode of behaviour of citizens. For instance,
an efficient justice system would undoubtedly influence the behaviour of
citizens who give their allegiance to the system since they are satisfied that
the rule of law is maintained. Thus, one finds that a citizen is satisfied with the
justice system after a rapist has been convicted and sentenced. However,
political institutions and systems do not function independently from the
commitment of people who want to safeguard their interests in public life. For
example, the Constitution guarantees all citizens the right to safety and
security. But this does not mean that all citizens would in fact be secure and
safe. If citizens are hijacked, assaulted and murdered they cannot be safe
although the Constitution announces that every citizen has a right to a
secured life. The point I am making is that the existence of efficient political
systems and institutions does not alone guarantee citizens' political and civil
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rights. In order for political systems and institutions to work efficiently, we also
require citizens who respect the principles of good life as encapsulated in
political systems and institutions. Such citizens must to some extent possess
qualities whereby persons whose interests may be in conflict with theirs, are
equally worthy of respect. Put differently, in order for a liberal democracy to
flourish one also requires a virtuous citizen, that is, one whose character is
imbibed with virtues such as to respect others as equals and to help establish
a stable peace in a community whose members might disagree about what is
good in life. In this regard I agree with Macedo (1990: 266) when he says
"liberal citizens are called upon to respect not only members of their family,
tribe, or race, but humanity in general". Hence, the idea of producing a
virtuous citizen is not after all an idealistic dream. Macedo (1990: 272) makes
the point that any form of liberal democracy, in this instance deliberative
democracy, cannot realise its goals of liberty, freedom and justice if citizens
do not possess virtues of liberal justice which include the following: broad
sympathies, self-critical reflectiveness, a willingness to experiment, to try and
to accept new things, self-control and active, autonomous self-development,
an appreciation of inherited social ideals, an attachment and even altruistic
regard for one's fellow liberal citizen. Lotter also accentuates the connection
between virtuous citizens and "just" (efficient and cogent) institutions. In his
words, "when citizens (I would add responsible as well) indeed do their part to
maintain just institutions, their fellows are motivated to do likewise as they
develop trust and ties of friendship toward one another" (Lotter, 2001: 96).
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6.4SUMMARY
This dissertation has argued that a deliberative democracy offers a conceptual
framework which can cultivate in others the care to justify their actions and to
which they are to be held accountable by and to others for those actions. This
implies that people are connected through conversational justice whereby
they can willingly justify their political articulations to one another and by
means of which they can share in inter-subjective (rational) deliberations with
their socio-political contexts.
A deliberative democracy engenders a notion of citizenship which does not
encourage one group of people or individuals to dominate unfairly another
group of people or other individuals, in this instance, advantaged minorities
over disadvantaged majorities and vice versa; a situation which would
enhance South Africa's multi-party democracy. In short, a deliberative
democracy inspires inter-subjective deliberations in which complete majority
rule is replaced by collaborative compromising rule - a political decision
making approach that seems far more tenable to ensure multi-party
democracy and better political accountability.
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